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Key messages
1. Why Negotiate?
Fair, effective and sustainable water management requires a multi-stakeholder, negotiated 
approach. The inherent complexity and diversity of interests in water is a social and political chal-
lenge for which top-down ‘command-and-control’ water management does not provide durable 
solutions. Lack of shared commitment or recognition of the legitimacy of decisions over water can 
mean people choose not to comply and water resources become overused, polluted and degraded. 
Coming to decisions which are instead fair, effective and sustainable is possible. Stakeholders with 
interests in water decisions need to work together to understand their differences and search for 
workable solutions that each can accept. 
Negotiation processes and the skills to design, facilitate and participate in multi-stakeholder 
negotiations are critical to improving water management.
Water users, water managers and policy makers involved in negotiating water decisions need to 
develop effective negotiation practice. Better negotiation can help stakeholders to arrive at work-
able solutions they would not otherwise achieve. Applications of better negotiation practice are 
numerous. Water allocation agreements, watershed management plans, national water law reforms, 
corporate water policies and transboundary water treaties all involve multiple stakeholders and can 
be strengthened through more deliberative and inclusive negotiation.
An explicit focus on the 4Rs of rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities supports effective 
water negotiations.
The 4Rs provide a framework for structuring, analyzing and understanding the interests of diverse 
stakeholders, based on defining who seeks a reward, claims a right, bears a risk or holds a respon-
sibility. Keeping a focus on the 4Rs in negotiations helps create the space needed by negotiators to 
identify the elements that must come together to accommodate diverse interests in agreements.
Water governance is strengthened by using constructive engagement.
Water governance encompasses ‘the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems 
that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and deliver water services, at different 
levels of society.’ Governance can be a constructive and creative process through engagement of dif-
ferent people in negotiation. The larger goal of water negotiation is to turn potential conflict into 
constructive engagement and ideally into voluntary, fair, lasting agreements that can be effectively 
implemented.
2. Constructive Engagement 
With constructive engagement, stakeholders gain the ability to influence and shape decisions. 
Stakeholders choosing constructive engagement recognize that it can be preferable to work with 
others to find options that are mutually acceptable. Public participation in planning and decision 
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making encourages engagement by multiple stakeholders. However, simply ‘informing’ or ‘consult-
ing’ the public is not adequate. In some circumstances the public may be empowered to make deci-
sions, but most frequently stakeholders influence and shape decisions by creating and deliberating 
options. 
Negotiation plays a central role where multiple stakeholders participate in constructive engagement. 
To offer a legitimate way forward for dealing with differences collectively, negotiations over com-
plex water decisions need to be transparent and inclusive. If negotiation can be approached in a 
considerate and constructive manner, it can encourage understanding and joint problem solving, 
greater mutual regard for diverse interests and values, and the possibility of integrating these into 
sustainable, rewarding and workable outcomes. Approaches to negotiation that are suited to con-
structive engagement are key.
Hard bargaining in competitive negotiation leads to loss of opportunities for mutual gains.
Competitive negotiation, parties often establish a particular ‘position’ at the outset that is then 
sought and defended on one side and argued against on the other. With its focus on bargaining 
over predetermined positions and dividing benefits to maximize gains or minimize losses, competi-
tive negotiation tends to result, at best, in a compromise. Opportunities for creating new solutions 
with mutual gains can be easily missed.
Cooperative negotiation strengthens constructive engagement. Rather than focusing on posi-
tions, cooperative negotiation focuses on ‘interests’. Interests relate to the reasons why a position is 
sought, the underlying values, needs, concerns or relationships. In cooperative negotiation, parties 
build trust and mutual understanding of interests. They create new options for agreement by exam-
ining the inter-dependent interests of the parties and exploring how they can find mutual gains in 
order to come to a workable, equitable agreement.
3. Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs)
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are an approach to constructive engagement and learning 
about complex water problems. Choices about water often involve contesting facts and values. In 
an MSP, deliberation is fostered among multiple, diverse stakeholders to help them undertake joint 
analysis prior to decisions. Differences are respected – or at least better understood – while pursuing 
fair and effective, workable agreements about complex issues.  
Setting up an MSP requires good design and process led by credible and competent convenors. 
The purpose and scope of an MSP must be clear, with appropriate scales and levels for deliberation 
and analysis (for example watershed versus river basin, or local district versus national). There should 
be sufficient human, financial and information resources, political support and enough time avail-
able for deliberations to be completed. Explicit recognition of politics and power should be incorpo-
rated into the MSP design and process. 
High quality process, enabling effective deliberation, is key to MSPs earning legitimacy. MSPs 
need high standards of deliberation, facilitation, inclusiveness, information exchange and communi-
cation with the participants and wider constituency. Deliberation is fundamental, aimed at produc-
ing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light 
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of discussion, new information and claims made by fellow participants. MSPs should use and share 
the best available information and build the knowledge base. Good facilitation is essential.
Practical steps for organizing an MSP must keep in mind the final goal of producing workable 
recommendations for forward action.
To get going, a steering group is established and the rationale for an MSP is explained to help build 
a constituency of support for the process. Convenors identify relevant stakeholders using stakeholder 
analysis and, as they come together, convenors and participating stakeholder representatives agree 
rules of engagement and roles and responsibilities. A sufficiently thorough assessment of contested 
issues is needed that is informed by, and of use to, all stakeholders. Deliberation tools such as sce-
nario building help participants create options for workable recommendations based on learning 
about each others’ different interests, values, priorities, assumptions and constraints. MSPs might 
also take and implement decisions, depending on the extent of their mandate. 
MSPs help deliberation to become routine, enabling complex water issues to be more rigor-
ously examined in better informed negotiations.
MSPs can lead to a variety of desirable outcomes. They can expand representation and participation 
of stakeholders in governance. They encourage learning and greater understanding of interdepen-
dencies among stakeholders and ways of resolving contested issues. By providing a pathway for 
deliberation, MSPs can lead to better decisions and water agreements that can be more successfully 
implemented.
Chapter 4. Consensus Building
Consensus building aims to meet the interests of all the parties at the negotiating table.
In consensus building, parties agree to seek unanimity but settle for overwhelming agreement. The 
politically less powerful are assured that their interests will be addressed and that they will not be 
forced to accept something they oppose. Politically powerful parties keep the equivalent of a veto as 
long as they make every effort to meet the interests of all the other parties at the table. The facilita-
tor holds the parties accountable to their consensus building commitments. 
Consensus-building negotiation creates new value for stakeholders through mutual gains.
It is a mistake in water negotiation to consider one issue at a time, as trading across issues is key to 
creating value. The agenda should guarantee all participants that issues of greatest concern to them 
will be addressed as part of a package. Negotiations on one issue should not be concluded until 
the full package of issues has been explored. Otherwise, negotiators may be unable to link issues 
together to create value through mutual gain.
Consensus building requires a commitment to take science and empirical knowledge seriously 
as well as focus on achieving political accord.
In a consensus-building process that has incorporated joint fact finding and an agenda developed by 
the group as a whole, it is much more likely that scientific and empirical knowledge will be given its 
due. A powerful majority cannot force its political preferences on a minority and overlook what the 
technical or local empirical evidence suggests.
8
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Consensus building is guided by a 6 step process, from convening to deciding, implementing 
and learning.
Successful water negotiations hinge on getting the right parties to the table in Step 1, convening. 
Step 2 is clarifying responsibilities. Once the right parties are at the table, they review roles and 
responsibilities, select the facilitator or chair and agree the agenda, work plan, budget, ground 
rules and joint fact-finding procedures. Step 3 is deliberating, that is informed by joint fact finding 
and enables invention of options and packages that respond to the concerns of all parties. Step 4 
is deciding, in which parties formulate agreements and check that their constituencies can live with 
what is being proposed. Step 5 is implementation, including creation of monitoring strategies and 
schedules for reporting. Step 6 is organizational learning, by applying monitoring results in adaptive 
management
Chapter 5. Agreements
An agreement is the direct tangible product of negotiation that captures joint decisions and 
outlines the steps for its implementation.
There are many types of water agreements: policies, laws, charters, codes of conduct, contracts or 
other agreements to manage and allocate water. Agreements can be guiding in nature, or set laws 
or specific rules. Agreements can be formal or informal, legally binding or voluntary, verbal or writ-
ten. They can apply at various scales and levels – from local to international, from wells to micro-
watershed to river basins – and between a diversity of actors. 
Agreements bring more certainty and more transparency to expected rewards, risks, rights and 
responsibilities.
Agreements must be formulated to be consistent with the existing legal and policy framework. 
Good agreements include clear steps to address future differences, inadequate implementation, or 
breaches of them. The clearer the agreement, the less its provisions will be contested. Regardless of 
type, core features of good agreements define and describe: scope, governance mechanisms includ-
ing roles and responsibilities, financing, provisions for data and information sharing, compliance 
needs, mechanisms for enforcement and dispute resolutions, and the dates of effect, duration and 
amendment procedures.
Fairer and more sustainable water allocation, use and management results from agreements 
only if they are effectively implemented.
Finalizing an agreement begins with drafting a written text, and requires verification by stakehold-
ers and endorsement through signature.  For agreements where authority rests outside the negoti-
ating table, a further enactment step may be required such as ministerial approval or parliamentary 
ratification. Implementation steps for formal agreements include putting in place the necessary 
institutional arrangements, building capacity, taking agreed actions and undertaking monitoring. 
For agreements that aim to influence decisions taken by others, influencing strategies need to be 
developed. 
Translating the agreement into action is at the heart of effecting change, and requires ongoing 
commitment.
Stakeholders must continue to work together to reflect on the fairness and effectiveness of imple-
mentation, resolve new differences and enhance cooperation.
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There are additional, less tangible results of negotiation that are essential to enhancing water 
governance in the long run.
Improved relationships, enhanced understanding and better processes for deliberation and decision 
making emerge from constructive engagement and effective multi-stakeholder negotiation. Where 
no formal agreement results, these other outcomes can nevertheless be highly influential in the way 
water resources are allocated and managed.
Multi-stakeholder water governance is a long-term process encompassing cycles of engage-
ment and negotiation.
Each negotiated agreement is significant, but new issues arise and need to be addressed and 
resolved. It is important to build on the momentum and relationships created during constructive 
engagement to positively influence decision-making processes and institutions in the long run. 
10
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Preface
Around the world people are involved in negotiations about water. This is a book for practi-
tioners committed to negotiations which lead to fair agreements about how societies sensibly use 
water.  The book provides ideas, tools and inspiration.
The book recognizes that water negotiation is often complex – socially, economically and envi-
ronmentally. Too often in East Asia, the part of world with which I am most familiar, this complexity 
is ignored or reduced to simplifications. To deal with complexity the writers suggest focused exami-
nation of Rewards and opportunities, Rights of different actors, Risks of action and inaction, and 
Responsibilities of all involved parties.
Too often, negotiation over-emphasizes bargaining and competition embedded in zero-sum 
thinking. In welcome contrast, this book has an emphasis on constructive engagement and encour-
aging space in negotiations for deliberation, hearing multiple perspectives and consensus-building. 
Institutionalizing, or normalizing, this approach would lead to more informed and respectful nego-
tiations and, hopefully, wiser and fairer choices.
Professor Surichai Wun’gaeo
Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
Chulalongkorn University
Thailand
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C h a p t e r  1
Why Negotiate? 
1.1 Negotiation as a tool for fair, effective and sustainable water  
     management
Managing water has been a source of challenge, innovation and advancement for societies 
since ancient times. This is evident in the elegantly engineered water infrastructure from millennia 
and centuries past that is still visible, and sometimes still in use at locations across the world. Most 
tangibly, water management has been an engineering problem, demanding technical solutions. 
Implementation has been achieved by institutions able to control the investments, knowledge and 
decisions needed to harness benefits from water. Allowing such a ‘technocratic’ approach to water 
management to predominate has a downside, however. It masks the true complexity of water. 
Water is needed by everyone, every day, for myriad uses that are critical to survival, health and 
prosperity. Human needs are mirrored by nature’s needs, and all must be accommodated within 
hydrological regimes of drought and flood in which there may be too little water, or otherwise too 
much. Interests in water and opinions on how it is best used, and for which benefits, are inherently 
diverse. Handling this complexity and diversity is a social and political challenge for which top-down, 
‘command-and-control’ water management does not provide durable solutions. Fair, effective and 
sustainable water management requires a different approach.
With so many different demands on how water should be used and managed, choices over water 
can affect the interests and concerns of many stakeholders. Those who feel impacted by such choices 
vary according to the issues and water uses involved and whether these are, for example, local, 
national, basin-wide, regional or global in scope. In small watersheds where farmers and households 
must find ways to share the available water, local decisions over water may especially affect groups 
such as women, herders, fishers and farmers. Where plans and investment strategies for river basin 
development are at stake, different groups may take an interest. These might include urban water 
utilities, hydropower operators, small-scale farmers, commercial irrigators, industrial processors, or 
managers of wetlands that sustain biodiversity, fisheries and clean water supplies. Poor decisions in 
either case, which might arouse anger, ignore rights or deprive users of water, can lead to disputes 
and conflict. Lack of shared commitment or recognition of the legitimacy of decisions can mean 
people choose not to comply and water resources become overused, polluted and degraded. Coming 
to decisions which are instead fair, effective and sustainable is possible, if the multiple stakeholders 
with interests in water decisions work together to understand their differences and search for work-
able solutions that each can accept. Negotiation processes and the skills to design, facilitate and 
participate in multi-stakeholder negotiations are critical to ensuring this happens (see Box 1.1).
NEGOTIATE is intended to help water users, water managers and policy makers involved in 
negotiating water decisions to identify and develop effective negotiation practice. Agreements over 
water take many different forms, and may be between governments or involve civil society, be writ-
ten or customary, but better negotiation can help stakeholders to arrive at workable solutions they 
would not otherwise achieve. Applications of better negotiation practice in water management are 
numerous. Water allocation agreements, watershed management plans, national water law reforms, 
corporate water policies and transboundary water treaties all involve multiple stakeholders and are 
subject to negotiation. NEGOTIATE aims to encourage and guide negotiation of fairer and more 
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effective and sustainable water agreements, based on putting into practice constructive engagement 
and multi-stakeholder techniques that build on analysis and understanding of rewards, rights, risks 
and responsibilities – the 4Rs of negotiation. 
   “NEGOTIATE AIMS TO ENCOURAGE AND GUIDE NEGOTIATION 
OF FAIRER AND MORE EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE
WATER AGREEMENTS”
Box 1.1 What is special about water? 
by Dipak Gyawali
Why negotiate? And what has negotiation to do with water? The answer lies in the very nature of water in 
both its physical reality and social impacts. Just as life is richly varied, so are the services that water is put to 
in the myriad niches that sustain the planet’s biodiversity. Water is known as a ‘fugitive’ resource: that means 
that – unlike land, food, trees, minerals or even people – when left alone water is constantly on the run, try-
ing to escape. 
Water’s movement is obvious in rivers; but even in the apparent stillness of a glacier or reservoir, it melts 
silently, evaporates invisibly. It flows inexorably downhill, seeping underground only to emerge back onto the 
surface as springs and oases in the unlikeliest of places, till it cycles back to the seas, evaporates and falls again 
as rain or snow. In its ubiquity, it seems to permeate everything – prompting the ancient Greek philosopher 
Thales of Miletus to declare water to be the ultimate substance behind all substances.
Yet when humans enter this cycle, with their ever-increasing demands and powers, the result is water stress. 
Stress is experienced most acutely by non-human life and between human societies with different values and 
requirements. Human economies have varied but ever-expanding needs to be satisfied by different properties 
of water, but there is not enough water to meet demand. Indeed, ever since the dawn of civilization, much 
human ingenuity has been expended in arresting the natural flow of water and diverting it elsewhere to 
quench our thirst. It has been the source of ill-will, if not outright fighting, between different efforts originating 
from varied perspectives: the Latin root of ‘rival’ traces back to ‘those who share the same stream’. Disputes 
over conflicting demands are thus inevitably part and parcel of the rights to, risks of, responsibilities towards 
and rewards from, a flowing yet fugitive resource such as water.
Water intersects subjects ranging from engineering, hydrology, chemistry and microbiology to economics, law, 
sociology, history, culture and philosophy. Privileging one field (e.g., civil engineering) while ignoring others 
(e.g., economics or ethics) in modern water management has been at the root of many contemporary conflicts 
over water. 
What has changed is that more people are demanding more say in how water is used, managed and shared. 
They demand, in a word: negotiation. Open negotiation can be a civilized approach to the voluntary settle-
ment of conflict; the alternative is domination of one party by another, capitulation, inaction, withdrawal and 
third-party intervention.
Negotiation is messy. It is time-consuming and often frustrating. Yet it remains the only process that can 
resolve the multitude of problems arising out of water disputes in a way that sustains both the rich tapestry of 
human societies and the even richer biosphere in which civilization is embedded.
1.1.1 What is negotiation?
We live in a world where there are choices to be made about water allocation and use, and differ-
ences to be resolved. These choices often make people come together to negotiate – to talk, bargain, 
trade, haggle, share perspectives and search for solutions which include workable collective decisions.
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The dictionary defines negotiate as to: 1) try to reach an agreement or compromise by discussion; 
2) obtain or bring about by negotiating; or 3) find a way over or through (an obstacle or difficult 
path). The word originates from the Latin negotiare which means ‘to do in the course of business’. 
A useful working definition holds that:
Negotiation is a process of interaction by which two or more parties, with differences to be 
reconciled or choices to be made, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they 
might do by acting individually. The main aim of negotiation is to reach a workable, acceptable 
agreement to all parties.
Negotiation is an active and dynamic process; it goes beyond participation in the evaluation of 
the ideas of another. Constructive negotiation implies being expected – and respected – to bring and 
share at least some of your ideas at a ‘negotiation table’.1
“NEGOTIATION IS AN ACTIVE AND DYNAMIC PROCESS”
1.1.2 Governance and negotiation
From discussions under ancient shade trees to modern UN General Assembly rooms, the ‘negotia-
tion table’ has formed the participatory basis for effective governance. Governance transcends the 
narrow definition of legislative, executive or judicial State officials to convey all the ways in which 
the activities of those officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) international organizations 
and business increasingly overlap. It describes ‘a complex tapestry of competing authority claims’.2 
More specifically, water governance expresses ‘the range of political, social, economic and adminis-
trative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water 
services, at different levels of society’.3
“THE ‘NEGOTIATION TABLE’ HAS FORMED THE PARTICIPATORY 
BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE”
In this light, governance can be a constructive and creative process that is often structured and 
implemented through negotiation. There is no single actor or outcome. Rather, governance includes 
engagement by different people in different modes of negotiation, and can result in a wide diversity 
of types of agreement.
From village to international levels, engagement and negotiation might involve: protesting and 
preaching, advocacy and diplomacy, deliberation and disagreement, competition and cooperation. 
Water conflict negotiation can prove a messy process. But then perhaps this is necessary in any 
attempt to deal adequately with complexity and nuance. After all, the larger goal is to turn poten-
tial conflict into constructive engagement, and then intensify this inclusive engagement into robust 
negotiations and ideally into voluntary, fair, lasting agreements.
This book aims to help water managers at all levels define and get to grips with the political and 
ecological complexity of water management, and respond to it as a new opportunity to engage in 
informed multi-perspective negotiation.
“THE LARGER GOAL IS TO TURN POTENTIAL CONFLICT INTO
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT” 
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1.2 The Four Rs
“NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAINTAIN AN EXPLICIT FOCUS ON THE 4Rs”
The path to fair, durable and effective water governance demands that all parties acting in 
‘good-faith’ negotiations must maintain an explicit focus on the 4Rs – Rewards, Risks, Rights and 
Responsibilities.
This approach supports the ‘rights and risks’ approach taken by the World Commission on Dams,4  
subsequently elaborated to ‘rights, risks and responsibilities’. NEGOTIATE adds the fourth element of 
‘rewards’ to clarify incentives in its 4Rs analysis.
The need to collectively document different facts and perspectives is itself a primary catalyst for 
bringing stakeholders together to negotiate. It helps identify all actors who have an ‘interest’ in a 
negotiation; it also transparently highlights what exactly each party’s specific interests may be. It asks 
the right questions of the right people to define: who seeks a reward, claims a right, bears a risk, or 
holds a responsibility.
Answering these questions is a dynamic ongoing process. NEGOTIATE’s 4Rs analysis may involve 
searching, interviewing, listening, mapping, photographing, recording, collating, interpreting, and 
discussing. It can be applied at early stages of engagement, help parties progress to more intensive 
negotiations, and act as a checklist for the acceptability of a draft agreement as it is being shaped. 
The 4Rs provide a framework for structuring, analyzing and understanding the interests of diverse 
stakeholders. Keeping a focus on the 4Rs in negotiations helps to create the space needed by 
negotiators to identify the elements that must come together to accommodate diverse interests in 
agreements.
Photo 1.1 Water allocation and management needs to be negotiated among water users. (Tanzania).
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“THE 4Rs PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR STRUCTURING,
ANALYZING AND UNDERSTANDING THE INTERESTS
OF DIVERSE STAKEHOLDERS”
1.2.1 Rewards
In situations where tensions over water may escalate, good negotiators always keep one thing 
at the front of their minds: rewards. These rewards range from the creation and sharing of benefits 
to the sharing and reduction of costs.
Material and measurable rewards include healthier ecosystems, new regimes, and progressive 
incentives. It is hard to dispute incentives such as a more affordable share of cleaner water, reliably 
delivered when and where people want it.
Not all rewards are so clearly visible, material or tangible. Some rewards have a dimension that 
cannot easily be measured. For many the goal of negotiation is to respect and support rights, equi-
tably share risks, and empower actors to effectively discharge their responsibilities.
4Rs rewards analysis should focus on both the material and the normative, with key questions:
•	 For	different	options,	what	are	the	possible	rewards?
•	 Who	stands	to	gain	these	rewards	or	benefits?	Who	stands	to	lose?
•	 How	might	rewards	be	shared?
•	 What	is	fair,	effective	and	sustainable?
1.2.2 Risks
Negotiating changes in water use, management and development invariably brings risk. But 
over time the nature and perception of that risk has evolved. In the past, most attention was given 
to financial risk posed to public or private investors. Today’s decisions now often include a much 
stronger emphasis on the risks all actors assume, either voluntarily or involuntarily.
Figure 1.1: 4Rs
REWARDS
What rewards?
Whose rewards?
RIGHTS
What rights?
Whose rights?
RESPONSIBILITIES
What responsibilities?
Whose responsibilities?
RISKS
What risks?
Whose risks?
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Some risks are optionally taken on in the normal course of business. A company may choose to 
invest financial capital in a hydropower dam. A government agency may choose to allocate a portion 
of its annual operating budget toward a water-supply system. A public-private business partnership 
may choose to devote years of human resources to planning, designing and implementing an irriga-
tion scheme. These stakeholders assume risks, but they are all taken voluntarily.
Involuntary risk is quite different, and may be contrasted to the cases above. Fishermen above 
that hydropower dam may be forced to lose some of their normal catch. Homes submerged by a new 
water-supply reservoir may force families to move. Habitat drained or flooded by a new irrigation 
scheme may result in declining wildlife populations. Stakeholders who lose access and water entitle-
ment as the result of a change also assume risks, but they must bear them involuntarily. 
NEGOTIATE’s 4Rs analysis should not ignore voluntary risk taking, but should focus primarily on 
involuntary risk bearing, whether it is fair, and if not, how can it be made so, guided by key ques-
tions such as:
•	 For	different	options,	what	are	the	possible	risks?
•	 Who	are	the	voluntary	risk	takers?
•	 Who	are	the	involuntary	risk	bearers?
•	 How	might	risks	be	shared,	and	especially,	how	might	involuntary	risks	be	reduced?
1.2.3 Rights
The 4Rs analysis leads directly to the question of whether those involuntary risk bearers come to 
the table with legal standing and negotiate from the position of having a human right to water or 
a water-related service. 
Many argue they do, implicit in a suite of other related ‘rights’ articulated in various texts of 
global norms and values, of relevance to water negotiations.5 The UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights maintains that because water is a limited natural resource and a public 
good fundamental for life and health: ‘The human right to water is indispensable for leading a life 
in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights. The human right to 
water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for 
personal and domestic use’.6
Other powers like the United States and transnational institutions, including the World Bank, 
dispute the explicit existence of this right. Some even call it potentially ruinous. The precise word-
ing of ‘human right’ vs ‘human need’ has engaged diplomats and protesters at global World Water 
Forums from Mexico City to Istanbul. It remains a contentious issue, debated at the highest levels of 
governance. 
Perhaps less critical than the precise letter of the law is the spirit in which the human rights of 
involuntary risk bearers are embraced. To that end, many regional texts help improve the context 
for more informed and inclusive water-related negotiations that involve potentially displaced and 
impacted people and the ecosystems upon which they depend. In Europe, the Aarhus Convention 
on environmental governance links sustainability principles, environmental rights and human rights.7 
An initiative of the Organization of American States commits members to enabling genuine partici-
pation by wider society in government decision making. Similar provisions are embedded in many 
national constitutions, transnational codes of conduct, and other informal or customary operating 
frameworks.
To be sure, complex situations require nuanced understanding to make wise decisions. The 
norms in these examples lay the foundation for defining water governance rights. Putting these 
norms into practice may seem daunting, and can indeed prove difficult, but this book outlines the 
transition processes to more equitable and egalitarian negotiations.
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NEGOTIATE will aid parties to be aware of the wide range of potentially overlapping rights that 
will be claimed, and different views on their priorities, which will influence engagement, negotiation 
and agreements. Key questions on rights include:
•	 What	are	the	rights	of	all	parties	in	the	negotiation?
•	 Are	there	overlapping	rights?
•	 What	are	the	different	views	on	prioritization	of	rights?
1.2.4 Responsibilities
 
In addition to rewards, risks and rights, negotiations over water must also consider responsibili-
ties. All stakeholders – whether citizens, transnational corporations or governments at different lev-
els – have responsibilities. For example, a right to access a certain quantity and quality of water from 
a river or aquifer entails responsibility to use it efficiently for the agreed-upon purpose. If respon-
sibilities are ignored, the expansion of one party’s desired benefits becomes another’s unwanted 
burden and cost. The links between rights and responsibilities may be formal or informal, but to have 
enduring value it must be understood and agreed to during the course of negotiations.
To explicitly define responsibility, and clarify the extent of accountability, 4Rs analysis should 
clearly identify the roles, duties, liabilities and obligations of different water actors, using key ques-
tions including:
•	 What	are	the	responsibilities	of	all	parties	in	the	engagement	or	negotiation?
•	 Who	is	accountable	to	whom?	For	what?
•	 Are	these	responsibilities	contested?
1.3 Organization of NEGOTIATE
NEGOTIATE’s chapters outline the main steps towards reaching fairer and more effective and 
sustainable water agreements. 
Chapter 1 ‘Why Negotiate?’ introduces water negotiations within the bigger governance pic-
ture. It emphasizes constructive engagement, and offers a four-part analytical tool that explicitly 
clarifies and defines Rewards, Risks, Rights and Responsibilities.
Chapter 2 ‘Constructive Engagement’ looks at the array of approaches to negotiation, ranging 
from the competitive to the cooperative, noting that the two can and do usefully coexist. It further 
discusses the social complexity of water and an analysis of some of the cultural, political and power 
issues surrounding water.
Chapter 3 ‘Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs)’ introduces and unpacks an example of a 
constructive-engagement approach that depends on deliberation. The chapter is structured around 
desirable characteristics of MSP context, process, content and outcomes. MSPs are not presented as 
a panacea, but experience from around the world suggests they can prove very helpful in informing 
and shaping negotiations.
Chapter 4 ‘Consensus Building’ explains another negotiation method, and argues that it is 
a useful way to reach fairer and more effective water agreements. This pragmatic chapter offers 
insights that can help would-be negotiators.
Chapter 5 ‘Agreements’ focuses on the intended products of water negotiations – the actual 
agreements which seek to guide fairer allocation and more sustainable use. The chapter discusses 
agreements within States (local, sub-national or national), between States (regional, international), 
and those which transcend States (transnational).
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C h a p t e r  2
Constructive Engagement
2.1 Constructive engagement for complex decision making
The complexity of water is partly due to there often being numerous stakeholders with many 
interests they wish taken into account in decisions over water. Choices made over how water is allo-
cated or managed have impacts on other people and other uses of water. These effects often cross 
scales and levels and, as a result, may be unseen or given low priority by those making decisions. 
Upstream irrigators may be unaware of the aggregate effects of their decisions over water allocation 
on downstream hydropower generation. Decisions over flood releases from dams may not account 
for risks, such as the vulnerability of those living beside and using rivers, that may be small at the 
basin scale, but overwhelming for those affected locally. Arriving at fair decisions over water is made 
complex by the need to weigh up and address a wide array of competing interests and perspectives 
on prioritizing how the 4Rs – rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities – are distributed.
Stakeholders can contribute to, endorse or contest decisions through a variety of routes. If per-
ceiving decisions or plans over water as unfair, stakeholders can choose resistance. They can protest 
or refuse to take action demanded of them. Those with more power can choose suppression, to 
enforce or overturn decisions. Both responses can sometimes escalate to include aggression and vio-
lence, with the result that water disputes can fuel or be a source of conflict, especially where there 
are wider tensions in society. Constructive engagement is an alternative path aiming to improve 
the fairness and effectiveness of complex decisions over water via peaceful, informed and inclusive 
processes.
“CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT OFFERS A WAY OF
ACCOMMODATING DIVERSE INTERESTS AND PERSPECTIVES” 
Constructive engagement does not remove the passions people bring to water disputes and deci-
sions, but it offers a way of accommodating the diverse interests and perspectives that inspire those 
passions in processes for finding agreed ways forward. Box 2.1 explores the importance of working 
with such diversity in building workable solutions to water management problems. Stakeholders 
choosing constructive engagement recognize that because of the complexity of water, outcomes are 
likely to be less desirable and problems inflated by acting in isolation. They recognize that a prefer-
able track is to work with others to find options that are mutually acceptable.
“CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT CAN TAKE MANY FORMS” 
Constructive engagement can take many forms. In relations between States, diplomacy is a form 
of constructive engagement. Using legal proceedings to resolve disputes is another, as parties use 
the judicial process to argue and debate the legality or legitimacy of, for example, protection of 
rights in water resource development schemes. Groups may engage constructively with governments 
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or corporations through advocacy or lobbying. All of these examples are means of trying to shape 
decisions that better accommodate varied interests and perspectives. 
A limitation on constructive engagement can be restriction on access. Some groups may be 
better positioned or more able to use some forms of constructive engagement. For example, legal 
recourse is often closed to stakeholders without the legal standing, financial resources or specialist 
skills needed to take part effectively in court proceedings. Even if resources and capacities are found, 
more powerful parties may retain an advantage by having more of them. Similarly, advocacy may be 
more successful for those with better access to more influential actors, marginalizing less powerful 
or less well represented groups. Such inequity in access can bias outcomes from engagement, leading 
to real or perceived unfairness. 
Box 2.1: Social solidarities – wax, wick, flame – science and art 
by Dipak Gyawali
Social solidarities – four diverse perspectives
Modern chemistry teaches us that water is simple H2O. The social sciences, however, tell us that water, as is 
the way with the social construction of reality, comes in many incarnations. While human societies are complex 
and plural, they still exhibit some common patterns of behaviour which determine how water is valued. Four 
social solidarities, with distinct views on water negotiation, can be found from village to global level:
•	 A	hierarchic	regulatory	solidarity	favouring	authorities	and	those	able	to	 influence	controls	 in	 institutions	
where rights reside, and to avoid risks.
•	 An	individualistic	market	solidarity	favouring	the	affluent	and	those	able	to	buy	rights,	take	risks	and	win	
in the market.
•	 A	civic	egalitarian	solidarity	aiming	for	more	equitable	and	equal	distribution	of	4Rs.
•	 A	fatalist	solidarity,	convinced	of	 its	 lack	of	agency,	seeing	imbalances	and	inequities	as	 insurmountable,	
and	comparatively	disadvantaged	in	all	of	the	4Rs.
The three primary and active social solidarities – leaving aside the passive fatalists – have different foundations 
that affect the way they view water – public, private, common-pool, etc. – and what fair negotiation outcomes 
should resemble. These philosophies are mutually contradictory and cannot be easily ‘integrated’. This is impor-
tant to appreciate if we are to understand what makes a negotiation successful or suspect in the eyes of the 
different protagonists. Of course, people and organizations may straddle more than one of these solidarities.
The wax, wick and flame – different types of power
Samkhya philosophy, one of the six main Hindu philosophical lineages, distinguishes between coercive (legal, 
regulatory, enforced) power exercised by the hierarchic solidarity (tamasik shakti), the persuasive (monetary or 
organizational) power exercised by the individualist solidarity (rajasik shakti) and the moral power claimed and 
wielded by the egalitarian ethics community (satwik shakti).
The hydrocracies of different countries may wield coercive power, and the business trading houses and the 
construction industry persuasive power; but many of the social and environmental movements enjoy support 
because of their moral or cognitive power. By being the voice of the excluded poor or the mute non-human 
nature, an array of social and environmental movements have touched a chord within many people, moving 
them to support courses of action that might even be at a cost to their immediate personal wellbeing.
Samkhya avoids reductionism by arguing that the harmonious exercise of power requires a balanced and 
infused deployment of all three. This early South Asian attempt at holistic thinking argued that tamasik, rajasik 
and satwik are akin to the wax, the wick and the flame: the absence of any one will result in no light. It is what 
we have chosen to call ‘constructive engagement’ between the hierarchic, market and egalitarian solidarities.
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Science and art
If impasse and domination are unacceptable, and negotiation the way forward, how is it to be realized in 
practice?	Those	who	have	practiced	it	argue	that	it	is	both	a	science	and	an	art.	Raiffa	argues	that	the	‘science’	
means systematic analysis for problem solving, with the systematic part developed and supported by the rigors 
of mathematics, in particular, its branches such as game theory and operational analysis.8  The ‘art’ part is slip-
pery for the rigorous mathematicians and includes interpersonal skills, the ability to convince and be convinced, 
the ability to employ a basketful of bargaining ploys, and the wisdom to know when and how to use them.9  In 
between the mathematical sciences of negotiation and its art of personal skills lie the social sciences of negotia-
tion, which do claim rational logic and analytical thoroughness; but they also introduce some of the fuzziness 
that comes with issues such as culture and power. They accept plural rationalities of different social solidarities 
and their inherently contradictory certitudes, which provide us with crucial lenses with which to understand the 
social encounter that is negotiation.
The field of water negotiations has been dominated in the past by the international relations and political 
science schools that see nation states as the primary (and often only) actors, believe in economic efficiency as 
the primary criterion, as well as the hierarchic proclivities towards regime formation through regulations, laws, 
rules and treaties. A re-positioning of perspectives for successful water management in the years and decades 
ahead requires that concerns of social and environmental equity as well as climate change be included. To do 
so, negotiating processes must also include in their engagements the voices of non-State actors, as well as 
other social science disciplines such as sociology and anthropology to supplement conventional insights from 
law and economics. This will mean giving up on monistic water solutions provided only by the market or gov-
ernments, moving beyond two-legged public-private partnerships, and enabling a three-cornered constructive 
engagement that includes the hitherto marginalized social and environmental civic movements who can play 
a creative role only if allowed to the negotiating table.
2.2 Effective public participation
Demands for public participation in planning and decision making are widely articulated, whether 
by governments, donors, civil society, or within law and policy itself. Participatory approaches imply 
that people outside the machinery of the State, or other formal institutions, are involved in some way 
in governance processes. However, the idea of public participation can mean different things to dif-
ferent people. Participation can have varying levels or degrees. These reflect the extent to which the 
influence or authority to make decisions is shared.
“THE IDEA OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION CAN MEAN DIFFERENT 
THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE” 
Modes of public participation can be organized along a spectrum (see Table 2.1). Moving from left 
to right, this spectrum begins with nominal – or token – participation and ends with public empower-
ment in which the authority to make decisions is placed in the hands of the public. Simply ‘inform-
ing’ or ‘consulting’ are not forms of participation that are adequate for constructive engagement, as 
decision makers are relatively free to ignore contributions by stakeholders. Public participation needs 
at the very least to be ‘involving’ and ‘collaborating’. This ensures that participation helps influence 
and shape decisions, by contributing options that are deliberated prior to decision making. A blanket 
embrace of ‘empowering’ participation is not possible, however, because while authorities have a 
responsibility to listen and learn, they also ultimately have responsibility to decide and implement on 
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behalf of the society they are appointed to serve. Within constructive engagement, therefore, even 
if participation does not always result in ultimate decision making, stakeholders gain the ability to 
influence and shape decisions.
“WITHIN CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, STAKEHOLDERS GAIN THE 
ABILITY TO INFLUENCE AND SHAPE DECISIONS”
Table 2.1: Public participation spectrum10
Inform
To provide the public 
with balanced and 
objective informa-
tion to assist them 
in understanding the 
problems, alternatives 
and solutions.
We will keep you 
informed.
Fact sheets, websites, 
open houses.
Consult
To obtain public 
feedback on analysis, 
alternatives and/or 
solutions.
We will keep you 
informed, listen to 
and acknowledge your 
concerns and provide 
feedback on how pub-
lic input influenced the 
decision.
Public comment, focus 
groups, surveys, public 
hearings.
Involve
To work directly with 
the public throughout 
the process to ensure 
that public issues and 
concerns are consis-
tently understood and 
considered.
We will work with you 
to ensure that your 
issues and concerns 
are directly reflected 
in the alternatives 
developed and provide 
feedback on how pub-
lic input influenced the 
decision.
Workshops, delibera-
tive polling, MSPs and 
associated tools, such 
as scenario building 
and exploration.
Collaborate
To partner with the 
public in each aspect 
of the decision includ-
ing the development 
of alternatives and the 
identification of pre-
ferred solutions.
We will look to you for 
direct advice and inno-
vation in formulating 
solutions and incor-
porate your advice 
and recommendations 
into the decision to 
the maximum extent 
possible.
Citizen advisory com-
mittees, MSPs includ-
ing consensus-building 
processes.
Empower
To place final decision 
making in the hands
of the public.
We will implement 
what you decide.
Citizen juries, ballots, 
delegated decisions, 
MSPs etc.
Examples of participation tools
2.3 Approaches to negotiation
 Negotiation plays a central role where multiple stakeholders participate in constructive engage-
ment. Where choices have to be made to agree ways forward, negotiation is the process used to 
attempt to reconcile differences among stakeholders. The main aim of an ideal-type negotiation is 
to reach a workable agreement, acceptable to all parties. In the context of constructive engagement 
over complex issues relating to water, there may be many stakeholders – individuals, communities, 
Goal of participation
Promise to public participants
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governments, business, financiers, scientists, NGOs and knowledge brokers – representing them-
selves or in various groups, organizations and coalitions. Approaches used for negotiation need to 
be appropriate for this context and for this diversity of actors. There are also many different types 
of arenas (see Box 2.2).
“THE MAIN AIM OF NEGOTIATION IS TO REACH A WORKABLE 
AGREEMENT, ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES”
Box 2.2: Global water negotiation arenas
Four distinct arenas in the global debate around water can be described:
The inter-governmental: Formal UN-type efforts at regime forming for water courses that water bureaucracies 
around the world uphold and engage in. It is mostly about framing rules that are to be upheld by formalized 
treaties and enforced by the collective ‘international will’.
Market-led: Globalized efforts to let market players find their own equilibrium through privatization, cham-
pioned by private multinational water companies and supported by development financing and development 
banks.
Civil society: There is a third influential arena dominated by egalitarian social movements often opposing large 
dams, big water diversions etc., that are seen as socially and environmentally harmful.
Expert-led: Water experts and professionals drawn from more or less all the above three who try to find a con-
sensus among the three forces of the State, market and civic movements through measures such as Integrated 
Water	Resources	Management	(IWRM).	
To offer a legitimate way forward for dealing with differences collectively, negotiations over 
complex water decisions need to be transparent and encourage well-intentioned participation. This 
premise does not make negotiations easy. The examination of rights and responsibilities along with 
risks and rewards is rarely straightforward. And yet, if negotiation can be approached in a consider-
ate and constructive manner, it can potentially encourage understanding and joint problem solving, 
greater mutual regard for diverse interests and values, and the possibility of integrating these into 
sustainable, rewarding and workable outcomes.
“NEGOTIATION REQUIRES THAT THERE IS A DIVERGENCE OF
INTERESTS AMONG ACTORS”
2.3.1 Pre-conditions for negotiation
There are some essential pre-conditions for negotiation. Negotiation requires that there is a 
divergence of interests among actors, but that actors recognize there is a degree of mutual interde-
pendence in resolving problems, and that actors are able to communicate freely with each other:
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•	 Divergence of interests: Different preferences among actors may be manifest, for example, 
in disagreements about how a body of water is owned, used, managed or priced. Differences 
among actors may be rooted in differing perceptions of water and its intangible values or in 
different attitudes to development. Differing ways of valuing and thinking about water result 
in different expectations of negotiations.
•	 Mutual interdependency: Without some recognition by stakeholders of interdependency, rea-
sons to negotiate may not be compelling. The negotiation process itself is an attempt to do 
something with others that cannot be done alone, coupled with the potential for improving 
outcomes (including social relations) or at least doing no harm to each other. This builds on 
the understanding that the fates of individuals or groups are interwoven, which challenges a 
prevalent view that water and its use is invariably a competitive struggle.
•	 Communication: Capacity to communicate is an important basis for constructive negotiation. 
This involves listening, learning, being respectful, clarity and endeavouring to address mis-
understandings. Communication with these qualities in negotiations leads to greater under-
standing among participants, helping them to evaluate and decide between choices, and to 
focus on finding resolutions to disagreements and pathways forward.
It is also important that negotiations operate where there is the possibility of some other action 
or recourse and/or appeal (for example, a legal process) if agreements are not reached or if they 
are challenged. This provides a motivation for participants to negotiate as well as alternate ways 
forward if agreement is not reached or if some parties are excluded or exclude themselves from 
agreements.
2.3.2 Types of negotiation
“NEGOTIATIONS ALSO INVOLVE THE EXERCISE OF POWER, WHICH 
ITSELF REFLECTS A COMPLEX SET OF RELATIONS AND PROCESSES” 
There are different approaches to negotiation. These shape the way negotiations are set up, the 
design of processes used, the stance taken by negotiators, the tone and openness of interactions and 
the types of outcomes possible. Overlain on this are differences in style and ways of behaving that 
actors may adopt when negotiating. 
A variety of factors influence how an individual, group, organization or government will negoti-
ate; for example, their purpose, intention, social status and their sense of responsibility to the process 
or parties involved. It depends also on what is being negotiated, the history of relationships and the 
issues at hand, and the legal, political and procedural context. Negotiations also involve the exercise 
of power, which itself reflects a complex set of relations and processes at both an individual and 
social level. The way power is exercised always affects the strategies parties use in negotiation. For 
example, when a party chooses to exercise power over another, they may be aiming to ‘defeat’ the 
other by demonstrating that they have greater means (in status, resources, ability, influence or legiti-
macy) to achieve their aims than does their ‘adversary’. Power can be exercised, however, for differ-
ent reasons and results, including cooperative pursuits. Complex social and psychological interactions 
thus underlie negotiations. Facilitators and participants in negotiations need to find constructive 
ways of managing this complexity if workable, fair and effective agreements are to emerge.
Facilitators and negotiators need approaches to negotiation that are suited to constructive 
engagement. It is vital, therefore, that they develop an understanding of what approaches and 
behaviours are more likely to lead to desirable, mutually acceptable outcomes. The distinctions 
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between types of negotiation should guide this understanding. There is a variety of terminologies 
and concepts applied to negotiation. These can be grouped into two main types of negotiation:
•	 Competitive negotiation, which generally places greater emphasis on trading, hard bargaining 
and distributing.
•	 Cooperative negotiation, which generally places greater emphasis on collaborating, seeking 
consensus and integrating.
“IN PRACTICE, COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE STANCES
CO-EXIST DURING NEGOTIATION”
The contrasts between these types of negotiation are summarized in Table 2.2. In practice, 
competitive and cooperative stances co-exist during negotiation. Negotiation can be structured 
and guided by cooperative principles, while at times parties use competitive behaviours, either as 
a deliberate ploy or inadvertently. In complex situations, if competitive negotiation is dominant, 
however, outcomes may be less than optimal. Cooperative negotiation strengthens constructive 
engagement.
“COOPERATIVE NEGOTIATION STRENGTHENS CONSTRUCTIVE
ENGAGEMENT”
Table 2.2: Contrasting emphases and assumptions in negotiation
Competitive negotiation
Greater emphasis on trading, hard bargaining, distributing
Parties tend to take ‘positions’ i.e., a specific ‘solution’, 
from their perspective
Process tends to assume fixed value, and distribution of 
that fixed ‘quantity’ or ‘good’
Negotiators seek to maximize own gain (or minimize loss) 
and assume ‘my gain is your loss’ 
Assume fixed preferences
Often seen to privilege particular branches of knowledge
May reinforce existing inequalities and inequities
Cooperative negotiation
Greater emphasis on collaborating, seeking consensus
 integrating
Parties encouraged to focus on their ‘interests’ i.e., that which 
underlies their possible ‘positions’
Negotiators focus on value creation, prior to agreements on 
distribution
Negotiators identify options, including trades, techniques or 
various criteria, that may provide added benefit to all
Assume preferences are changeable, as a result of new under-
standings
Greater emphasis on embracing wider diversity of relevant 
knowledge
Process tends to level out power imbalances – at least to 
some extent – partly as a result of emphases on deliberation 
and exploration of options, and how to access the merits of 
options or preferences
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Competitive negotiation
Competitive negotiation is characterized by a set of assumptions about the relationships among 
parties and the transactions to be negotiated:
•	 Parties	 take	 the	 stance	 that	whatever	 difference	 is	 involved,	 the	other	 party	 is	 a	 potential	
threat or competitor to obtaining a particular end. The assumption is that there are incompat-
ible or oppositional goals or objectives to the negotiation from the outset.
•	 What	is	at	issue	can	(or	must)	be	divided	and	distributed.	The	aim	of	negotiating	is	to	maxi-
mize the greatest share of a fixed set of rewards. This is usually gained at the expense of the 
‘other side’, or at least not to your detriment. The language spoken is usually adversarial, with 
other parties viewed as an opponent, threat or competitor to a contested or limited resource. 
From the outset the tendency is to assume that ‘your gain is my loss’. The focus tends to 
remain on risk factors and claiming a share of whatever is at stake.
Competitive negotiation is seen as predominantly about bargaining, which involves settling on 
what each party shall concede and take, or perform and receive. The general focus is on identifying 
a particular solution that is then sought. Having a particular solution at the outset is known as estab-
lishing a ‘position’, which is then defended and used by parties as the target for what needs to be 
achieved by negotiating. The discussion is then limited to this reference point.
With parties taking different positions that are defended and sought, negotiation becomes a 
concession-making process. This can involve each party implicitly or explicitly having a bargaining 
‘range’ between what they want most and what would be unacceptable to them, with an optimum 
point or a ‘bottom-line’ somewhere between the two extremes.
A bargaining range can be set in terms of, for example, prices: ‘I’d prefer $60,000, but would 
take $50,000, however, I’m not going below $40,000!’ Or it might be in terms of types of actions: 
“I want you to stop pumping water, or at least reduce it to this level, or else…”. With this range in 
mind, the basic expectation of negotiation and strategy is the making of offers and counter-offers 
(or a series of demands) until a workable agreement can be reached. If this fails then the ‘talks’ may 
be postponed or ended.
Having a bargaining range is not unhelpful, but it can limit what is discussed and the results pos-
sible. The competitive approach – with its focus on predetermined positions, distribution, and maxi-
mizing gain/minimizing losses – tends to result, at best, in a compromise. Little or nothing is added 
to the scope of the discussion or outcomes. The purpose is to claim something (of value) within a 
predetermined range of options. The positions of parties are played off one against another, with a 
net result that may not be satisfying to either, or more to one party at the expense of the other. The 
parties tend to be working against each other, as compared to with each other. Communication spi-
rals easily into monologues about why one position or outcome is better than another. Information 
used, in a variety of forms, tends to reinforce one party’s position over the others and become a 
source of contention. For simple exchanges/transactions/decisions, this might be efficient and accept-
able. However, for complex situations where ongoing relationships are important, this way of nego-
tiating has a tendency neither to foster nor maintain the relationship, and may make it difficult to 
achieve the best overall results, as seen in international cooperation in the Aral Sea Basin (Case 2.1), 
conserving the Florida Everglades (see Chapter 4, Case 4.2) and wastewater management in Coffs 
Harbour, Australia.11 
“COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATION IS CHARACTERIZED BY CERTAIN 
TYPES OF BEHAVIOUR OR ACTIONS”
Competitive negotiation is characterized by certain types of behaviour or actions. Parties tend to 
be: dominating or combative, where people try to convince, persuade, influence, manipulate, argue, 
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threaten or bargain hard to gain an advantage; or accommodating or compromising, where a little 
of something is claimed in order to gain at least a portion of what is required; or at least efforts are 
directed to not losing too much, and the bargaining style may be to concede, avoid confrontation or 
hostility, submit or withdraw. Each style of behaviour reflects different goals and values, as well as 
the different contexts (including the nature of the relationship) involved.12 
There are a number of strategies that may be employed. For instance trade-offs, in which some-
thing is given up or provided in exchange for a gain of another type, or a take-it-or-leave-it offer, or 
a time-specific offer. It can also be an advantageous tactic to try to uncover information about the 
other’s bargaining range, or to not be forthcoming with one’s own. Information in general becomes 
part of the struggle or game and therefore valuable as a resource to use, gain, conceal or manipu-
late.13 House buying and selling is a classic example where competitive, hard bargaining is the norm. 
Houses are different from complex water.
Case 2.1: Tensions in the Aral Sea Basin
The Aral Sea – once the fourth largest inland body of water in the world – has been reduced to 10% of its origi-
nal size and is plagued by salinization and pollution. Competition for water is adding tension to what is already 
an uneasy region. However the shrinking Aral Sea is not so much the crux of the problem as an illustration of 
the impact of the real problem which is overuse of water caused by inefficient use of water. Many people think 
the Aral Sea itself is a lost cause. Improving the way water is used so that there is more to share is not.
The problems of increasing demand and declining supplies have been compounded by the failure of the 
region’s nations to work together. Despite an agreement in 1992 amongst the five States to cooperate on 
its management, an annual cycle of disputes has developed between the three downstream countries – 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – that are all heavy consumers of water for growing cotton and 
wheat, and the upstream nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who have considerable water resources and 
hydroelectric potential, but little potential for agriculture.
Water management in Central Asia has suffered greatly from the Soviet legacy of top-down control and gen-
eral rivalries between the States. The inter-governmental organization charged with managing the basin – the 
Interstate Water Coordination Commission – has been criticized for operating with little transparency, with no 
representation from agricultural or industrial consumers, NGOs or other parties, and being generally ill-equipped 
to deal with the complexity of issues. Accusations of favouritism have further weakened cooperation.
As each country started to view the problem as a zero-sum game, it took steps to increase control over water 
and energy, often to the detriment of the others. There is increasing uncertainty over plans to build new res-
ervoirs and dams or to expand irrigation, and the relatively little consultation over most of these projects has 
led to intensified suspicions between States. 
Tensions over water and energy have contributed to a generally uneasy political climate in Central Asia. Not 
only do they tend to provoke hostile rhetoric, but they have also prompted suggestions that the countries are 
willing to defend their interests by force if necessary. Competition for water can only increase, and tensions 
will continue to rise unless better mechanisms are put in place to manage the problems.14
 
“COOPERATIVE NEGOTIATION IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONFER 
AND PROBLEM SOLVE” 
Cooperative negotiation
Cooperative negotiation is an opportunity to confer and problem solve to enable outcomes that 
are mutually beneficial to all involved. This is achieved by striving to accommodate the differences 
and/or the interests of the parties involved in integrated packages. Both the means of negotiating 
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and the particular ends sought are viewed as interlinked and integral to arriving at a sustainable, 
satisfying or beneficial outcome.
The aim is for parties to negotiate on the merits of the options available. The parties explore 
how efficiently and amicably they can find mutual gains or establish mutually agreeable standards 
for assessing gains in order to come to a workable, equitable agreement.
“COOPERATIVE NEGOTIATION FOCUSES ON INTERESTS RATHER 
THAN DIFFERENCES”
Cooperative negotiation focuses on interests rather than differences in positions. Interests are 
defined in broader terms such as values, needs, wants or fears,15 or underlying concerns (about the 
substance of the negotiation) and relationships with other parties. In either case, interests are under-
stood to relate to what lies behind a stated position – that is, the reasons why something is sought. 
For example, in the context of regulation of river flows by a dam, an environmental group may take 
the position that the dam spillways must be open during flood seasons, but their underlying interest 
is in ensuring that peak flows occur during spawning of an endangered fish species in downstream 
wetlands. The dam operator may take the position that timing of flow releases should be determined 
only by power demand and reservoir levels. Their actual interests may relate more to avoiding loss 
of income and avoiding shortfalls in electricity. Negotiations between the two parties that only focus 
on their positions leave little room for finding solutions. Understanding respective interests through 
cooperative negotiation, on the other hand, opens room for discussion of ideas and innovation in the 
way a dam might be managed and financed and the way water is allocated that could be acceptable 
to both parties. 
Cooperative negotiation is more explicit about the aim of negotiation being a collective, con-
structive and mutually rewarding process. It leads to integrated decision making that is based on 
mutual regard and the co-existence of interests and values. Sometimes it is described as ‘win-win’, 
or ‘mutual gain’, or ‘creating value’.
There are assumptions underpinning cooperative negotiation that relate to the stance of the 
parties, their ways of relating, and outcomes sought:
•	 Differences	are	viewed	as	inevitable	and	are	not	assumed	from	the	outset	to	reflect	incompat-
ibilities or opposing objectives. Other parties may not therefore be potential competitors and 
their goals or interests may not be a threat. Rather, the differences that arise may provide an 
opportunity for another way of doing or understanding something, or the impetus for change 
and decision making. 
•	 As	 there	 is	 some	 level	 of	 interdependency,	 there	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 collaborating	 rather	
than competing. There is an underlying assumption that people have the capacity to work 
through differences constructively, alongside recognition that mutual benefit can not always 
be achieved. Other parties are seen as integral to working through an issue or situation. There 
is, hence, an emphasis on improving ways of relating and giving attention to the relationship. 
This can be seen as being motivated by altruism or, pragmatically, by the need to create the 
conditions for achieving a workable agreement. Issues of trust, communicating openly or 
effectively, and fostering dialogue are central.
•	 Any	issue	may	involve	more	than	a	fixed	value	or	sum	of	rewards,	ensuring	there	are	various	
ways to address what parties are seeking. Negotiation is not simply about bargaining, but also 
involves managing and valuing relationships. Although substantive interests are considered 
important, other interests are seen as equally so, like being treated fairly and with respect, 
having a chance to speak and be heard, and having values and needs acknowledged and 
addressed.
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By going beyond viewing situations or issues as having a constant or fixed value, more can be 
added to the situation than seems apparent at first. For instance, there may be different ways to 
measure worth, a whole sought by parties can be broken down into parts, and/or something new or 
different may be created through understanding the reasons for why something is wanted or desired. 
Integrating decisions opens the possibility of creating new options or possible arrangements for 
agreement. A negotiation and its outcomes may not, therefore, be restricted to dividing portions or 
result in a gain-loss scenario. It may not even result in compromising, as there may be the possibility 
of making anew something not considered before, as compared to just giving and taking.16 
Cooperative negotiation thus goes beyond dealing with positions, and gives attention to the 
process of exploring issues. Time must be spent bringing differences into the open, asking parties to 
explain to each other:
•	 why	they	hold	a	particular	position	in	the	first	place
•	 how	they	came	to	decide	on	it
•	 how	it	serves	them	better
•	 whether	there	are	other	aspects	to	a	situation	that	need	attention	or	addressing
This process is critical, as it provides a space in which parties can better understand what may have 
previously been unknown or misunderstood about other parties. This paves the way for creating new 
pathways and options for decision making and outcomes that are more workable, fair and effective. 
Case 2.2 presents a positive change towards constructive engagement in Nepal’s hydropower sector. 
Case 2.3 describes the steps taken to comprehensively review the operation of the Ok Tedi Mine in 
Papua New Guinea, change the paradigm of engagement, and build trust required to negotiate fairer 
compensation to affected communities. 
Case 2.2: From conflict to constructive engagement in Nepal’s hydropower sector
Nepal’s hydropower politics have traditionally been dominated by confrontation between environmental and 
social activists and large-scale dam proponents. The campaign to stop the Arun-3 hydroelectric project in the 
1990s, however, marked a shift from confrontation to more constructive engagement.
A coalition of national and international activists together with small-scale hydropower entrepreneurs success-
fully campaigned to halt the billion dollar 201 MW project in eastern Nepal. The campaign used economics 
and science to demonstrate that the proposed project, to be financed by the World Bank and a consortium 
of donors, was financially unsound. A crucial component of the campaign was the proposal of cost-effective 
and timely alternatives – rather than simply opposing ‘bad’ dams, there was advocacy for socially and environ-
mentally ‘good’ dams.
The success of the activists in halting Arun-3 changed water politics in Nepal; government could no longer 
ignore activists and their call for constructive dialogue. Water politics were also changing globally with the 
release in 2000 of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) report.
Seeing the need to move beyond the ‘pro-dam’ and ‘anti-dam’ positions, the government of Nepal initiated 
a multi-stakeholder negotiation process in 2003, in which State and non-State water actors agreed to come 
together to explore options and find workable ways forward. Drawing upon the work of the WCD, multidis-
ciplinary and multisectoral teams worked to improve joint understanding of the complexity of the issues with 
the ultimate aim of modifying the WCD recommendations to guide Nepal’s hydropower sector.
The participants in the dialogue process included representatives of the government’s parastatal electricity 
authority	 and	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 Resources	 (dam	managers),	 the	 private	 sector	 (dam	 builders),	 and	 NGOs	
representing the communities affected by the project and concerned about other social and environmental 
issues.17
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Case 2.3: Ok Tedi Mine, Papua New Guinea – Changing the negotiating paradigm
The Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is among the largest gold-copper mines in the world, a major 
source of revenue for the PNG government, and a source of employment and revenue for people in PNG’s 
remote Western Province.
When building a mine tailings storage dam proved technically treacherous, the mine operator, Ok Tedi Mining 
Limited (OTML), received permission in 1984 from the government to discharge 90,000 tonnes of mine waste 
directly into the local river each day. The tailings have caused significant environmental damage to the Ok Tedi 
and Fly river systems, and seriously affected the livelihoods of more than 90,000 people living downstream. 
A series of legal actions in Australia, where BHP, multi-national mining company and then majority shareholder 
of OTML, was registered, resulted in, first, a payment to landowners in an out-of-court settlement, and later 
unsuccessful class actions on behalf of landowners.
By 2000, new assessments of the damage from the mine led the World Bank to recommend closing the mine 
without delay, and BHP to withdraw from the project. The government, a shareholder of OTML, agreed to 
keep operating the mine, having already lost the national income from the Bougainville copper mine due to 
civil war.
With this legal history and a need to garner the support of affected communities to continue mining, OTML 
negotiated Community Mine Continuation Agreements (CMCAs) in 2001. These agreements sought the com-
munities’ consent for continued operation along with acceptable compensation arrangements. 
The CMCAs were not supported by all villages, with some villagers who took part in legal action refusing to sign 
up. The CMCAs included provision for a mid-term review in 2005, and an obligation on the mining company to 
report major changes in the environmental predictions on which the agreements were based. 
Photo 2.1 Women’s meeting to discuss Community Mine Continuation Agreements with the OK Tedi Mine 
(Serki Village, Papua New Guinea).
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The review became a centrepoint for airing conflicts, concerns, hopes and demands, and a platform for 
improved delivery on the sustainable development projects component of the compensation. There was clear 
interdependency among the key stakeholders: the mining company desired community consent to continue 
operating; the villagers had limited alternatives other than to work with the company to alleviate their social, 
environmental and economic hardships. The dilemma for the communities was that the obvious social and eco-
nomic benefits of the mine, and their dependence on them, had to be balanced against the continuing damage 
of	the	mine’s	tailings	on	their	lifeblood	–	the	Fly	River	system.
The review centred on renewing communities’ support for continued mining, and a better sustainable devel-
opment outcome. The environmental and social contexts were indivisible – and a process of negotiation was 
required that could result in an enduring and positive legacy for all affected.
The CMCA mid-term negotiations took 18 months, involved 500 meetings and many thousands of people from 
150 villages. The review faced a number of challenges: i) communication and language differences; ii) distances 
and the inaccessibility of some villages; iii) cultural issues regarding participation of women; iv) representation, 
trust and capacity to participate; and v) how to ensure informed consent and deal with technical information. 
A fully transparent, collaborative approach to the situation was identified as the best way forward, to overcome 
entrenched distrust and real and perceived power imbalances. The mining company, OTML, its advisors and 
others developed a negotiation and communication process based on interest-based negotiation principles. The 
Informed Consensus approach adopted also reflected Papua New Guinean traditions of discussion in longhouses 
to reach community consensus.
The review process culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement by all parties in 2007 that result-
ed	in	a	four-fold	increase	in	compensation	to	affected	communities,	and	a	new	Ok	Tedi	and	Fly	River	Sustainable	
Development Foundation to be controlled by affected communities and funded by mining royalties. An evalua-
tion of the review reported that the working relationships between all parties had significantly improved.18 
2.4 Designing negotiation processes
“NEGOTIATION PROCESSES SHOULD PAY ATTENTION TO THE 
NEEDS OF THOSE LESS ABLE TO ARTICULATE THEIR CLAIMS” 
There can be a healthy tension between flexibility and structured design in a negotiation process. 
As social, political and economic contexts change, so too might the stances and behaviour of key 
actors. Some issues should be non-negotiable – for example, basic human rights – but other changes 
might require facilitators and participants to adjust.
There are also usually constraints to any ideal setting for constructive engagement. For example, 
special efforts might be necessary to ensure that stakeholders without essential means or resources 
can genuinely participate. Negotiation processes should pay attention to the needs of those less able 
to articulate their claims, understand their entitlements or obtain adequate representation.
Sub-optimal results can have many other causes. For example, it is important not to under-
play power relations or be blind to the political and cultural contexts that favour certain groups. 
Valuation is another area where mistakes are often made. Often there are very different views of 
the ‘right way’ of valuing, and care must be taken not to use frameworks which unfairly privilege 
particular options. Appropriate design of a negotiation process, reshaping when needed, and foster-
ing deliberation are key to unravelling and eventually understanding different perspectives.
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) (see Chapter 3) and consensus building (see Chapter 4) are 
forms of deliberative and constructive engagement that are being applied to complex water issues 
and decisions, by those aspiring to make decision making more reasoned. As demonstrated in the 
following chapters, their design explicitly incorporates methods for increasing the fairness and effec-
tiveness of agreements, implementation and outcomes. 
001-120_ARP.indd   35 17.2.2010   8:44:38
36
001-120_ARP.indd   36 17.2.2010   8:44:41
37
C h a p t e r  3
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs)
3.1 MSPs: a basis for fairer water governance
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are a part of governance in which different stakeholders 
are identified and, usually through representatives, invited and assisted to interact in a deliberative 
forum that focuses on:
•	 sharing	knowledge	and	perspectives
•	 generating	and	examining	options
•	 informing	and	shaping	negotiations	and	decisions
MSPs are not the only places where deliberation takes place. MSPs and dialogues are words that 
are often used interchangeably. This may be misleading. Any ‘dialogue process’ implies delibera-
tion is central. There may be much dialogue and deliberation embedded in advocacy organizations, 
diplomacy, operations within the party room, the parliament, contract drafting, the corporate board 
room or the village committee. However, as the name specifies, MSPs refer to where deliberation is 
fostered among multiple, diverse stakeholders.
MSPs are an approach for constructive engagement and learning about complex problems where 
facts and values may be in dispute. Choices about water often involve society contesting facts, such 
as the most efficient way to supply water, recover delivery costs, and provide efficiency incentives. 
Choices about water also often involve contesting values, for example, whose priorities and needs 
matter most, when there is insufficient water to satisfy all demands.
MSPs may lead to the creation or strengthening of bridges of understanding between actors 
representing wide-ranging interests, and the satisfactory resolution of at least some differences. An 
MSP can bring into sharper focus substantive differences of approach and priorities that may not be 
easily reconcilable. By articulating these differences in the public sphere, an MSP can contribute to a 
sounder basis for negotiation and decision making.
“MSPs ARE AN APPROACH FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND 
LEARNING ABOUT COMPLEX PROBLEMS”
MSPs can be influential by bringing together stakeholders in a new form of communication and 
decision finding. In this way, they can ensure that differences are respected – or at least better under-
stood – while pursuing fair and effective workable agreements about complex issues.
Influence is different to authority. Many MSPs are not necessarily vested with, nor must they 
claim, authority to make decisions. To do so may invite resistance and be counter-productive. 
Although not all dominant political cultures support or permit MSPs, in many places MSPs are part 
of a broader trend towards new forms of governance based on collaboration that build and draw 
upon social capital.
A way of focusing the MSP contribution to water negotiations is to use the 4Rs, (introduced in 
Chapter 1) as part of a systematic and semi-structured approach. Recapping, the 4Rs refer to rewards, 
risks, rights and responsibilities. For example:
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•	 The	rewards	being	sought	 from	the	care,	use	and	further	development	of	water	 resources,	
and the distribution of the full spectrum of the possible rewards/benefits/costs of various 
options.
•	 The	involuntary	and	voluntary	water-related	risks.
•	 Water-related	rights.
•	 The	various	water-related	responsibilities of State and non-State actors.
While the 4Rs can always be useful as reference points, MSPs do not all need to follow the 
same format or structure. MSPs exist in different shapes and sizes. But, as a guide, there are desir-
able characteristics of MSPs. These are summarized in Figure 3.1 and explained in Sections 3.2–3.5 
to provide an outline for an ‘ideal type’ of MSP that can contribute to fairer, more effective water 
governance.19
“MSPs EXIST IN DIFFERENT SHAPES AND SIZES”
Figure 3.1: MSP conceptual framework and desirable characteristics
DESIRABLE PROCESS
• Deliberative
• Facilitated
• Inclusive
• Informed and communicative
DESIRABLE CONTENT
(example elements)
• Setting up
• Stakeholder analysis
• Social contract between participants
• Comprehensive assessments
• Scenarios
• Selective use of ‘deliberation-support’ tools
• Action recommendations
   ...all documented
DESIRABLE CONTEXT
• Purpose and scope clear
• Convenors credible and competent
• Appropriate scales and levels
• Sufficient resources, political support, and time
• Politics and power recognized
DESIRABLE OUTCOMES
• Political space created
• Representation and participation expanded
• Discourses and norms constructively contested
• Interdependencies recognized
• Reflection and collective sensemaking
• Deliberation made routine for complex issues
• Negotiations more informed
• Better decisions, agreements and implementation
Context
Process
Content
Outcomes
ImpactConstructiveengagement
Fairer, more effective
water governance
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3.2 Desirable context for MSPs
3.2.1 Clear purpose and scope 
The purpose of an MSP needs to be clearly articulated in terms of its political and practical 
boundaries to enquiry, the derivation, extent and duration of its mandate, and a justification of how 
the MSP might improve existing governance. 
Questions to consider include:
•	 Is	the	MSP	trying	to	shape	the	higher-level	discourse	of	the	wider	political	and	institutional	
environment,	 i.e.,	 the	 ‘big	context’?	Examples	are	MSPs	 focusing	on	climate	change	and	 its	
implications (including for the Earth’s hydrological cycle), examining global drivers and pos-
sible societal responses, such as mitigation approaches, financing adaptation, and establish-
ing equitable carbon markets. Other MSPs include the deliberations before, during and after 
global fora such as the World Water Forum and the World Water Congress.
•	 Is	the	MSP	focusing	on	building	a	policy-shaping	network	and	space	for	debate	in	a	particular	
community	or	place,	 intending	to	catalyze	reflection	and	action	on	some	shared	 issues?	An	
example is the MSP working with the many actors and institutions with a stake in improv-
ing river basin governance in Namibia and Botswana’s Okavango floodplain; or the Mekong 
Region (see Case 3.1).
•	 Is	the	MSP	focusing	on	informing	and	shaping	a	particular	negotiation	process?	For	example,	
devising a fair and effective water allocation and management regime in the irrigation sys-
tems of the Viet Nam delta; or the MSP informing the negotiation and review of the agree-
ment to enable the continuation of mining –subject to more stringent Fly River pollution 
controls, and sharing of rewards – in the western provinces of Papua New Guinea.20
Answers to these questions should determine the design of the MSP and tactics to optimize 
engagement, particularly regarding choices of convenors, facilitators, invitees, agenda and tools. 
There are more ideas on how to clarify the purpose and scope of an MSP later in this chapter.
Case 3.1: ‘Exploring Water Futures Together’ in the Mekong Region
A	new	water	governance	paradigm	was	needed	in	the	Mekong	Region	which	encompasses	Cambodia,	Laos,	
Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam and southern China.
On main streams and tributaries disputes exist resulting from interventions to natural flow regimes and overt 
or default allocation decisions. These interventions are justified on grounds of: flood control, more irrigation 
for food or fibre production, urban or industrial supply, improving ease of navigation, or boosting energy 
production via hydropower. There are associated disputes about altered sediment and nutrient loads, fisher-
ies, livelihood options, groundwater use, water re-use, and diversions (inter-State, intra-State, inter-basin and 
intra-basin).
An	alliance	of	 actors	 in	 the	Mekong	Region	 cooperated	 to	 convene	and	 implement	an	MSP	undertaken	at	
national and regional scales. The convening coalition comprised: IUCN, the Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) 
– a national organization focused on sustainability; the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) – an 
international	research	organization;	and	the	M-POWER	regional	knowledge	network	whose	core	membership	
is	from,	and	focus	is	on,	the	six	Mekong	Region	countries.
The	purpose	and	scope	has	been	to	make	it	routine	in	the	Mekong	Region	for	important	national	and	transna-
tional water-related options and decisions to be examined in the public sphere from a range of perspectives. 
The MSP aimed to demonstrate this practice.21
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3.2.2 Credible and competent convenors
Convenors are those who call people to come together and collectively engage in an issue. There 
are many possible convenors for MSPs and they can be either from within or outside of government 
(see Box 3.1). Credibility and competence are essential. Credibility will be linked to the ‘social capital’ 
of the convenor or convening coalition. Without the capacity to build new or upon existing relation-
ships, convenors will be unable to establish an MSP constituency. Without competence, convenors 
will not be able to maintain the constituency or have an effective engagement.
Box 3.1: MSPs and dialogue tracks 1, 2, 3
The terminology of dialogue tracks 1–3 is one way of differentiating between water governance fora, some of 
which are MSPs, and the different convening possibilities.
Track 1 refers to processes of governments and associated bureaucracy, including inter- and intra-State fora. 
In the eyes of States these are ‘official’ and the most legitimate. The dominant logic is, for the most part, still 
implicitly accepting of rational, self-interested behaviour, particularly in international affairs. Track 1 dialogues 
are convened by State actors for State actors. The UN General Assembly is an example. They may be delibera-
tive, but they are not multi-stakeholder.
Track 2 refers to governance processes involving State, UN family, donor/lender, civil society and business. 
These interactive forums are usually convened and led by an actor or coalition closely aligned with States 
ensuring government representatives remain privileged actors, such as with the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD). The convenors are usually focused on enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of States by widening the field of ideas and influences. Track 2 MSPs may be convened 
by State or non-State actors, but usually widen the range of stakeholder involvement.
Track 3 refers to research, dialogue and advocacy efforts led by civil society or business, less impeded by or less 
subordinate to State actors. These fora are committed to enlarging the political space and are often optimistic 
about the potential of MSPs to find and assist in negotiating better ways forward for society. The convening is 
led by non-State actors, and by design should bring in the full range of relevant stakeholders or possible con-
tributors to addressing an issue. Convening coalitions are often a useful way of aggregating the social capital 
of the individual convenors. Tracks 2 and 3 are often now grappling with the idea and practices of deliberative 
MSPs. Practice may be less than ideal, but there are many promising efforts around the world where Tracks 
2 and 3 are trying to improve the quality of their MSPs to inform and shape water-related debates, generate 
options, and inform and shape negotiations.
3.2.3 Appropriate scales and levels
Clarifying purpose and scope is a precursor to thinking about scales and levels.22 Scales are the 
spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used to measure, or rank, and study an issue 
(see Figure 3.2). Levels are the units of analysis that are located at different positions on a scale.
Water management is often institutionalized around the spatial scales of government (i.e., 
administrative) or hydrology. The scale of government has different levels, for example: district, 
provincial, national, regional, global. The scale of hydrology also has different levels, for example: 
well, aquifer, stream, lake, reservoir, small watershed, larger national river basin, or international 
river basin. MSP convenors must be aware that analysis and action may best occur at various scales 
and levels – single or multiple. For complex water issues it is usually multiple. A strength of MSPs is 
that they can be flexibly constructed so as to fit any scale or level, but also to enable cross-level and 
cross-scale deliberations.
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“A STRENGTH OF MSPs IS THAT THEY CAN BE FLEXIBLY
CONSTRUCTED SO AS TO FIT ANY SCALE OR LEVEL, BUT ALSO TO 
ENABLE CROSS-LEVEL AND CROSS-SCALE DELIBERATIONS”
Figure 3.2: Scales and levels
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Figure 3.223 shows some examples of typical levels on five different scales (one temporal and four 
spatial). Examples of cross-level and cross-scale interactions are given for a pair of spatial scales. Some 
multi-level processes are shown on the ecosystem scale.
Actors contest scales and levels, overtly through debates, media releases, lobbying and protests, 
and more subtly, through use and control of technologies, indicators, deliberations over measure-
ments and controlling political sites. Thus, some actors push for hydrological scales – watersheds to 
river basins – as levels correspond to manageable units in the models or infrastructure they operate. 
Others promote conventional, area-based administrative hierarchies – districts to regions – arguing 
that this is where capacity, accountability and legitimacy already exist. Differences between admin-
istrative and hydrological scales, for example, are a common source of tensions in water resource 
governance. 
Contests can arise in MSPs because different actors favour particular scales and levels in their anal-
ysis, arguments and responses. Convenors may take steps in selection of participants and format to 
ensure there are constructive exchanges and debate within and between relevant scales and levels.
The scales and levels used in an MSP should eventually be a joint product of biophysical and 
social processes. It is rarely possible, and probably undesirable, in an MSP being undertaken for a 
complex water issue, to be too strict, too early about scale and level choices.
The physics of flows, and the dynamics of ecosystems or social institutions can often be collec-
tively better understood if scale and level boundaries are not overly constrained at the beginning 
of an MSP. For example, seasonal dynamics of flow regimes are important to fish (and thus fishers) 
on different temporal levels than the operational and planning logics of hydropower generation, 
irrigation and flood risk management.
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3.2.4 Sufficient resources, political support and time
Without adequate resources – human, financial, informational and intellectual – an MSP will not 
reach its potential. Competent people will be needed to support the operation of the MSP. Costs 
will be incurred and so funding needs to be organized. Uncertainties will need to be addressed with 
information and people that have the knowledge that can help to move forward.
It is vital that any MSP has sufficient political space and momentum to permit or encourage 
establishment and support. The need for some degree of political support is unavoidable. This does 
not just refer to political support from the State, but rather is a reminder that an MSP must have 
some type of supportive stakeholder constituency with either influence or authority. In the case of 
Cape York, Australia (see Case 3.2) the political support wavered, but endured for long enough to 
ensure the MSP was given a chance to make its best contribution.
“IT IS VITAL THAT ANY MSP HAS SUFFICIENT POLITICAL SPACE
AND MOMENTUM”
Case 3.2: Breaking down the wall in Australia’s Cape York
The MSP of CYPLUS (Cape York Peninsula Land Use Strategy) was born in the 1990s after 20 years of intensify-
ing conflict about major development proposals, mining, land rights, cattle grazing and Aboriginal land rights 
in the Cape York Peninsula of north-eastern Australia. CYPLUS was an intensive and extensive MSP to develop 
a land-use strategy – not water-focused, but undoubtedly complex – in a remote area of northern Australia 
covering 137,000 km2 but home to only 18,000 people, the majority of whom are of Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander descent. All levels of government were actively involved.
People who studied CYPLUS were told by one participant: ‘Before CYPLUS there was a brick wall between 
graziers (cattle farmers), greens and aboriginal people on Cape York – they were all trying to cut the Cape up 
into little pieces for themselves but there wasn’t enough to go around. CYPLUS broke down the wall’. The 
researchers also warned of the need for a long-term commitment, which for CYPLUS was envisaged as at least 
10 years, during which time there would be (in the Australian political system) ‘at least three elections and 
countless changes in policies, programs and players involved in the effort’.
“IF THE MSP IS NOT FOLLOWED UP, OR IS NOT TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT BY DECISION MAKERS, MANY PARTICIPANTS WILL
BE DISILLUSIONED”
The saying ‘Rome was not built in a day’ also applies to MSPs which require an investment in time 
and patience, some degree of continuity, and then follow-up. If the time allowed is too short, it is 
hard for an MSP to do its job. If the MSP is not followed up, or is not taken into account by decision 
makers, many participants will be disillusioned and re-engaging with them in the future will likely 
be more difficult.24 A key lesson noted by an observer of a Canadian MSP (see Case 3.3) was that: 
‘One of the main criticisms aimed at collaborative systems of governance is that whilst they provide 
opportunities for deliberation and wider participation in decision making, they often produce imple-
mentation failures because insufficient attention is given to outputs that will have an impact on the 
problem at hand. As a result, participants may lose enthusiasm for further collaboration if there is 
little sign of their efforts having a positive effect’. 25
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Case 3.3: Balancing power in the Fraser Basin Council in Canada
The Fraser Basin spans 13 watersheds in western Canada and supports more than 2.5 million people with an 
economy based on natural resources. The need for a more integrated approach to effectively and sustainably 
managing the land and water resources has long been recognized.
The Fraser Basin Council was established in 1997 as an MSP to pursue sustainable development through inte-
grated river basin planning and management. It succeeded the Fraser Basin Management Programme, which 
was seen as being dominated by government interests.
The Council is a not-for-profit organization with a corporate structure that aims to address multi-jurisdictional 
issues to resolve disputes using a consensual rather than a legal or bureaucratic approach. It was specifi-
cally designed to complement, as opposed to duplicate, government management functions. A Charter for 
Sustainability was initially developed as a means of creating shared understanding among the diverse groups. 
The Charter outlines problems as well a vision, and articulates the values, principles and rules to guide collec-
tive action. 
The institutional set-up of the Council was carefully crafted in order to create a space for equitable delibera-
tive opportunity amongst diverse stakeholders to influence policy and programme decisions. It was recognized 
that a key challenge for collaborative governance is to provide fair representation, given that there are always 
economic and political power imbalances between groups that have legitimate interests in various facets of 
river basin management.
The Council included 36 directors drawn from three tiers of government (federal, provincial and local), First 
Nations, community groups, businesses as well as social, economic and environmental interest groups. To 
ensure fair local involvement, there were five regional committees for specific watersheds comprising repre-
sentatives from local government, First Nations and sectoral interests.
3.2.5 Politics and power recognized
When scoping an MSP it is necessary to consider politics and power explicitly.
Politics is a slippery concept. Comments from almost 50 years ago remain useful: ‘Politics is about 
policy, first and foremost; and policy is a matter of either the desire for change or the desire to pro-
tect something against change’ and ‘Politics is a natural reflex of the divergences between members 
of a society… [where]… there is a variety of perpetual disagreements which arise from fundamental 
differences of condition, status, power, opinion, and aim’.26 Water sharing is not just about technical 
choices. Contesting different views is the realm of politics. MSPs are a place for this contesting. MSPs 
are one way of ensuring that political tussles include evidence and exploration of different values 
and perspectives.
Another elusive concept is power. It can be seen as the ability to shape the context and conduct 
of others. This is helpful, but it only gets you so far. It is useful also, and very relevant to MSPs, to 
think of power in terms of assets and power relations (see Figure 3.3).27 Thinking of both can help in 
understanding the context.
“WHEN SCOPING AN MSP IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER POLITICS 
AND POWER EXPLICITLY”
MSPs are likely to be more influential if they are endowed with adequate helpings of ‘assets’ 
including: resources, participants in strategic positions, individuals with leadership ability, and a rich 
inflow of ideas.
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For some, politics and therefore political analysis, is focused on an analysis of power – identifying 
and interrogating its distribution, exercise and consequences. How power relations are manifested 
is just as important as whether particular actors have power – ‘power to act’, power with others’, 
‘power over’ and ‘power to lead’28 – all are important, as with the invocation of the wax, wick and 
flame metaphor in Box 2.1 in Chapter 2. MSPs are more likely to be agents of constructive engage-
ment if the power relations manifested are a healthy mixture of these different forms. Perhaps most 
important and integral to the success of MSPs is fostering the acceptance by many participants that 
there is new and additional power in collectively working with others.
Figure 3.3: Assets that shape power and power relations
3.3 Elements of good process
MSPs earn legitimacy, at least in part, by demonstrating high-quality process. To do so requires 
attaining and maintaining high standards of deliberation, facilitation, inclusiveness, information 
exchange and communication with the participants and wider constituency.
3.3.1 Deliberative
Deliberation is integral, by which we mean: ‘deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at pro-
ducing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in 
light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. Although consensus 
need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, 
Power relations
Power to act: e.g. to set agendas, 
to make decisions, to shape prefer-
ences
Power over: e.g. to direct, control, 
regulate, penalize, marginalize
Power to lead: e.g. to inspire, moti-
vate, facilitate, empower
Power with others: e.g. collective 
power by acting with others
POWER
Ability to shape the 
conduct and context of 
others, either directly or 
indirectly
Power assets
Resources: resources available 
to further a cause, including: 
human, intellectual, financial,
legal and physical force (e.g. 
State apparatus, military, wealth)
Positions: e.g. being high up in a 
hierarchy, giving leverage, oppor-
tunity, authority
Individuals: leadership or influ-
encing qualities
Ideas: thoughts, assumptions, 
judgements, preferences
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an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) 
ideally characterizes deliberation’. 
MSPs are rooted in a belief in the value of ‘authentic deliberation’29 between people with differ-
ent perspectives. In this way, MSPs give privilege to the power of argument, explanation and reason 
over other types of power. Therefore, it is important to note that stakeholders who do not have 
language and communication skills can be disadvantaged, unless adequately represented.
“MSPs GIVE PRIVILEGE TO THE POWER OF ARGUMENT,
EXPLANATION AND REASON OVER OTHER TYPES OF POWER”
3.3.2 Facilitated
To enable deliberation, good facilitation is an essential characteristic if MSPs are to reach their 
potential. Ideally in a group of MSP facilitators, there would be a mixture of men and women of 
varying cultural backgrounds, united by having open minds. These facilitators need to possess a rea-
sonable share of the following traits:
Listener: Ability to listen and create an atmosphere where others will listen (not just talk).
Enabler: Ability to see who is participating and who is not, and to find ways to enable all participants 
to contribute in an authentic way. This includes stopping any particular individual or group from 
dominating an MSP.
Linker: Willingness to prepare by thinking through the programme and backgrounds of participants, 
anticipating what might happen. It is important the facilitator link the steps in the MSP process, 
maintaining some direction/focus, whilst also being adaptable to the needs of participants.
Respectful: Respect and empathy for different people and the different world views that they hold. 
This includes respect for different forms of knowledge – engineering, agriculture, ecology, economic, 
cultural, social, national politics, local villagers.
Energetic: To maintain the enthusiasm of the participants to persist and work through what may be 
difficult tasks, the facilitator usually requires large reserves of personal energy.
Familiarity with appropriate ‘facilitator techniques’: There are many techniques to encourage cre-
ative expression, such as buzzing, mind mapping, rich pictures. A skilful facilitator can draw on these 
as components of the MSP method.30
“TO ENABLE DELIBERATION, GOOD FACILITATION IS AN ESSENTIAL 
CHARACTERISTIC”
3.3.3 Inclusive
MSPs should enable representation of a wide range of stakeholders and their disparate interests 
via a flexible process which may have many different facets. Inclusiveness implies being respectful of 
diverse ethics, ways of reasoning, world views and priorities of actors.
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3.3.4 Informed and communicative
MSPs should use and share the best available information, building the knowledge base. MSP 
participants should become familiar with other relevant fora, plans, agendas etc. The MSP also 
needs to communicate effectively with the wider public sphere if it wishes to create and maintain 
a constituency.
3.4 Desirable MSP content
MSPs are not all the same. Figure 3.4 provides a practical example of a hypothetical MSP which 
shows a plausible flow from acknowledgement of a concern through to deliberation and agreement 
on next steps.
MSPs may involve regular meetings between core participants. These might be informal gather-
ings beside an irrigation canal, next to a wetland, or on the banks of a river. There might also be 
conferences/discussions open to the wider public, locally hosted field visits, electronic exchanges, 
government briefings, films, plays, historical texts, testimony, or commissioned research.
Despite differences in the way they are set up and implemented, examples of desirable content 
can be suggested.
A general
concern
among
stakeholders
Informal 
working 
group 
meets to 
initiate 
process
Bilateral discussions
with key stakeholders
Communication and media engagement
Capacity and perspective development by individuel stakeholder groups
Inputs development by specialist working/research groups
Bilateral meetings with political and business leaders
Organisation, coordination and facilitation by steering group
Raising funds and resources for the process
Time frame in months
kick off 
multi-
stakeholder 
workshop
Workshops/
meetings 
with single-
stakeholder-
groups
Multi-
stakeholder 
workshop 
for situation 
analysis
Multi-
stakeholder 
workshop
for detailed 
planning
Multi-
stakeholder 
workshop to 
agree on
next steps or
to wind up
1            2            3           4            5           6           7           8          9           10         11          12
Figure 3.4: Timeframe and sequence of hypothetical MSP 31
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3.4.1 Setting-up
Setting up refers to the practical steps that must be taken in establishing an effective MSP.32 
Essential steps include:
•	 establishment	of	an	interim	MSP	steering	group
•	 articulating	clear	rationale	for	the	MSP
•	 building	a	constituency	for	the	MSP
•	 preliminary	examination	of	the	wider	MSP	context
•	 assessing	potential	MSP	designs	and	mandates
Establishment of an interim MSP steering group
There are now hundreds of examples around the world of water-related MSPs. To get going 
has usually required an interim MSP steering group. Some say ‘interim’, others ‘initial’ or ‘informal’. 
Some prefer ‘working group’ or ‘committee’ to steering group. It’s important, though, not to get 
hung up at this early stage. The key is to start somewhere. Final convening, management and coor-
dination responsibilities for the MSP are sorted out and adjusted during the setting-up phase (see 
Case 3.4).
Case 3.4: Improving agricultural knowledge, science and technology
A prominent recent example of an MSP was the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and 
Technology for Development (IAASTD). This was a five-year process from 2003–2008. Whilst not focused on 
water, it is nevertheless an excellent example.
In the beginning a Steering Committee of 40 representatives from governments, agencies, industry, farmers 
and other rural producers, consumers, environmental and other NGOs produced a basic document in August 
2003 calling for the International Assessment. They chose to address this question: How can we reduce hun-
ger and poverty, improve rural livelihoods, and facilitate equitable, environmentally, socially and economically 
sustainable development through the generation, access to, and use of agricultural knowledge, science and 
technology?
A design process soon followed. The first meeting of the parties (governments), five co-sponsoring UN agen-
cies, the World Bank and civil society representatives took place in 2004. The government representatives (45 
countries present) decided to go ahead with the Assessment. They agreed on the content and scope of the 
Assessment and adopted outlines and procedures, a timetable and a budget of US$ 10.7 million.
The process became a UN inter-governmental process, which means the participating member State repre-
sentatives made the final decisions and were asked to adopt the final report. The initial Steering Committee 
morphed into a multi-stakeholder Bureau of 60 representatives of governments (30), civil society (22) and 
international institutions (8) to oversee the process.
The IAASTD then undertook a comprehensive global assessment that included five more detailed sub-global 
reports, of the role of agricultural science and technology in development, culminating in a final plenary in 
Johannesburg in April 2008 at which synthesis reports and summaries for decision makers were presented to 
all stakeholders.
Articulating clear rationale for the MSP
The need for an MSP has to be explained and accepted before people will agree to invest time 
and	effort.	What	problems	or	opportunities	will	the	MSP	seek	to	address?	How	will	an	MSP	fill	a	gap,	
or	add	value,	to	the	existing	efforts	being	made?
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Diverse goals have catalyzed recent local, national, regional and global MSPs, including:
•	 Bringing	 some	 element	 of	 public	 deliberation	 into	 decision	 making	 about	 possible	 links	
between 37 major rivers across India (see Case 3.6).
•	 Micro-watershed	 equitable	 sharing	 of	 irrigation	 water	 in	 the	 Lingmutey	 Chu	 Watershed,	
Bhutan (see Case 3.7 Companion Modelling).
•	 Combining	maintenance	of	the	character	of	natural	floods	with	hydropower	generation	in	the	
negotiation of ‘environmental flows’ in the Senegal River Basin (see Case 3.9).
•	 Energy	future	–	using	national	follow-up	to	the	World	Commission	on	Dams	to	address	con-
troversies about building large dams in Nepal (see Case 3.10).
•	 Better	use	and	care	for	ground	water	in	Umatilla	County,	USA.33 
•	 Improving	cooperation	among	interest	groups	and	negotiating	a	water	charter	to	guide	land	
on water management in the Komadugu Yobe Basin of Lake Chad, northern Nigeria.34
“THE NEED FOR AN MSP HAS TO BE EXPLAINED AND ACCEPTED 
BEFORE PEOPLE WILL AGREE TO INVEST TIME AND EFFORT”
Building a constituency for the MSP
To reach its potential an MSP needs a constituency of diverse supporters. Providing early oppor-
tunity for involvement is important. Although people may constructively engage for different rea-
sons, most will want to be convinced that the MSP is a genuine and worthy effort to search for fair 
and effective ways forward. Building a constituency means building a base of MSP supporters who 
are committed to engaging in a collective process. It is far more than ‘engaging with stakeholders’ 
or undertaking a ‘stakeholder analysis’ (see section 3.4.2). 
“TO REACH ITS POTENTIAL AN MSP NEEDS A CONSTITUENCY OF 
DIVERSE SUPPORTERS”
Preliminary examination of the wider MSP context
The interim steering group needs to ensure that the wider MSP context is understood. Some call 
this the ‘operating environment’ or the wider ‘political economy’. It is important to get a basic over-
view of the present and relevant history, including an initial understanding of the range of perspec-
tives of the MSP stakeholders. This will provide guidance on the areas to be explored in more detail.
Assessing potential MSP operating structures
There are usually various choices for an MSP operating structure which will determine function, 
legitimacy and credibility. Links to existing authority structures need to be clear. For example, what is 
to	be	the	link	to	existing	levels	of	government	(if	any)?	Taking	the	time	to	investigate	and	introduce	
an appropriate structure is vital.
Assessing MSP designs and mandates
In the words of one expert: ‘MSPs, by any other name, are currently ‘hot’ in the water sector’ 
attracting diverse actors to operate collectively – at least for a time – in a ‘weird and wonderful pan-
orama’ of different multi-stakeholder processes.35
That said, there are many choices for the design of an MSP, which must match the purpose and scope. 
The design includes operating structures and plans for carrying out the MSP. The setting-up phase 
is critical in negotiating appropriate designs and mandates, so that the particular MSP can serve the 
needs of the part of society grappling with a particular issue, hoping to make water governance 
fairer and more effective via a well-intentioned platform.
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3.4.2 Stakeholder analysis
Stakeholder analysis is essential to properly design and implement an MSP. It helps to clarify 
who to involve in an MSP and in what way. It should provide a foundation and plan for participa-
tion throughout the MSP making it easier for stakeholders to engage, be respected, and learn from 
each other. 
MSP drivers – that is, the convenors, or steering group – must agree on criteria for determining 
stakeholders. For many MSPs, the 4Rs are a useful starting point. What are the benefits and who may 
be	involved	in	reaping	a	reward	or	bearing	a	cost?	What	are	the	risks	and	who	are	the	voluntary	or	
involuntary	risk	bearers?	Who	has	or	may	claim	a	right	to	be	involved,	recognizing	that	some	will	
always	say	their	‘right	to	participate’	is	greater	than	others?	Who	has	a	responsibility	to	be	involved	
– legal or perhaps because of ‘civic duty’ – given the insights they possess and may be able to con-
tribute?
List all the people and organizations that might fit the criteria. The list may need to be revisited 
several times to ensure that all key groups and people are given the opportunity to engage, either 
directly or via representatives. Allowing stakeholders to self-nominate can also ensure that those 
with an interest are not excluded. Decisions need to be taken on how best to involve people. It is 
sensible to hear from all parties likely to be interested in the MSP so as to hear how they think they 
can be optimally involved in different ways.
Various tools can be used to learn about stakeholders and their relationships, such as: brainstorm-
ing, actor mapping, interviews with key informants or producing ‘rich pictures’ with focus groups.
It can be helpful to make a stakeholder matrix with the stakeholders along one axis and 4Rs 
criteria along the other (see Table 3.1). In complex situations, it is often the case that there are con-
testing views. It can help to use the 4Rs to research the roles of different stakeholders in the MSP 
key issues.
Cross-checking with different people can lessen the risk of oversights or bias. If not too provoca-
tive, it can also be useful to prepare preliminary summaries of the influence and authority of differ-
ent actors. Recognizing the dynamism of actor relationships, it can also help to use the 4Rs to reflect 
on the power (influence and/or authority of different stakeholders).
Photo 3.1 Dams and Development Dialogue meeting (Nepal).
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           Examples of the rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities which should be explored during 
stakeholder analysis
Locally affected 
people
Developer
Expert
NGO representative
Financier
Government official
Rewards:
Potential benefits
4Rs
Stakeholders
(Examples)
• Local rewards need 
to be assessed. They 
could include: equitable 
access to quality water 
or related resources; 
compensation for loss 
of access to resources; 
cessation or redesign 
of project with impacts 
that are too negative. 
• Profit from construction 
or operation of a new 
facility.
• Fees, sometimes future 
profit share.
• Often negligible, but as 
with others, this should 
be examined. Inclusion 
of issues they feel are 
important.
• Return on investment.
• Benefits should be 
restricted to those to 
be enjoyed by wider 
citizenry.
Risks:
Risks voluntarily 
being taken or invol-
untarily borne
• May be involuntary 
risk bearers. Examples 
include: negative 
impacts related to 
reduced quality or 
quantity of water or 
ecosystems; threatened 
livelihood security etc. 
• Construction cost over-
runs, or unprofitable 
operation.
• Borrowing and invest-
ment risks.
• Minimal, except for 
reputational if shown to 
be incorrect.
• Risk of being marginal-
ized from the political 
or legal process if not a 
directly affected person.
• Reputational, if seen to 
be engaging in a less 
than ideal MSP or of 
making too great con-
cessions.
• Loss of investment.
• Minimal, except for 
reputational if shown 
to support unwise or 
unfair development.
Rights:
Rights claimed
• Right to free prior 
informed consultation. 
(Right to withhold con-
sent is contested vigor-
ously by State officials).
• Right to be made bet-
ter off, or at least not 
worse off.
• As per authorized con-
tracts.
• Right to provide unbi-
ased advice for con-
sideration by decision 
makers.
• Right to explore, ques-
tion and present their 
ideas and opinions.
• To lend within the 
spaces provided within 
the law.
• To discharge their 
duties as authorized 
and employed citizens.
Responsibilities:
Formal or informal 
responsibilities
• Recognition of the 
rights of others to try 
and improve their lives.
• Follow the laws.
• Full disclosure of all 
anticipated impacts.
• Construction and 
operation as per agree-
ments.
• To operate within their 
fields of expertise, and 
to provide clear and 
impartial advice.
• Political accountability 
to their stakeholder 
constituency.
• Due diligence, adher-
ence to internal and 
industry policies, includ-
ing codes of conduct.
• Adjudicate wisely and 
fairly, upholding the 
spirit of just laws and 
guiding regulations.
Table 3.1: Stakeholder analysis using the 4Rs in a hypothetical water project
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3.4.3 Social contract between participants
The social contract is a summary of the rules of engagement in the MSP. A social contract 36 needs 
to be established between the convenors and all stakeholder representatives, which requires reach-
ing some workable agreement on purpose, scope, political space, resources, time and process so that 
participants in an MSP understand the roles and responsibilities of all.
Social contracts – which are also usually negotiated – should make the ‘participation promise’ 
clear, to lessen the chance of a mismatch between reality and expectations. For example, are stake-
holder representatives being invited to:
•	 Come	together	primarily	to	build	relationships	and	share	information?
•	 Set	the	agenda	for	subsequent	public	or	private-sector	action?
•	 To	brainstorm	and	problem	solve?
•	 Join	a	consensus-building	initiative?
•	 To	provide	recommendations,	or	to	take	decisions?
The social contract needs to be unambiguous and documented, such as for the global Hydropower 
Sustainability Assessment Forum (see Case 3.5).
“THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS A SUMMARY OF THE RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT IN THE MSP”
Case 3.5: The ‘social contract’ of the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum
In 2004, the International Hydropower Association (IHA) adopted Sustainability Guidelines, followed in 2006 by 
the adoption of a Sustainability Assessment Protocol (SAP). During 2008–2009, the Hydropower Sustainability 
Assessment Forum (HSAF)37 examined whether it is possible to establish a broadly endorsed sustainability 
assessment tool to measure and guide performance in the hydropower sector, based on the IHA’s SAP. The 
HSAF included on-ground assessments and meetings in USA, Zambia, China, Brazil, Iceland and Turkey. In 
August 2009 it released its draft Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP).
The Forum membership included representatives of developed and developing countries involved in hydro-
power as well as from the NGO, finance and industry sectors. At the beginning of the Forum, participants 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding and agreed to detailed ‘Communications and Operating Procedures’ 
including, for example, that:
•	 The	HSAF	will	be	transparent,	conducted	with	goodwill,	and	will	search	for	consensus.
•	 Where	a	 consensus	 cannot	be	 reached,	 the	differences	will	 be	 recorded	and	acknowledged	 in	 all	HSAF	
documentation.
•	 The	HSAF	will	only	use	the	name	and	brand	of	participants	in	public	communication	after	obtaining	their	
permission.
•	 The	decision	on	endorsement	of	the	final	product	will	be	taken	by	each	participant	at	the	end	of	the	pro-
cess, after consultation with their respective constituencies.
•	 Participants	 reserve	 the	 right	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	MSP	during	 the	process.	 If	 this	 action	 is	 taken,	 the	
withdrawing participant will provide a written explanation to the Chair.
“THE SOCIAL CONTRACT NEEDS TO BE UNAMBIGUOUS AND
DOCUMENTED”
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3.4.4 Comprehensive assessments
There are many deliberation-support tools that can be helpful when negotiating water-related 
resource use and further development. It is axiomatic that MSPs should strive to ensure a compre-
hensive, meaning ‘sufficiently thorough’, assessment of issues, informed by all stakeholders, and 
ultimately of use to them all. There is now extensive experience in undertaking MSPs that have a 
substantial knowledge-assembly, contesting and building component.
Case 3.6: Civil society-led dialogue assessing river-linking schemes in India
River	 diversions	 and	 basin	 transfers	 are	 some	 of	 the	 most	 contested	 water	 issues	 globally.	 India’s	 mega	
Interlinking	of	Rivers	(ILR)	project	has	proposed	to	provide	173	billion	m3 of water to irrigate 37 million hectares 
through 31 links in Himalayan and peninsula rivers and associated large dams, reservoirs and canals.
Proponents argue the merits of diverting water from ‘surplus’ rivers to ‘deficit’ rivers to increase irrigation and 
thereby food grain production, mitigate floods and droughts, and reduce regional imbalance in the availability 
of water. Critics cite the negative ecological, economic and social costs, and argue for more effective ways to 
address food security. 
A coalition of civil society groups, led by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), initiated an MSP in 2003 to 
comprehensively assess the benefits and risks of the project, and explore alternatives to river linking. An initial 
working group, including civil society, government representatives, political leaders and media, spent eight 
months negotiating the set-up of the forum, and especially its members. The resulting ‘National Civil Society 
Committee’ (NCSC) was comprised of eminent persons representing diverse views. The NCSC was expected 
to: generate public debate; facilitate and improve information sharing between civil society and government; 
make available past knowledge and experience; and generate new knowledge about the project through 
independent studies.
The NCSC successfully raised public debate on the issue and influenced government to rethink its procedures 
and actions. Although the establishment of the forum took longer than anticipated, the credibility and legiti-
macy of the process was largely due to the diversity of perspectives represented and the comprehensiveness 
of the analysis.38
3.4.5 Scenarios
Scenarios are stories that outline possible futures. For complex situations with associated uncer-
tainty, scenario building in an MSP can help all participants think laterally and learn about each oth-
ers’ different interests, values, priorities, assumptions, constraints and options.
Scenario analysis has a history going back to the 1960s in the military and business. In recent 
times, as both the pace of change and uncertainty has increased, there has been renewed interest in 
scenario analysis and planning.
The basic principle of scenario planning is to try and understand plausible future trends to help 
make strategic decisions based on an analysis of the possible consequences. Some form of scenario 
analysis is highly relevant to many MSPs (see Box 3.2).
Scenarios are an interpretation of the present as well as an image of a possible future. Qualitative 
scenario storylines should be internally consistent and describe paths from the present to the possible 
futures. Where data exists, quantitative modelling is a way of making scenarios more explanatory 
and coherent by making important connections more explicit.
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“SOME FORM OF SCENARIO ANALYSIS IS HIGHLY RELEVANT TO 
MANY MSPs”
Box 3.2: Steps used in scenario building
Step 1: Identify driving forces – from whatever source: politics, economics, social or ecological change,   
  technical breakthroughs etc.
Step 2: Identify predetermined factors – assessing what is inevitable about the future.
Step 3: Identify critical uncertainties – assessing those areas where the future is uncertain, which can be  
  prioritized according to importance and degree of uncertainty.
Step 4: Develop scenario storylines – a series of plausible alternative futures.
Step 5: Assess the implication of different scenarios – for the issue(s), organization(s), place(s) or   
  sector(s) of concern.
Step 6: Identify and use indicators – to enable continual reassessment and adaptation.
Formats and settings can be experimented with creatively. The Georgia Basin Futures Project, for 
example, drew on expert knowledge and community inputs to build tools and a game for explor-
ing what-if-type scenarios for a basin on the west coast of Canada. Visioning is commonly used in 
scenario building and decision making, for example by policy makers and youth in Europe,39 and for 
much longer by indigenous people grappling with water sharing in the High Atlas mountains and 
Negev desert.
Role-playing games can also help stakeholders explore each others’ perspectives on water man-
agement options. Case 3.7 introduces Companion Modelling, which combines role-playing games 
with computerized modelling to explore scenarios.
“VISIONING IS COMMONLY USED IN SCENARIO BUILDING AND
DECISION MAKING”
Case 3.7: Companion Modelling
Companion Modelling combines role-playing games with computer model simulations to facilitate shared 
learning and explore scenarios in order to assist with collective decision making.
The approach has been successfully applied to resolve conflict amongst villagers on water allocation for rice 
irrigation in Bhutan and Thailand. Farmers in the Lingmutey Chu watershed in Bhutan played several sessions 
of the game to see the outcomes of various water-sharing strategies when applied both within their village and 
also	 in	a	collective	approach	between	villages.	Role	swapping	was	particularly	effective	 in	building	common	
understanding amongst participants of the situations of other parties. 
The computerized multi-agent model allows rapid simulation of a more comprehensive set of scenarios of 
water-sharing rules. It examines the interactions among different actors (or ‘agents’) and between these actors 
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and	the	common	resource	to	be	shared.	Researchers	and	participants	can	discuss	 the	outcomes	of	 the	sce-
narios, and adapt the model so that scenarios genuinely reflect the on-the-ground situation. 
Participants initially engaged in the games as an exercise, but soon realized the power of the tools for joint 
analysis of complex issues. Plenary discussions amidst the gaming sessions took the deliberations from simu-
lation to reality. Villagers in Bhutan concluded their sessions with a formal agreement on how to allocate 
water more fairly, including the creation of a water management committee and steps to develop rules and 
procedures.40
Case 3.8: Scenarios in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)41 assessed the consequences of ecosystem change for human 
wellbeing. From 2001–2005, the MA involved the work of more than 1,360 experts worldwide. Their findings 
provide a state-of-the-art scientific appraisal of the condition and trends in the world’s ecosystems and the 
services they provide, as well as the scientific basis for action to conserve and use them sustainably.
The MA Scenarios Working Group considered scenario development as a tool to explore possibilities for the 
future that cannot be predicted by extrapolation of past and current trends.
The MA considered the possible evolution of ecosystem services during the 21st century by developing four 
global scenarios exploring plausible future changes in drivers, ecosystems, ecosystem services, and human 
wellbeing:
•	 The	Global	Orchestration	scenario	depicted	a	worldwide	connected	society	in	which	global	markets	are	well	
developed and where there is a high degree of global cooperation.
•	 The	Order	from	Strength	scenario	examined	a	regionalized	and	fragmented	world	preoccupied	with	security	
and protection.
•	 The	Adapting	Mosaic	scenario	explored	a	fragmented	world	resulting	from	discredited	global	institutions,	in	
which local ecosystem management strategies are evolved and adopted by strengthened local institutions.
•	 The	TechnoGarden	scenario	was	characterized	by	a	globally	connected	world	relying	strongly	on	technology	
and highly managed and often-engineered ecosystems to deliver needed goods and services.
Wetlands and water was a key part of the MA analysis, and many evidence-based key messages were distilled 
for policy makers. For example, noting and exploring the policy decisions that have to be made involving 
trade-offs between agricultural production and water quality, land use and biodiversity, water use and aquatic 
biodiversity, and current water use for irrigation and future agriculture production.
3.4.6 Selective use of tools
There are many tools to support water negotiations, including the previously introduced stake-
holder analysis, comprehensive assessments and scenarios. Other tools are explored in companion 
books to NEGOTIATE, such as FLOW, PAY, SHARE and RULE.42
FLOW introduces the user to the essentials of environmental flows. Implementing ‘environmen-
tal flows’ requires establishing water flow regimes which recognize ecosystem needs whilst trying 
to satisfy social and economic demands (see Case 3.9). FLOW explores how societies define flow 
requirements, modifications that might be necessary to infrastructure design and operation, finance 
and incentives, policy and legal frameworks, and the necessity to generate and maintain political 
momentum. Environmental flows work requires the integration of a range of disciplines includ-
ing engineering, law, ecology, economy, hydrology, political science and communication. An MSP 
approach is very suitable for informing the negotiations and decision making about how humans 
interfere with natural flow regimes.
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Case 3.9: Negotiating environmental flows in the Senegal River Basin
Transboundary	cooperation	in	the	Senegal	River	Basin	is	led	by	OMVS	(The	Senegal	River	Basin	Development	
Organization) which provides a forum for joint efforts by Mali, Mauritania and Senegal (and recently, 
upstream Guinea) to respond to development challenges while operationalizing integrated water resource 
management.
In 2002,	the	OMVS	member	countries	adopted	the	first-ever	River	Basin	Water	Charter	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	
which was preceded in 2000 by the establishment of an Observatory of the Environment responsible for moni-
toring the state of the environment in the basin and impacts of development interventions. The Charter and 
Observatory were the culmination of a two-decade-long process marked by studies and debates on optimal 
ways of managing the river waters and investing in major water infrastructure projects. 
The	objective	of	the	Charter	is	to	provide	for	efficient	allocation	of	the	waters	of	the	Senegal	River	among	many	
different sectors, such as domestic uses, urban and rural water supply, irrigation and agriculture, hydropower 
production, navigation, fisheries, while paying attention to minimum stream flows and other environmental 
matters. It also establishes a process for approving new projects that may have significant impacts on those 
sectors, based on the provision of information to, and consultation with, all riparian stakeholders including 
local users.
The Charter drew on comprehensive analysis of the effects of the Diama and Manantali dams and exploration 
of alternatives to their current operation. The studies revealed the considerable and diverse benefits of the 
natural flood system – in terms of wetlands, fisheries, agriculture, livestock, forestry and groundwater recharge 
– benefits which needed to be factored into the operation of the dams and in planning of future development 
interventions. This was particularly essential since the majority of those affected rely heavily on the exploitation 
of water-dependent natural resources (traditional agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and exploitation of forest 
and wetland products). 
As a result, the Water Charter includes specific provisions for the release of water from the dams to help restore 
the floodplains and generate an annual flood, thereby recognizing the value of the floodplain ecosystem and 
traditional livelihood strategies.43
“WORKABLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FORWARD ACTION
MUST BE SOUGHT”
3.4.7 Action recommendations
MSP content must provide action recommendations. There is no need to manufacture consensus 
if it cannot be reached, but workable recommendations for forward action must be sought, other-
wise the MSP might end up being nothing more than an interesting discussion. If empowered to do 
so, the MSP might also take and implement decisions, but this is dependent on the extent of the 
mandate.
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) (see Case 3.10) is an example of an MSP that provided 
extensive action recommendations, without claiming decision-making authority.
Case 3.10: World Commission on Dams
Don’t plan, build, protest, operate, decommission, propose, oppose or discuss a dam without it! By 2000, the 
world had built 45,000 large dams to irrigate a third of all crops, generate a fifth of all power, control floods 
in wet times and store water in dry times. Yet, in the last century, large dams also disrupted the ecology of 
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over half the world’s rivers, displaced over 40 million people from their homes and left nations burdened with 
debt (Earthscan advertizing material promoting the WCD report)
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was a high-profile MSP which emerged from increasing public criti-
cism of large dams. It aimed to undertake a rigorous, independent review of the development effectiveness 
of large dams, to assess alternatives and propose practical guidelines for future decision making. The WCD 
attempted to conduct an ideal, deliberative multi-stakeholder learning process. Government participated, but 
with the same standing as civil society. There were many actors involved at the local, regional and international 
level – dam ‘practitioners’, economists, sociologists, ecologists, political scientists and the media. The process 
received enormous publicity and international recognition. In its own words it ‘provided a unique arena for 
understanding complex choices facing societies in meeting their water and energy needs’.
The WCD commissioners produced a ‘consensus’ report, an informed and negotiated contribution, which 
was launched in a blaze of publicity in 2000, evoking a range of responses.44 The ‘WCD decision-making 
framework’ has since been evaluated for use as both an implementation and advocacy tool. It is complex. The 
framework includes three grounding global norms, five core values, five key decision points, seven strategic 
priorities, 33 associated policy principles, and 26 guidelines. The task of trying to figure out how to combine 
these pieces of advice remains a challenge for post-WCD activity.
Following the release of the WCD report, there were numerous follow-up activities, including MSPs, under-
taken around the world. The Dams and Development Dialogue in Nepal45 is just one example where diverse 
stakeholders assembled and persisted over several years to explore sensitive large dam issues in the Nepal 
context.
3.5 Outcomes and impact
There is a suite of desirable outcomes possible from MSPs that successfully manage to read and 
respond to the context, establish a fair and safe process, and generally display the desirable charac-
teristics outlined in the preceding sections.
In some places, the MSP approach has already become routine behaviour, but in other places an 
MSP is a new possibility. In an example from Peru, it is claimed that an MSP has provided a positive 
and ‘unprecedented’ experience: ‘The multi-stakeholder platform is an unprecedented mechanism 
in the country. Throughout its history, Peru has developed a culture based on confrontation rather 
than one based on negotiation. Therefore, experiences such as that of Yakunchik imply ‘learning 
to negotiate’ after a long tradition of domination, submission and violence’. (The MSP ‘Yakunchik’, 
after the Quecha word for ‘our water’, was established at the end of 1998 in the central highlands of 
Peru). It was further claimed that: ‘As a result of the platform’s initiatives, irrigation has been placed 
on the regional agenda, and has led to the discussion of other issues such as the rural-urban rela-
tionship, conflict negotiation, organizational and institutional water management-related problems, 
and rural development. In other words, the platform is contributing not only to the development of 
a new social fabric, but also to activating the agenda of regional development’.
There is no attempt here to claim that all MSP experiences have been positive, but lessons have 
been learned, and there is sufficient evidence from around the world to conclude the following:
•	 MSPs	can	lead	to	the	expansion	of	representation	and	participation	of	stakeholders	in	gover-
nance, potentially increasing the legitimacy of public decisions.
•	 MSPs	can	provide	greater	opportunity	for	discourses	and	norms	to	be	launched	and	contested,	
ensuring that new and old perspectives are examined on their merits.
•	 MSPs	can	assist	in	the	recognition	and	understanding	of	interdependencies.	Societal	learning	
about interdependencies is vital among stakeholders who will often have different values, 
motivations, perceptions and priorities.46
001-120_ARP.indd   56 17.2.2010   8:44:44
57
•	 MSPs	enable	 reflection	by	 representatives	of	 various	 constituencies,	 clarification	of	existing	
accord and differences among stakeholders, and collective sense making.
•	 MSPs	can	help	deliberation	become	routine,	enabling	complex	 issues	to	be	more	rigorously	
examined.
•	 MSPs	increase	the	prospects	of	negotiations	being	more	informed.
•	 By	providing	a	pathway	for	deliberation,	MSPs	can	lead	to	better	decisions,	agreements	and	
implementation.
MSPs can be a valuable, collaborative addition to water governance when the issues are complex. 
It needs to be stressed that MSPs are a complement to other forms of governing, not a replacement, 
and not a panacea. There is potential for their wider use.
Establishing the link between the policy-informing and decision-searching processes of an MSP, 
and policy making and decision taking, remains a skilled task. However, by favouring deliberation, 
MSPs can give people of goodwill a better chance to constructively influence decisions that affect 
their lives.
Chapter 4 provides guidance on consensus building, an elusive but key element of MSPs. The 
construction and operation of MSPs, and the pursuit of consensus building, are central pillars of 
constructive engagement, improving negotiations, and a move towards fairer, more effective water 
governance.
“MSPs ARE A COMPLEMENT TO OTHER FORMS OF GOVERNING, 
NOT A REPLACEMENT, AND NOT A PANACEA”
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C h a p t e r  4
Consensus Building
4.1 Improving negotiation practice
There are negotiations underway in many parts of the world regarding the management of 
water resources. These cover allocation decisions as well as the measures that ought to be taken to 
ensure water quality and availability. Unfortunately, many of these negotiations have not produced 
fair, efficient, stable or wise agreements.47 In part, this is because multi-party, multi-issue negotia-
tions, especially those in which scientific and technical uncertainty levels are high, are inherently 
difficult. It is also because many of the stakeholders and officials involved have not embraced ‘best 
negotiation practices’ in the design of their deliberations. This chapter provides advice to the parties 
involved in on-going water negotiations regarding possible ways of shifting from the hard-bargain-
ing techniques that characterize most (unproductive) negotiations to a consensus-building approach 
that is likely to be more effective.
To achieve best practice, six key questions need to be addressed:
1)	Why	is	it	so	hard	to	reach	equitable	and	sustainable	water	agreements?
2)	What	strategies	are	available	to	stakeholders	and	administrators	involved	in	water	disputes?
3) When and how should the consensus-building approach be used to make decisions, fashion 
agreements	and	implement	partnerships?
4) When and how should facilitation or mediation (i.e., the services of ‘professional neutrals’) 
be	used?
5)	What	can	be	done	to	hold	negotiators	to	the	commitments	they	make?
6) How should organizations involved in water negotiations go about building their negotiating 
capabilities	over	time?
4.2 Why the usual approach to water negotiation often fails
Multi-party negotiations in the public arena, within countries or between countries, often fail 
because the wrong parties are at the table, the process of negotiation is poorly designed and man-
aged, or agreements do not incorporate an adaptive approach to resource management that can 
respond to changing conditions and scientific uncertainty. 
When only high-level elected and appointed officials and not the full range of (self-selected) 
stakeholder representatives are at the table, negotiations are likely to overlook important informa-
tion or forego the legitimacy necessary for effective implementation. In an effort to increase the 
‘manageability’ of negotiation processes, public officials often limit the number of parties involved. 
However, if only a ‘blue ribbon committee’ of officials is selected, the membership may be insuf-
ficient to give adequate attention to the full range of scientific and technical considerations and 
on-the-ground experience. And, if only technocrats (i.e., appointed technical officials) are involved, 
agreements are likely to be insufficiently responsive to political or local considerations. Stakeholders, 
including advocacy groups, community representatives, business leaders, and independent scientific 
experts all have specialized or ‘indigenous’ knowledge as well as political sensitivities that are needed 
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to shape agreements and policies in an appropriately balanced fashion. In addition, unless the full 
range of relevant stakeholders is represented in developing water agreements, implementation can 
be much more costly and more difficult, as reluctant or unhappy groups dig in their heels and try to 
block implementation or keep raising objections to what has already been decided (for example, see 
Case 4.2 on the Florida Everglades). Only when all the relevant parties have been directly involved 
will the resulting agreements tap the appropriate knowledge and gain sufficient political credibility 
to ensure voluntary compliance. 
“MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC ARENA OFTEN FAIL 
BECAUSE THE WRONG PARTIES ARE AT THE TABLE”
Most water negotiations consider one issue at a time. This can be a mistake. Often, it is only 
possible to get agreement when trades across issues occur. That is, unless each group knows that its 
interests will be served on the issues it deems most important, it is unlikely to respond favourably to 
requests from other negotiators, even on issues it considers less important. Thus, trading is the key 
to creating value in negotiations.48
Negotiating agendas should be set in a way that guarantees all participants that issues of great-
est concern to them will be addressed as part of a package. This will not happen if negotiating fora 
only take up the most pressing political concern of the day, the most visible resource management 
emergency, or whatever issue is of greatest concern to the most politically powerful members of the 
group. The full array of concerns of the whole group needs to be considered together. The group 
as a whole needs to be involved in shaping a long-term agenda (and sticking to it) and negotia-
tions concerning one issue should not be concluded until a full package of issues has been explored. 
Taking one issue at a time, as opposed to looking at the connections among issues or trying to ‘nest’ 
issues in an interlocking fashion usually yields sub-optimal agreements (or no agreement at all), as 
illustrated by Case 4.1 on the Danube Basin in Europe. 
Case 4.1: Determining the agenda for negotiations on a sustainable water
management agreement in the Danube Basin 49
In the mid-1980s the Danube countries began cooperating to develop a legal basis for joint water manage-
ment.	This	culminated	in	the	1994	Danube	River	Protection	Convention	(DRPC).50 The legacy of mistrust from 
the Cold War and negotiators’ desire to formulate a workable consensual agreement in a reasonable time led 
to a narrowing of the scope of the agreement. The parties decided to focus on the environmental aspects 
of water management and issues not addressed by existing agreements, and exclude those issues that were 
especially contentious or which did not affect the entire basin. 
Although successful in many ways, conflicting visions about how the river should be used were not resolved. 
These	differences	contributed	to	the	Danube’s	 inclusion	 in	the	2007	WWF	list	of	the	World’s	Top	10	Rivers	
at	 Risk	 due	 to	 risks	 posed	 by	 navigation	 infrastructure.51 For example, coordination under the International 
Commission	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 the	Danube	River	 (ICPDR,	 responsible	 for	 implementing	 the	 1994	DRPC)	
could lead to activities directed at floodplain restoration and protection of fish spawning habitat in the same 
place where cooperation under the separate and older Danube Commission52 aims to improve the river for 
navigation, requiring deepening and widening of the river banks. Both of these potential uses are not possible 
at the same time and in the same location. As a result, some development projects, such as the Bystroe chan-
nel through the Danube Delta, have become framed as issues of economic development versus environmental 
protection. Without a process for developing an integrated vision of the Danube that includes all relevant 
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participants and addresses all critical issues, these kinds of disputes will escalate as riparians are unable to link 
issues and create value through trades across their preferences. 
The riparians are now in the process of addressing these limitations to cooperation. For example, through 
ICPDR	involvement,	the	discussion	on	the	Bystroe	canal	development	was	broadened	to	include	other	partici-
pants and issue areas. A multi-stakeholder forum has been created in which national governments can meet 
together with NGOs to conduct research, share data and develop a shared vision for management of the 
Delta.	Similarly,	a	forum	for	cooperation	in	the	international	Sava	sub-basin	has	been	created	under	the	ICPDR	
umbrella that enables participants to address a broader array of issues, including navigation, in parallel with 
sustainable	water	use.	At	the	basin	scale,	the	ICPDR	is	trying	to	address	this	issue	through	increased	coopera-
tion with the Danube Commission.
Such efforts and the dedicated fora now engage a larger number of stakeholders on a broader range of 
issues.	NGOs	can	become	official	observers	to	the	ICPDR	and	provide	input	into	policy	making.	For	example,	
the Danube Environment Forum is an observer and coordinates public participation in environmental decision 
making and sustainable development in the basin. Taken together, this enlarged group of participants works 
as ambassadors for the process and as intermediaries between the international forum and their governments 
or organizations, engaging and informing a broadened group of stakeholders on a wide variety of issues.
Water negotiations actually become harder than they need to be when they are framed in 
zero-sum (win-lose) terms: either one side gets the water it wants or some other party does. This 
is especially true when convenors do not pay enough attention to getting the right parties to the 
table, structuring agendas and ground rules properly, and ensuring effective meeting facilitation. 
In such cases, negotiators may be unable to create ‘value’ by, for example, linking issues together. 
If negotiations are framed as choices between ‘the environment’ winning and sacrificing economic 
development; or, agreeing to grow the economy while environmental and health concerns are set 
aside, they will surely become win-lose battles. Groups with the greater political clout will try to 
piece together a winning majority, while the weaker parties get little or nothing. 
“WATER NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY BECOME HARDER THAN THEY 
NEED TO BE WHEN THEY ARE FRAMED IN ZERO-SUM
(WIN-LOSE) TERMS”
Opportunities to create mutual gain, that is, to create value by managing common pool resources 
to the advantage of all, require an entirely different approach. This is as true at the local level as 
it is internationally. Indeed, when sovereign nations are at the table and the only option is volun-
tary agreement (because no sovereign nation can be forced to accept terms it finds objectionable), 
agreements must meet the concerns of all sides or countries will not agree to be bound by them.53 
Similarly, in sub-national negotiations involving different kinds of water actors, all stakeholders need 
to feel their interests have been addressed. Although the process may be arduous, unless each party 
feels that at least some of its concerns are met, they will not sign an agreement. 
Most water negotiations often pit parties against each other as if there is no way that all can or 
will gain by managing shared water resources effectively. But mutual gains are, in fact, available if 
commitments are made to give parties what they want and need (i.e., that meet their interests). For 
example, through agreements to adopt water conservation measures now, all parties will have more 
water to meet their (growing) needs in the future. Or, upstream riparians may need a promise that 
food produced with the water flowing downstream will be available to them before they agree to a 
deal that lets more water flow to downstream parties. Or, the pricing of water purchased by down-
stream users may need to go up to ensure upstream parties that they can earn enough to meet all 
their needs. Water negotiations that aren’t focused on such exchanges are likely to fail. Even weak 
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parties when pushed by politically powerful parties trying to exploit shared water resources unfairly, 
will find a way to push back. Often, they form coalitions with the political opponents of the most 
powerful party. Water negotiations that deteriorate into political battles over unrelated matters are 
also likely to fail. 
Likewise, water negotiations that focus solely on who wants what and are not informed by 
credible scientific and technical analysis or local empirical knowledge will fall short. Information is 
needed to make considered decisions. If the group hasn’t laid out a careful joint fact-finding pro-
cess in advance of decision making, it is not likely to have the data it needs when decisions must be 
made. Agreement may be reached, but commitments will quickly erode when it becomes clear that 
assumptions about how much water will be available or how ecological systems will respond are 
wrong. Only by setting a systematic agenda, and developing an accompanying data-gathering plan, 
will informed trades across issues be possible. And, as noted above, only trades across issues can cre-
ate value; that is, offer an incentive to each party to accept less than its ideal outcome on one issue 
in exchange for getting what is most important to that party on some other related issue(s).
“INFORMATION IS NEEDED TO MAKE CONSIDERED DECISIONS”
Most negotiation fora don’t adopt even the simplest ground rules. Or, if they do, they don’t 
enforce them. For example, if parties are not asked to come ‘prepared’ and ‘ready to commit’ (i.e., to 
have reviewed draft documents with their internal constituencies well ahead of scheduled meetings), 
negotiations can stretch out interminably. Many negotiation sessions are often given over to speech 
making rather than to effective problem solving. Written ground rules regarding how meetings will 
be run are essential and ought to be approved by all parties before any negotiations begin. 
Individuals assigned to chair or moderate meetings are often unskilled in the techniques of 
facilitation. And, rather than pass the baton to someone better able to manage difficult conversa-
tions, these same individuals are inclined to hold on to power, thereby undermining the group’s 
effectiveness. Even the obvious need to agree on who will prepare a written summary of each 
negotiation session is often overlooked. This means that each participant generates his or her own 
record of what was said, and who promised what. Unless the group develops a ‘single text’ to which 
they are all committed, confusion is sure to emerge. What is reported back to constituents needs to 
accurately reflect what was discussed and what was agreed, even if that is not flattering to all the 
group representatives. 
“A HARD-BARGAINING APPROACH MAY LEAD TO DECISIONS IN 
THE SHORT TERM, BUT OFTEN PRODUCES LONG-TERM RESULTS 
THAT ALL PARTIES FIND UNSATISFACTORY”
Thus, a hard-bargaining approach which limits the number of parties involved, addresses only a 
narrow set of issues (usually one at a time), treats each decision as a formal zero-sum political bar-
gaining game (emphasizing political wins and losses at the expense of collaborative inquiry), may 
lead to decisions in the short term, but often produces long-term results that all parties find unsat-
isfactory. In contrast, a consensus-building approach provides tools for overcoming these limitations 
(Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Overcoming the limitations of hard bargaining
Limitations of hard bargaining
Wrong parties at the table.
Agenda too narrow and focused on positions – single 
issues create a win-lose (zero-sum) situation.
Poor facilitation and management can pit parties against 
each other and cause negotiations to be inconclusive, or 
reach unworkable decisions.
Decisions often taken without credible (or trusted) infor-
mation.
Objectives are to ‘win as much as possible’ and reach 
agreement.
Merits of consensus building
Stakeholders identified through situation assessment or 
self-selection.
Mutual gains created by focusing on interests and trading 
across multiple issues.
A neutral facilitator guides the process to jointly develop 
the agenda, set ground rules, generate and assess 
options, and use a single text to reach a workable
agreement.
Joint fact finding and analysis of scientific data and
empirical knowledge informs the negotiation.
Objectives are to reach a mutually acceptable agreement 
that all parties can and will implement.
4.3 The consensus-building approach
There is nothing to stop water negotiators from adopting a better approach – one that ensures 
that all the relevant stakeholders are at the table, that negotiations are managed in a problem-solv-
ing (or value-creating) fashion, and that the parties commit to workable and adaptable agreements. 
Someone in a leadership role within the negotiating group must suggest that something besides the 
hard-bargaining approach is possible. Others within the group need to understand at least enough 
about the alternative approach to negotiation to know that they need not give up power if they 
agree to operate in a consensus-building fashion. The group as a whole needs to commit sufficient 
time and resources to allow a more effective negotiation process to succeed.
Consensus building is an approach to negotiation that empowers those most concerned about 
equity while simultaneously responding to the most politically powerful parties’ concerns about pre-
serving their prerogatives. This is accomplished by agreeing in the first instance to seek unanimity 
but settle for overwhelming agreement, as long as every effort has been made to meet the interests 
of those who express concerns about a nearly final agreement.54
Although there are significant differences between local, national and international water 
negotiations, especially as different regulatory and legal regimes apply, participants in all situations 
will benefit from using a consensus decision rule. Those parties who are politically less powerful 
are assured that their interests will be addressed, that they will not be forced to accept something 
they oppose (the way they might if a majority voting rule were in effect), and that even the most 
powerful parties at the table have agreed to make a good-faith effort to address their concerns. At 
the same time, the most politically powerful parties must be assured that they will have the equiva-
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lent of a veto as long as they make every effort to meet the interests of all the other parties at the 
table. Under a majority-rule voting system, the interests of a minority are not protected. Fifty-one 
percent of the group can force the remaining 49 percent to accept their will. A consensus-building 
approach, however, protects the minority by avoiding votes and ensuring that the group as a whole 
accepts responsibility for doing everything it can to meet the interests of all the parties involved. The 
presence of an experienced and impartial facilitator can be reassuring in this regard. The facilitator 
(or mediator or moderator, as he or she is sometimes called) holds the parties accountable to their 
consensus-building commitments.
“A CONSENSUS-BUILDING APPROACH PROTECTS THE MINORITY”
Consensus building can be an especially effective tool for producing fairer and more effective 
water agreements because this requires both a commitment to take science and empirical knowl-
edge seriously as well as a focus on achieving political accord. Managing for sustainability requires 
striking a balance between science, local knowledge and politics as well as formulating agreements 
among contending parties (who must commit to adapting their institutional behaviour). Seeking to 
build consensus means seeking voluntary agreement (i.e., there is no vote that can force the minority 
to accept something it does not want). Consensus building is therefore much more likely to produce 
lasting results that encourage individuals, groups and communities to live up to their commitments. 
In a consensus-building process that has incorporated joint fact finding and an agenda developed by 
the group as a whole, it is much more likely that scientific and empirical knowledge will be given its 
due. A powerful majority cannot force its political preferences on a minority and overlook what the 
technical or local empirical evidence suggests.
There are six steps in the consensus-building process,55 as shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Six steps in the consensus-building process 56
4.3.1 Convening – getting the right parties to the table
Successful water negotiations hinge on getting the right parties to the table. Most of the time, in 
the conventional hard-bargaining mode, a convening agency assembles the parties it feels ought to 
be involved. Consensus building, by contrast, usually begins with the preparation of a situation or con-
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flict assessment by a professional neutral – someone who is mutually acceptable and who has no stake 
in the outcome of the negotiation – to identify which stakeholders should be invited to engage. 
Participant selection for negotiations or other dialogues depends in part on their intended purpose 
and format:
•	 When	the	purpose	is	to	build	relationships,	share	information,	clarify	areas	of	agreement	and	
disagreement or to identify possible policy options to recommend to decision makers, partici-
pants ought to be selected who can speak primarily on the basis of their personal knowledge 
and skill. 
•	 When	the	objective	is	to	plan	what	should	be	addressed	in	negotiations,	frame	the	agenda,	
or generate an agreement through a consensus-building process, then participants ought to 
have the capacity to make a commitment (i.e., speak for a certain group) or significantly influ-
ence the commitment of a particular constituency.
“SUCCESSFUL WATER NEGOTIATIONS HINGE ON GETTING THE 
RIGHT PARTIES TO THE TABLE”
However, even when the purpose of a dialogue is known, it is not always obvious who should 
participate in a negotiation. For example, in the Danube negotiations different countries partici-
pated in developing two multinational treaties. Countries that were historically on the main stem of 
the river participated in the 1948 Belgrade Convention focusing on navigation, which is implemented 
by the Danube Commission, whereas the Danube River Protection Convention, which came into force 
in 1998, takes a whole-of-basin approach and involves countries with more than 2000 km2 in the river 
basin and the European Union as contracting parties.
Selecting the right participants determines not only if an agreement can be reached, but wheth-
er it will be implemented. This is apparent in negotiations within countries, such as early negotia-
tions concerning the management of Florida’s Everglades in Case 4.2 in which key water users, such 
as the sugar industry, and interest groups, such as environmental groups, were not included and 
subsequently blocked the implementation of the initial agreement. 
Case 4.2: A consensus-building process for the restoration of South Florida’s 
Everglades 57
Natural water flows in the Everglades wetlands of Florida, USA have been altered by federal projects designed 
to control flooding and drain the land in order to make it suitable for agriculture, such as sugar production, 
and urban development. Agreements on how to restore ecosystem health that did not respond to the interests 
of key stakeholders, such as the sugar industry, Native Americans and environmental groups, were delayed 
by litigation. This led the Florida State government to convene the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable 
South Florida in 1994.
The Governor’s office worked with State agencies to identify potential participants and a Chair, a former 
Speaker for the State Legislature. They identified key stakeholder groups and effective representatives. 
Commissioners included over 40 representatives from public interest, environmental, economic and business 
groups, Native American tribes, and county, city, State and regional agencies. The Chair was assisted by a team 
of professional neutrals. The broad scope of the mandate – to look at sustainable development, both in its 
spatial and issue breadth, and stakeholder diversity – was used to move stakeholders beyond disagreements 
that had prevented agreement in the past on water quality issues. The Commission made an effort to seek 
consensus from the non-voting participants from the Federal government and also directly cooperated with a 
parallel Task Force of government agencies. According to State law, the deliberations were open to the public. 
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This meant that members of the public could attend all meetings and provide input through public comment 
periods, including sub-committees and ad hoc meetings convened to address difficult issues. Interested par-
ties who were not Commissioners could also become members of working sub-committees and some were 
explicitly invited to do so. 
Although the Chair was appointed by the Governor’s initial planning group, the Commissioners accepted his 
legitimacy based on his impartiality in conducting the meetings. He was accepted because he ensured that all 
stakeholders were heard, designated representatives from a wide spectrum of interests to lead sub-groups, 
listened attentively, and demonstrated a sincere commitment to the group and to reaching consensus.
The Chair and facilitators conducted a conflict assessment, but it was ultimately the Commission that decided 
what issues should be on its agenda, and when and how to divide into smaller sub-committees. The group 
was able to agree that South Florida was currently ‘not sustainable’. It developed a common vision of what 
long-term sustainability in the Everglades could mean and agreed that the water management regime would 
have to be modified to get to what they envisioned. Sub-committees worked on specific issues, presented 
drafts to the plenary of its in-progress document highlighting recommendations as well as topics on which its 
members still disagreed.
The Commission convened scientific advisory sub-committees to address controversial technical issues, espe-
cially matters about which there was considerable uncertainty. Membership was open to anyone who was 
interested and a report was prepared for the plenary to use. Some uncertainties could not be resolved and 
the Commission decided to move ahead with an adaptive management approach, establishing a monitoring 
programme and evaluating contingent options.
The facilitators introduced a single text technique and prioritization processes that helped the Commission 
negotiate	a	final	Initial	Report.	After	a	year	and	a	half	of	meetings,	the	Commission	unanimously	adopted	this	
report. Afterwards, the Commission continued cooperating with federal agencies to develop a Comprehensive 
Ecosystem	 Restoration	 Plan	 (CERP)	 and	 identify	 how	 to	 prioritize	 and	 fund	 projects.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	
Commission’s mandate, representatives from both environmental interests and the sugar industry lobbied the 
government	to	implement	CERP.	In	the	end,	the	Commission’s	recommendations	were	incorporated	into	CERP	
and	into	new	legislation.	Relationships	built	through	participation	in	the	Commission	are	still	generally	good	
and	stakeholders	continue	to	be	involved	in	public	participation	efforts	linked	to	CERP	implementation.
Deciding whose interests should be considered can also extend to parties who do not currently 
wish to participate but who may have an interest in joining cooperative efforts in the future. In Case 
4.5 on the Mekong River Basin, the four countries in the lower part of the basin – Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, Viet Nam and Thailand – negotiated the 1995 Mekong Agreement on water management. This 
treaty could be relevant for the entire basin and accommodate the interests of non-participating 
countries in the upper part of the basin, China and Myanmar, should they wish to join in the future. 
One participant observed:
‘When we started the negotiations of the 1995 Mekong Agreement in early 1993, all four countries 
concurred that the contents of the agreement should be as equally fair and applicable to all ripar-
ians, even though two were not participating….Everyone acknowledged that planning and imple-
menting sustainable development could only be successfully undertaken if you took into consider-
ation the entire basin area and impacts, even though the two upper riparians were not members. It 
was discussed and well understood that those two countries could participate in the MRC,58  and the 
1995 Mekong Agreement made provision for their eventually joining the MRC.’59 
 The negotiating countries strove to make the Agreement inclusive by basing it on universally 
acceptable principles of international law and placing no prejudice on other riparians not party to 
the original agreement.60  Similarly in the Volta Basin, the Code of Conduct signed by Burkina Faso 
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and Ghana includes explicit provisions to promote its adoption by other riparian states (see Case 5.3 
in Chapter 5).
An assessment for the purpose of bringing the right parties to the table can be prepared as 
follows:
1. At the behest of a preliminary set of parties (the convenors of the negotiation), a neutral facil-
itator contacts various ‘circles’ of potential stakeholders to interview them on a confidential 
and not-for-attribution basis. In the first circle are the obvious players who have expressed an 
interest in being involved. When the facilitator interviews these individuals, he or she asks for 
their recommendations regarding other possible stakeholder groups to interview. This leads 
to a second, larger circle of contacts. The convenor also publicizes the fact that the assessment 
is underway. Groups that want to step forward can contact the facilitator directly. This group 
constitutes the third circle. 
2. Based on all these interviews, the facilitator maps the situation, preparing a report identify-
ing the most important categories of stakeholders and highlighting their key concerns. This is 
done without quoting any individual. This ‘map’ is sent to everyone interviewed so they can 
ascertain whether the issues they raised are adequately addressed. 
3. Once all the parties have responded, the facilitator proposes a design for the consensus-build-
ing process based on the results of the assessment. That is, the facilitator proposes a list of the 
stakeholder groups that should be invited to caucus and select a representative to be part of 
the negotiations. In addition, the process design includes a proposed agenda, ground rules, 
work plan (including joint fact-finding priorities), and a budget. This, too, is sent to everyone 
interviewed for their comments. 
4. Based on their reactions the facilitator either recommends that a consensus-building process 
(that the group has designed) proceed or not. At this point, the decision to go ahead is up to 
the convenor(s).
“ONCE THE PARTIES ARE AT THE TABLE IN CONSENSUS-BUILDING 
MODE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THEY REVIEW, FACE-TO-FACE, WHAT THEIR 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WILL BE”
4.3.2 Clarifying responsibilities – roles, agenda, ground rules
Once the parties are at the table in consensus-building mode, it is essential they review, face-to-
face, what their roles and responsibilities will be. The group as a whole, when it assembles for the 
first time, must approve the selection of the facilitator or chair as well as the agenda, work plan, 
budget, ground rules and joint fact-finding procedures. Despite any individual biases, facilitators 
should be able to provide impartial assistance to participants. If participants have persistent concerns 
about the neutral’s impartiality, they should be able to engage a different facilitator. 
For example, the Executive Agent of the Secretariat facilitated interactions between participants 
of the Interim Mekong Committee. However, some of the riparians became convinced that he and 
the Secretariat had lost their neutrality. They therefore excluded the Secretariat from negotiations 
toward a new agreement. Instead, UNDP took a more active role, assuming the Secretariat’s facilitat-
ing role, convening a new meeting and eventually contracting with an acceptable mediator. Because 
they were perceived as neutral by all parties, UNDP and the mediator were able to move the discus-
sion beyond a cooperation impasse and then through negotiations towards a new agreement that 
would address the parties’ critical issues.
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The group may ask the facilitator to prepare meeting summaries or designate one of its mem-
bers to do so. They may select a group leader or chair to represent the process to the world at large, 
although this task is sometimes assigned to the facilitator. Finally, before they begin, they may 
decide that some category of stakeholders is inadequately represented and agree to reach out to 
additional individuals or groups to augment the parties at the negotiation table. For groups that 
have limited experience in negotiations, the facilitator, or another third party, may build their capac-
ity to prepare for and engage in the process, as seen in Case 4.3 in Peru.
Case 4.3: Joint design of the negotiation process between BHP Billiton and 
affected communities over the Tintaya mine, Peru
A conflict between BHP Billiton and communities living near the Tintaya mine in Peru has centred on control and 
management of natural resources (expropriation of land), social and economic impact on communities (human 
rights violations, inadequate economic opportunities) and environmental impacts (to water and land). A series 
of dialogues was undertaken between 2001 and 2004 to bring the key parties together to negotiate the resolu-
tion of long-standing grievances and develop a more constructive relationship between communities and the 
mining company. In addition to representatives of the mining company and five neighbouring communities, 
the	multi-stakeholder	process	involved	national	and	international	NGOs	(National	and	Regional	Coordinating	
Committees	of	Communities	Affected	by	Mining	(CONACAMI	and	CORECAMI	Cusco),	CooperAccion,	Oxfam	
America and the Oxfam-Community Aid Abroad Mining Ombudsman’s Office in Australia) who helped to 
facilitate the process and strengthen the capacity of the indigenous communities to adequately prepare for 
and engage in the negotiations.
The MSP involved a series of stages to jointly develop the agenda and inclusive process for the negotiations, 
build trust, undertake joint studies to build shared understanding of the grievances, and negotiate a set of 
commitments. 
A draft agreement was written by a core committee representing all stakeholders and validated and amended 
through workshops with a wide number of representatives of the communities, company and NGOs where it 
was reviewed line by line. The final text was presented and approved in general assemblies in each of the five 
communities and signed by all parties.
The agreement addressed all grievances: it compensated community members with land (above and beyond 
what had been appropriated) together with technical assistance to help develop new livelihood opportunities; 
it formed an environmental oversight programme where community members played a key role in on-going 
monitoring of the company’s compliance with measures to reduce or mitigate environmental impacts; it 
formed a working group to oversee the company’s compliance with compensating confirmed victims of human 
rights violations and for assessing new allegations; it outlined steps to create and fund sustainable development 
plans to support medium and long-term development in affected communities; and committed the company 
to secure prior informed consent for future mining activities on new land. 
A multi-stakeholder Coordination and Follow-Up Committee was given the responsibility to implement and 
oversee the agreement. All parties committed to continue to use the dialogue tables to address and resolve 
emerging difficulties. The participants acknowledged that while the dialogues and resulting agreement had 
greatly transformed the relationships amongst the previously conflicting parties, a true collaborative relation-
ship depends on the effective and timely implementation of commitments and on-going engagement to 
resolve emerging issues. Achieving this transformation will require constant efforts to overcome the asymme-
tries of power that characterize relations between corporations and communities.
Consensus-building efforts only make sense if the participants involved make an on-going effort 
to stay in touch with the constituencies they ostensibly represent. For some groups this is easy – they 
have well established internal communication mechanisms. For other groups, it is much harder. This 
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is especially true for an ad hoc network of individuals or organizations cobbled together for the pur-
pose of participating in a consensus-building effort. Such groups may need help from the facilitator 
to establish channels for regular interaction. The participants are often asked to initial the ground 
rules spelling out the obligations of participants to maintain contact with the ‘constituencies’ they 
are expected to speak ‘for’ or speak ‘like’.
4.3.3 Deliberating – joint investigations, discussions, learning
Because many water ecosystems are complex and it may be difficult to assess current conditions, 
much less develop a shared vision for how they should function, negotiating parties typically engage 
in joint fact finding to inform their discussions. If participants know they want to cooperate but are 
unwilling to enter into negotiations towards an official agreement because they do not have enough 
information, they may start by creating mechanisms to collect data jointly.
“NEGOTIATING PARTIES TYPICALLY ENGAGE IN JOINT FACT
FINDING TO INFORM THEIR DISCUSSIONS”
 
The data-gathering activities of the Danube countries in the mid-1980s and of the Mekong 
Committee, mostly in the 1960s–1980s, show how countries can learn to work together at a tech-
nical level. In Case 4.3, community groups and NGOs worked with the mining company to define 
and undertake joint fact finding on key issues, prior to negotiating the action required. Similarly 
in Nepal, representatives from both pro- and anti-dam groups undertook a series of studies to 
jointly investigate the state of Nepal’s hydropower experience as an initial step to developing a set 
of country-specific guidelines based on the WCD report. The experience of working collectively, as 
well as the data collected, can build confidence that an agreement can be reached that will protect 
participants’ interests. 
If participants can officially agree on common principles, they may decide to postpone techni-
cal matters for later official implementing agencies to handle. The Danube nations decided on this 
approach, initially creating a framework agreement and leaving specific water quality standards to 
be dealt with on the agenda of the commission they established, the ICPDR. In this case, parties may 
need to establish data-collecting mechanisms that will provide joint information to inform subse-
quent decisions. So-called ‘third parties’ can play an important role in financing these mechanisms 
and building needed technical and professional capacity. However, as the Danube riparians learned 
before they generated joint official data, unless all participants agree on how data are to be gath-
ered, the information generated may not be accepted and useful later.
Participants may also be able to incorporate joint fact finding into on-going consensus-building 
negotiations. As described in the Mekong case, third parties can also help keep negotiations mov-
ing forward. When the four negotiating states reached an ‘impasse’ UNDP sponsored an informal 
consultation that led to each country reiterating its interest in cooperating. UNDP’s active involve-
ment by convening meetings, funding the Senior Advisor (neutral) and covering the costs of national 
delegates’ participation was critical in moving the negotiations towards their eventual success in 
drafting a framework agreement.
As in the Florida Everglades case, with the help of a neutral facilitator, the group might begin by 
reviewing the interests of each of the stakeholder groups. Together, the stakeholders then usually 
decide what kinds of data are relevant and needed. Stakeholders work together to design studies 
and strategies for obtaining data, analyzing them, and creating forecasts that can inform consensus 
decisions. In order to meet the needs of different kinds of stakeholders, data often take a variety 
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of forms, such as technical studies from numerous disciplines as well as local or indigenous knowl-
edge (i.e., things that people living in an area know that experts from outside might miss entirely). 
Consensus-building groups sometimes agree to invite a range of outside experts to present technical 
briefings, often highlighting disagreements about methods or assumptions. Technical sub-committees 
may be assigned to produce background reports for the group. Panels of experts may be assigned to 
help bring some members of the group up-to-speed on various technical considerations.
Once fact finding has been completed, the group typically engages in a brainstorming process. 
Informed by the results of joint fact finding, the goal is to invent options and packages that respond 
to the concerns of all the parties. Various tools can be used to assist participants in assessing options 
and reaching decision, as illustrated in Case 4.4 on water-use planning in British Columbia, Canada. 
Based on full group discussions as well as caucuses of various kinds, the neutral prepares a negotiat-
ing text that the group can review line by line. For some negotiations, this can involve simultaneous 
review of texts in multiple languages. Sometimes, if the group is large, there are on-line decision-
making aids that can be used to clarify possible choices and the ways in which different participants 
rate them. Similarly, web-based tools can be used to allow participants to interact between meetings 
with their constituents and share detailed reactions to complex negotiating texts. 
“THE GOAL IS TO INVENT OPTIONS AND PACKAGES THAT
RESPOND TO THE CONCERNS OF ALL THE PARTIES”
Case 4.4: Structured decision making in water-use planning in British Columbia, 
Canada 61 
The structured decision-making process of British Columbia’s Water-Use Planning initiative highlights how 
a deliberative process can unfold and depicts some of the group decision-making tools available. BC Hydro, 
regulators and a wide range of stakeholders, including local citizens, aboriginal representatives, environmental 
interests, resource users, governments and regulatory agencies, worked to identify specific issues for joint fact 
finding through technical sub-committees. Together, the group created a road map for a process through 
which they could voice and examine claims, explore trade-offs and the implications of alternatives, and search 
for new mutually acceptable alternatives. 
They were helped by specific decision-making tools: (1) objective hierarchies enabled all participants to contrib-
ute to identifying priorities and establishing criteria for evaluating alternatives; (2) influence diagrams helped 
participants use different techniques to explore the consequences of various alternatives, and to identify areas 
where mutually compatible gains were possible and where trade-offs remained; (3) ranking and weighting of 
trade-offs brought out value-based differences among stakeholders. Through this process, participants devel-
oped water-use recommendations that were linked to mechanisms for implementation. Finally, the process 
followed through with monitoring, capacity building, and a review of on-going policies to continue social 
learning and adaptive water management. 
4.3.4 Deciding – negotiating fairer and effective agreements
Complex water negotiations may take months or even years to resolve. Consensus building works 
best when a group sets an agenda (and a timetable) and sticks with it. A large group might schedule 
monthly meetings for six or eight months after an organizational session (at which the agenda and 
timetable were approved) and before a final meeting to sign an agreed-upon text. Between monthly 
meetings, sub-committees or caucuses might convene with the assistance of a facilitator to prepare 
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statements or reports for the full group. Building in sufficient time is essential to create the space 
for mutual gains to be identified and trading across preferences to occur, as seen in Case 4.5 on the 
Mekong Agreement.
“COMPLEX WATER NEGOTIATIONS MAY TAKE MONTHS OR EVEN 
YEARS TO RESOLVE”
Case 4.5: Trading across preferences in the Mekong River Basin 62 
In the Mekong negotiations, the four lower riparians reached an agreement for sustainable water resource use 
and	development,	and	established	the	Mekong	River	Commission	(MRC).	In	the	context	of	other	articles	in	the	
1995 Mekong Agreement, they agreed to a package including the principle of reasonable and equitable utiliza-
tion (Article 5). In particular, the countries wanted a flexible agreement that could adapt to future conditions 
but be specific enough to ensure that their interests were met on each one’s priority concerns. 
Thailand, initially concerned that other countries might try to veto proposed developments, advanced the 
position that each riparian should unilaterally be able to use tributary waters within its territory without the 
approval of the other riparians. Viet Nam, in agreement with Cambodia and Laos, was very concerned about 
maintaining flow levels in the mainstream during the dry season and advanced the position that the use of 
water from the mainstream should be agreed upon by a joint technical committee before any water was divert-
ed. In negotiations, Viet Nam suggested ‘…expressly recognizing that such consultation is not a right of veto 
by any riparian’ in subsequent iterations of the text for Article 5. Although this wording was eventually deemed 
unnecessary, it was an effort to address Thailand’s concern through reassurances that none of the principles 
of cooperation would be used to veto any country’s reasonable use of its rightful share of Mekong waters. 
The countries tentatively agreed in principle on the requirements for water use during the wet season in the 
tributaries and the mainstream, pending resolution of conditions on water use from the mainstream during 
the dry season. Article 6 of the Agreement details requirements for maintaining base flows on the mainstream, 
including during the dry season. In Article 26 the negotiating parties address the institutional framework and 
specify	how	the	MRC	Joint	Committee	would	develop	Rules	for	Water	Utilization	and	Inter-Basin	Diversions.	
The	Rules	include	assurances	that	notification	of	proposed	uses	will	provide	sufficient	time	for	planning	before	
the onset of the dry season. They also stipulate improved monitoring through hydrological stations and mecha-
nisms for monitoring intra-basin use and inter-basin diversions from the mainstream. 
These points can be considered part of the package that made Article 5, including conditions for water use 
from the mainstream during the dry season, acceptable to the parties. The package the countries eventually 
accepted builds on differences in the location (tributary or mainstream), kind of use (inter- or intra-basin), 
timing (wet or dry season) and type of procedural requirements (ranging from notification to prior consulta-
tion to specific agreement). While requiring agreement only for inter-basin dry season diversions, the text also 
incorporates	flexibility	into	the	agreement	by	creating	a	provision	under	which	the	MRC	Joint	Committee	can	
unanimously decide such agreement is not necessary. Although these details represent significant movement 
on the part of all parties from their initial positions, taken together they met each party’s issues of greatest 
concern. This is the kind of trading across preferences that can create value for negotiating parties.
At various stages, the facilitator might take ‘straw votes’ to test levels of support or opposition 
to particular ideas or packages. But no one should be asked to commit to anything until a full text of 
an agreement has been distributed and each representative can check back with his or her constitu-
ents (in whatever way makes sense for that group). When it appears that an agreement has general 
support,	the	facilitator	will	ask,	‘Who	can’t	live	with	this	package?’	At	that	point,	those	who	object	
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are usually asked to suggest ‘improvements’ that will make the package acceptable to them without 
making it worse for anyone who is already on board. Note that the facilitator does not ask whether 
everyone ‘is in favour of the agreement’. When asked whether they can ‘live with’ the agreement 
each participant is being asked to compare the package to no agreement at all, 63 Once a draft agree-
ment is formulated, each participant in a consensus-building process expects the others to check with 
all relevant stakeholders to be sure that they can, indeed, live with what is being proposed. Then, the 
negotiating group should come together one last time to ‘ratify’ the written agreement they have 
developed, often signing a statement committing the participants, if not their constituents, to work 
on behalf of the agreement and to support it publicly. In the case of binding international agree-
ments, there are established procedures for signature and ratification.
When an authority, such as a regulatory agency or government body retains the right, indeed, 
the responsibility to make a final decision regarding negotiations, it is often necessary to submit 
what has been worked out in an ad hoc forum to formal administrative review. At that time, the 
informally negotiated agreement is presented to the relevant decision makers as a proposal for their 
consideration, (the neutral may present the agreement on behalf of the full group), not as a final 
decision. Participants may be asked to testify at follow-up hearings. An inclusive consensus-building 
process can generate proposals that decision makers can act on with confidence that their decision 
and later implementation will be supported by all relevant parties. Alternatively, decision makers 
usually feel obliged to offer convincing reasons should they have chosen to depart from the partici-
pants’ proposal.
Before they are done, participants typically spell out the steps they think will be involved in 
implementing an informally negotiated agreement. The goal in a consensus-building process is to 
design ‘nearly self-enforcing agreements’.64 Ideally, a negotiated agreement will include a variety 
of contingent commitments that specify what the group’s preference is under various sets of future 
circumstances. This is a way of dealing with scientific or political uncertainty. The negotiated agree-
ment also ought to include a dispute-resolution clause. That is, for agreements to be nearly self-
enforcing, provisions should be included that spell out how one party can raise concerns if it thinks 
that the others are not doing what they promised or, for whatever reason, it no longer feels it can 
complete all the tasks it promised to complete. Before the whole agreement unravels, the facilitator 
may be called upon to reassemble the original participants and try to work out a modified set of 
commitments.
“THE GOAL IN A CONSENSUS-BUILDING PROCESS IS TO DESIGN 
‘NEARLY SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS’”
4.3.5 Implementing agreements – holding parties to their commitment
By the time a negotiated agreement is signed (and before it is sent to a formal convening agency if 
required for final action) participants ought to have discussed how they expect it to be implemented. 
As in the Danube and Nigeria cases, participants may want to create carefully calibrated monitoring 
strategies (see Case 4.6) and develop regular schedules for reporting and meeting to share and evalu-
ate results. Data that are collected, shared, analyzed and compiled through a transparent process are 
more likely to be accepted and considered legitimate. Regular meetings provide an opportunity for 
participants to reconvene and reconsider their agreement as well as any contingent provisions that 
are relevant in light of new data or changes in the basin. Sharing and discussing monitoring results 
can also build participants’ confidence that others are meeting their obligations. When participants 
are unable to meet their obligations despite good-faith efforts, it may be necessary to make financial 
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or technical support available. At a minimum, participants should make plans for on-going communi-
cation, cooperation and coordination. In some cases, this will involve creating some permanent body 
to assist the parties to the agreement.
“BY THE TIME A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT IS SIGNED …
PARTICIPANTS OUGHT TO HAVE DISCUSSED HOW THEY EXPECT IT 
TO BE IMPLEMENTED”
Case 4.6: Implementation considerations of the Komadugu Yobe Basin Water 
Charter in Nigeria 65
Nigeria has developed a Water Charter through a participatory process for the Komadugu Yobe Basin (KYB), 
a sub-basin of the international Lake Chad Basin.66 The Water Charter specifically addresses the roles of differ-
ent stakeholders in implementing the agreement as well as future mechanisms for cooperation among them. 
These include regular meetings, details about procedures for cooperating, and obligations for monitoring. The 
Charter includes institutional mechanisms for implementation that include the kinds of management bodies 
that are needed, their mandate and rules about their membership. It also details arrangements for funding 
implementation and how those funds will be administered. In the event of a dispute, the Charter specifies that 
the signatories (six Nigerian states and the federal government) first try to resolve their differences amicably 
amongst themselves. If they cannot, they are committed to refer their dispute to either the National Council of 
States or the Supreme Court of Nigeria, depending on whether the disagreement is between States or between 
a	 State	 and	 the	 federal	 government.	 Recognizing	 the	 international	 nature	 of	 the	 basin,	 the	Charter	 refers	
disputes between the federal government and other riparian nations to the dispute-settlement mechanisms in 
the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission Convention.
 
4.3.6 Organizational learning – adaptive management and building capacity
While most efforts to negotiate specific agreements end with the step listed above, on-going 
advisory committees or certain negotiating fora may convene on a continuing basis, via an assigned 
or created implementing organization. This is the case in the Mekong where the parties did not want 
a static agreement or formula for dividing water resources. Instead, the Mekong River Commission 
created a process that enables the parties to make water-sharing decisions based on changing condi-
tions. The 1995 Mekong Agreement stipulates that the Rules (or Procedures) for Water Utilization 
may change based on hydrological conditions, such as drought, flooding, or water surpluses during 
the dry season:
The idea and expectations were to provide a broad and flexible framework of principles, 
objectives and institutional structure so that as different issues took on priority, the Council, [Joint 
Committee (JC)] and Secretariat could adjust and adapt to the new needs. That is why the agree-
ment calls for rules or procedures by the Council and JC and allows for rule/procedure making by 
them so that they don’t have to go back and get government approval or amend the agreement.
The Danube countries built similar flexibility for technical working groups and rule making into 
their framework agreement for sustainable and equitable water management.
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“ON-GOING ADVISORY COMMITTEES OR CERTAIN NEGOTIATING 
FORA MAY CONVENE ON A CONTINUING BASIS”
The wish to create an adaptive institutional framework that can address future issues that are 
not yet clear relies heavily on monitoring that provides data to on-going planning and decision-
making meetings in which future policies can be revised. Participants in the Everglades negotiations 
decided to proceed in a step-wise manner and to view each policy intervention as an experiment that 
would provide information to inform subsequent actions. They therefore collaboratively developed 
a schedule and prioritized projects for incremental implementation. In this way the parties have rec-
ognized the scientific uncertainty about ecosystem dynamics, acknowledging that they didn’t know 
what would happen as the ecosystem moved back to more natural hydrological conditions. Due to 
the spatial and temporal scales and complexity of the Everglades, scientists and resource managers 
have not been able to fully implement field experiments. Nevertheless, they have pursued an adap-
tive management strategy characterized by a focus on the learning process through monitoring and 
use of models to test scenarios that inform on-going decision making. 
When this is the case, it is also important for all the stakeholders involved to spend at least 
some time together reflecting on how their negotiations have worked out and what they should 
learn from their experience, including from instances when consensus-building efforts fall short of 
expectation or meet serious barriers (see Box 4.1). This kind of social learning or capacity building is 
sometimes supplemented with further training in the techniques of group decision making. It would 
be a pity not to do everything possible to help each group improve its efforts if it is going to engage 
in on-going problem solving. All too often though, ad hoc negotiations, even those undertaken by 
advisory committees that will continue to interact, are seen as independent episodes and the oppor-
tunities for organizational development are lost.67
Photo 4.1 Fishing in the Hadeja-Nguru wetlands. Wetland restoration is supported by the Komadugu Yobe 
Trust Fund as part of the Catchment Management Plan negotiated by stakeholders (Nigeria).
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Box 4.1: Beware the pitfalls of adhocracy
The potential downside of consensus building is quite visible, especially where many agencies commit to ‘col-
laborate’ in a consensus-building style, but then violate the most important precepts of collaborative problem 
solving.
First, convenors sometimes ‘hand pick’ the stakeholder representatives they want at the table; i.e., rather than 
relying on a situation or conflict assessment prepared by a neutral, some convenors select the representatives 
they prefer.
Second, they do not always rely on professional neutrals to manage the consensus-building process; or if they 
do, the convenors independently select a facilitator without giving the participants a hand in selecting a facilita-
tor they prefer (or giving the parties control over the continued payment of the neutral).
Third, some agencies focus on discussion rather than the preparation of a written agreement that all sides can 
endorse and sign. Thus, there is dialogue but no clear consensus generated by the stakeholders involved and 
no commitment to implement what has been negotiated. 
A process that violates these fundamental precepts of best practice is seriously flawed. It may be more ‘partici-
patory’ than traditional hard bargaining, and it may include more extensive and transparent deliberations than 
many win-lose negotiations conducted behind closed doors by a handful of stakeholders, but it does not meet 
the minimum standards of consensus building. In these instances, consensus building is used as a smokescreen, 
giving traditional hard-bargaining approaches the appearance of being more collaborative. There is a range of 
negotiating strategies available in water negotiations, extending from hard bargaining among a small group, 
to somewhat more participatory and transparent dialogue that ends with a vote in which the majority decides 
what will happen or the imposition of a decision by the agency-in-charge, to a consensus-building process 
that is more inclusive and aims to achieve a workable agreement through joint fact finding, facilitated problem 
solving and the techniques of consensus building. 
The key question remains, is it possible to move in the direction of consensus building without shifting entirely 
away from the hard-bargaining approach? Or, is some participation by a limited set of stakeholders better than 
no participation at all? This is a choice that only those directly involved in each water negotiation must make. 
The barriers to consensus building, especially in places that have never operated in this way, can be substantial. 
The powerful parties will see any attempt to do things in a new and different way as a threat to their authority. 
They may misunderstand the role a neutral facilitator is supposed to play. The transparency and accountability 
that flow from joint fact finding may constitute a threat. And, finally, in many parts of the world short-term 
political concerns trump long-term considerations. 
The argument is not that different from the debate over democratizing the operation of government in places 
that have traditionally been run autocratically. Is it better to have a ‘little’ democracy rather than none at all? 
Many believe that some participation of stakeholders in water negotiations is better than none at all. But 
those in positions of authority should not be permitted to claim that they are engaging in consensus building 
if they are not.
4.4 Advice to water agreement negotiators
For water negotiators who want to move away from traditional hard bargaining toward a 
consensus-building approach, there are a series of steps that can be taken. Each follows from the 
analysis above:
1) Pay attention to process. 
•	 Although	 it	 may	 seem	 expedient	 to	 cut	 procedural	 corners,	 this	 often	 leads	 to	 delays	 or	
increased financial exposure caused by subsequent political and legal challenges or failed 
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implementation. By paying attention to the process of consultation, ensuring that the right 
parties are at the table in the first place (and are empowered to speak for their constituents), 
participants and decision-making authorities can generate fairer and more sustainable agree-
ments that strike an effective balance between science and politics. 
•	 Any	decision	about	whether	to	adopt	a	consensus-building	approach	ought	to	be	preceded	
by a situation or conflict assessment. An assessment maps out the stakeholders, their interests 
regarding the main issues, and may propose a design for the consensus-building process.
•	 A	consensus-building	process	should	seek	to	offer	parties	with	differing	interests	and	values	a	
chance to produce agreements that are better for all of them than their ‘no-agreement’ alter-
natives. Consensus is reached when ‘joint gains’ have been thoroughly explored, and explicit 
efforts have been made to meet the needs of all parties – though parties are never asked to 
give up pursuit of their own self-interest. 
•	 Consensus	does	not	require	unanimity,	 i.e.,	 that	all	parties	agree.	 It	does,	however,	 require	
that all parties will do their best to meet not only their own interests, but the interests of oth-
ers as well. 
2) Commit to use neutral services. It is easier to hold parties to their agreements if the 
group as a whole has engaged the services of a neutral mediator/facilitator and adopted 
explicit ground rules. 
•	 A	trained	neutral,	or	mediator,	is	needed	to	manage	group	problem	solving.	The	convenor	or	
any other party with a stake in the outcome should not be in charge of the dialogue. There are 
a great many skilled professional neutrals operating around the world. Any negotiating group 
that wants a facilitator or mediator should be able to find someone qualified to assist.
•	 One	 responsibility	 of	 a	 professional	 neutral	 is	 to	 remind	 the	 stakeholders	 throughout	 a	
consensus-building process of the procedural commitments they have voluntarily made. As an 
unbiased party, the neutral has the legitimacy to keep participants on track and discussions 
constructive. Indeed, the reason for asking participants to sign a set of ground rules they have 
helped to draft is to give the neutral the authority to act on the group’s behalf to rein in any 
participants who fail to abide by the norms the group has established.
3) Consensus building can only work when stakeholders self-identify and ‘own’ the design 
of the collaborative process. Expand the number of parties involved and find ways to 
include ‘unofficials’.
•	 Stakeholders	need	to	be	able	to	help	design	the	process	in	which	they	will	be	involved	so	they	
are confident that it is in their interest to participate. At a minimum, the first time they meet 
face to face they should formally adopt ground rules and agree on an agenda and timetable. 
They can revise these as necessary throughout the process. 
•	 Unless	all	the	key	stakeholders	support	the	results	of	a	negotiation,	implementation	of	com-
mon-pool resource agreements will be exceedingly difficult. Voluntary compliance reduces 
the difficulties of overseeing implementation, and ‘compliance without enforcement’ is much 
less expensive. The only way to get voluntary compliance is through direct participation by all 
relevant stakeholder groups. Some categories of stakeholders are best represented by indi-
viduals who have no other official responsibilities. This may mean that official representatives 
from one group will have to sit with individuals who don’t have the same ‘standing’ as they 
do. Nevertheless, it is in everyone’s interest to proceed in such a fashion.
4) Share information about interests and look at packages of options to find ways to create 
mutual gains. 
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Multi-issue, multi-party science-intensive negotiations are complex:
•	 Energy	should	be	focused	on	sharing	information	about	priorities	and	what	each	participant	
thinks are unacceptable outcomes. 
•	 In	order	to	be	able	to	prioritize	interests,	participants	need	to	be	well	prepared.	They	should	
know their ‘Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement’ (BATNA) and use it to evaluate all 
proposed agreements or packages generated by the group. 
•	 By	 looking	at	packages	of	options	 covering	all	 the	 issues	 in	a	negotiation,	participants	 can	
offer to support something that they care less about, in exchange for ‘getting’ what they want 
on the issues they care most about. If possible, participants should look at several packages at 
the same time to understand why players prefer one package over another. 
5) Understand that any agreement will only be useful for a limited period and you will only 
get things partially right. It is almost always better to pursue an adaptive management 
approach in seeking to resolve water disputes or set water management policy, then to 
try to lay out a long-term comprehensive solution. 
•	 Support	 your	arguments	with	 the	best	data	available.	However,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	of	 skill	 and	
knowledge to model most complex ecosystems with much precision. Thus, the assumptions 
upon which most negotiated water agreements are based are, at best, approximations. 
•	 Given	that	the	ability	to	model	these	systems	is	so	limited,	it	makes	sense	to	accept	agreements	
as approximations and build into them contingent elements, provisions for on-going monitor-
ing, and detailed arrangements for reconvening to update or fine-tune as new information 
becomes available. 
•	 If	 contingent	agreements	are	used,	 the	parties	need	to	have	a	clear	understanding	of	how	
they will come into play at critical moments. 
6) Ask parties to sign the written agreement they have helped to craft.
•	 The	act	of	signing	or	ratifying	a	negotiated	agreement	 is	an	 important	signal	to	the	public	
that a legitimate accord has been reached. 
7) Don’t neglect to link an informally negotiated agreement to whatever formal actions are 
needed by those in positions of authority to ensure its implementation. 
It is inappropriate to substitute adhocracy for representative democracy. Nevertheless, consensus-
building efforts can generate proposals that elected and appointed officials may prefer because all 
the relevant parties have clearly supported them. If negotiated agreements are ultimately brushed 
aside with little concern for the effort that has gone into generating them, it is highly unlikely that 
stakeholders will participate in such efforts in the future (or re-elect the public officials who act in 
such a cavalier fashion). Confidence in government will erode if those in positions of authority don’t 
offer convincing reasons to explain why they have decided to set aside the consensus proposals that 
have been put before them. 
8) Commit to capacity building (and organizational development) over time.
All too often, subsequent rounds of negotiations get increasingly difficult. This is usually because 
little or no effort is made to learn from what happens during earlier rounds or to make the necessary 
organizational development efforts required to enhance working relationships in the future. 
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C h a p t e r  5
Agreements
5.1 Outcomes from constructive engagement
Constructive engagement can lead to fairer and more effective decisions about how water is 
allocated, used and managed. The most tangible direct product of a negotiation is an agreement 
that clearly captures the decisions reached and outlines the steps for its implementation. There are 
many different types of agreements that can apply at various scales and levels – from local to inter-
national, from wells to micro-watersheds to river basins – and between a diversity of actors. 
“CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT CAN LEAD TO FAIRER AND MORE 
EFFECTIVE DECISIONS ABOUT HOW WATER IS ALLOCATED, USED 
AND MANAGED”
Translating the agreement into action is at the heart of effecting change, and requires on-going 
commitment. Stakeholders must continue to work together to reflect on the fairness and effective-
ness of implementation, resolve new differences and enhance cooperation. Negotiation about com-
plex water allocation and management issues is an on-going process.
Finalizing and implementing an agreement are important results of negotiations, but not the 
only outcomes. The less tangible results – improved relationships, enhancing understanding and bet-
ter processes for deliberation and decision making – are essential to enhancing water governance 
in the long run. These outcomes may start to appear long before an agreement is reached, and last 
long after a specific agreement is signed and enacted. 
Where MSPs do not lead to a formal agreement, these other outcomes can still be highly influen-
tial in the way water resources are allocated and managed. With the door to participation by wider 
groups of actors opened, understanding of the perspectives of other stakeholders can improve, for 
example, on the 4Rs of rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities related to water. A key motivator 
for people to engage in MSPs is to be heard – to have their issues valued and their ideas respected 
– so as to inform and shape negotiations and constructively influence decisions. More trusting and 
respectful relationships can result, enabling differences to be raised and addressed more fairly and 
effectively. This can open up the space for more creative exploration of options, and ideally more 
equitable water decision making.
“MORE TRUSTING AND RESPECTFUL RELATIONSHIPS CAN RESULT”
Managing MSPs, consensus building and other negotiation processes so they effect real change 
means paying attention to how an agreement is finalized – and particularly its content, coherence 
with the existing legal and policy framework, and enactment. For MSPs that aim to shape and inform 
external water negotiations, participants need to consider how best to capture the decisions from 
their dialogue – be they specific recommendations, analysis of options or issues for consideration – 
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and effectively influence the relevant decision makers. Finally, water actors should consider what 
can be done to build on the momentum created during constructive engagement to influence water 
decision making and governance more broadly. 
5.2 Understanding water agreements
5.2.1 What are water agreements?
An ‘agreement’ is the direct tangible product of negotiation that captures joint decisions and 
intentions. There are many types of water agreements: policies, laws, charters, codes of conduct, 
contracts or other agreements to manage and allocate water. Agreements can be formal or informal, 
legally binding or voluntary, verbal or written. 
Water agreements are negotiated at many scales and levels: for example international conven-
tions, river basin treaties, national laws and strategies, State or provincial regulations, watershed or 
catchment plans, and local agreements to manage or allocate water.
Water agreements include different intents and degrees of authority: some focus more on prin-
ciples, guidelines or frameworks of cooperation, others specify the legally binding means to manage 
and use water or settle disputes.
Water agreements involve many different actors – State and non-State – in terms of who influ-
ences its development, who is a party or signatory, and who it affects. 
Agreements are used to capture joint decisions and intentions on a wide range of issues related 
to water resource use, allocation and management. Such decisions can be reflected in a new water 
policy or law, in the establishment of a mechanism to manage waters, allocate them among differ-
ent users and different uses, regulate shared water resources, or settle water disputes. They may 
address water issues in general, or apply to specific sectors or water uses, such as to electricity, water 
transfers, or agriculture. 
Not all policies, laws or rules are the product of constructive engagement. However, to be 
legitimate – and ideally fair and effective – water resource agreements about complex allocation 
and management should be informed and shaped by processes where the range of interests are 
genuinely represented and deliberated.
“AN AGREEMENT IS THE DIRECT TANGIBLE PRODUCT OF
NEGOTIATION”
5.2.2 Benefits of formalizing agreements
 There are many reasons why it is worth the effort to capture the decisions from negotiations in 
a formal, signed document. 
Agreements make public and explicit the goodwill of the parties involved in a negotiation to 
reach fairer and more effective use of water and care for water-related resources. A water agree-
ment secures commitments from the parties, be they governments, corporations, civil society orga-
nizations (CSOs) or individuals.
Agreements bring more certainty and more transparency to expected rewards, risks, rights and 
responsibilities. They provide a clear framework for verifying implementation. Good agreements 
include clear steps to address future differences, inadequate implementation of the agreements, or 
breaches of them. The clearer the agreement, the less its provisions will be contested and the greater 
its legal strength in terms of its binding and enforcing effects. 
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The value of formalizing an agreement is highlighted by a case from Bhutan. Farmers in seven 
villages participated in role-playing exercises to help resolve long-standing conflicts over water shar-
ing for rice irrigation. At the end of one of the exercises, farmers agreed on a fairer means for allo-
cating water. However, during the subsequent planting season, upstream farmers failed to release 
water as per their verbal agreement. When confronted, the upstream farmers claimed they wanted 
a written, signed agreement. A further workshop was convened, during which farmers agreed to 
create a new committee to regulate the management of watershed resources. The constitution and 
bylaws for the watershed management committee were developed during the following months and 
signed by representatives from all villages.68
“AGREEMENTS MAKE PUBLIC AND EXPLICIT THE GOODWILL OF 
THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN A NEGOTIATION”
Agreements that result from inclusive and deliberative negotiation processes can be smoother 
to implement and avoid the setbacks and associated costs and time that can occur when people feel 
they have not been heard. This was seen in the Florida Everglades (case 4.2), where stakeholders 
who felt their interests had not been met used litigation to block a proposed Act. The agreement 
reached during the subsequent consensus-building process was used to develop the Comprehensive 
Ecosystem Restoration Plan. Resistance was even more dramatic during the Bolivian ‘Water Wars’ 
where conflict was violent prior to a turn towards constructive engagement. This constructive, 
deliberative shift eventually resulted in new ‘water for irrigation’ legislation being presented to and 
unanimously passed through the Bolivian parliament.69
5.2.3 Determining the agreement focus
Water agreements can take many forms, address a wide range of water and related issues and 
govern the behaviour of many kinds of actors. It is important that from the outset of negotiations, 
water actors should be clear on what type of agreement is sought. Determining the most suitable 
type of agreement can be done by asking a series of questions about issues, authority and influence, 
scales and levels, and actors. This will guide stakeholders on what type of agreement is required, 
for example a policy, law, charter or code of conduct, contract or other allocation and management 
arrangement.
“WATER AGREEMENTS CAN TAKE MANY FORMS”
Issues 
The starting point when developing an agreement (or planning an MSP or negotiation) is the 
issues	or	problems	that	will	be	addressed.	Why	is	an	agreement	desired?	What	will	it	achieve?
Agreements can span all water-related issues. They may be intended to provide strategic policy 
directions for water use in general such as Brazil’s 1997 Water Law, or for a particular sector such 
as energy.
Agreements can map out the basis for cooperation between States on shared waters, such as 
the 1994 Danube River Protection Convention,70 or specify institutional arrangements for water man-
agement as in the 1997 regulations that established the Tarim Basin Water Resources Commission 
in China.71 Agreements can provide broad guidance on good practice in a particular sector as do the 
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2004 IHA Sustainability Guidelines 72 – that by 2010 have evolved into a Hydropower Sustainability 
Assessment Protocol – or address a range of land and water management behaviour as does the 2006 
Volta Basin Code of Conduct in West Africa (see Case 5.3). They can specify mechanisms to allocate 
and manage water such as the 1987 Murray-Darling Basin Water Sharing Agreement.73 Their time-
frame may be long as in the Umatilla Sub-Basin 2050 Water Management Plan in Oregon USA,74 or 
resolve a specific dispute as with the Community Mine Continuation Agreements in PNG (see Case 
2.3). 
All stakeholders engaged in creating an agreement need a common and specific understanding 
of its purpose.
“AGREEMENTS CAN SPAN ALL WATER-RELATED ISSUES” 
Authority and influence
A second issue to consider is the degree of authority. This relates to whether an agreement is 
meant to influence through principles, guidelines or recommendations, or to serve as the authority 
by setting laws or specific rules.
Many agreements are guiding in nature, in that they set out broad policies or recommended 
actions. Parties are typically held accountable through peer or public pressure. Many international 
conventions aim to influence global behaviour, and States are responsible for enacting laws and 
programmes to implement them. Similarly, codes of conduct or charters set principles for specific 
members or signatories, for example transnational financiers in the case of the Equator Principles, 75 
or institutions and individuals living within the Komadugu Yobe Basin (KYB) in Nigeria for the KYB 
Water Charter. 76
Other agreements are very specific, and detail actions, rights and responsibilities. Many of these 
agreements are enforceable by law (traditional or conventional), and take the form of contracts, 
regulations or bilateral treaties.
Scales and levels
It is important to clarify the appropriate scale and level for the agreement. Scales are most often 
thought of spatially – what physical boundary or territory will be subject to the agreement. There can 
be administrative, hydrological or ecological scales. It may also be useful to consider the temporal 
scale of an MSP or agreement, and levels within them (Chapter 3). Scales and levels are important 
as they clarify the boundary for the agreement and, as a result, suggest key actors. Yet care must 
be taken so as not to exclude actors, issues or territory. Water-related MSPs and agreements may 
be purposefully cross-scale or cross-level to accommodate differences between administrative and 
hydrological scales for example.
Whilst acknowledging that there can be cross-scale and cross-level interactions, identifying the 
dominant territorial level of an agreement – local, national (and sub-national), international (and 
regional) or transnational – is one useful method to distinguish different types of agreement (see 
below and Table 5.1).
“IT IS IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY THE APPROPRIATE SCALE AND 
LEVEL FOR THE AGREEMENT”
Local 
Local agreements govern behaviour at a specific location within a nation-state. They can apply 
to an administrative unit (municipality, district, village etc.), such as the 2006 Douglas Shire Water 
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Quality Improvement Plan in nothern Queensland, Australia or the contract between local authori-
ties and women’s groups for water system maintenance in Gujarat, India.77 They can also be devel-
oped for a specific lake or watershed, as seen in the efforts of communities in Guatemala and Mexico 
to move towards integrated management of micro-watersheds near the Tacaná volcano.78
Some MSPs and negotiations target local governance processes and provide an important 
means of influencing more sustainable and equitable water management and use. Case 5.6 later in 
this chapter outlines the steps taken by community groups and NGOs to influence district policy in 
India.
National
National agreements apply within a single nation-state, governing the behaviour of citizens and 
others operating within a country. They include policies and laws at the various levels of jurisdiction 
that might exist in any country – national, provincial, etc. – as well as agreements that are specific 
to a river basin, watershed, lake or aquifer that fall entirely within a State such as Australia’s Great 
Artesian Basin Strategic Management Plan. While some negotiations focus on the development or 
amendment of a specific policy or law, in many countries water-related reform occurs in a more 
comprehensive manner. As outlined in the IUCN toolkit RULE, reforms of policies, laws and institu-
tions build a national water governance capacity. RULE provides detailed guidance on developing 
and implementing water governance reform processes. For example, in South Africa, substantial 
systemic overhauls created new policies and laws, and the institutions and processes to implement 
them (see case 5.1). 
Case 5.1: Comprehensive water reform in South Africa
After the creation of the new South Africa in the mid 1990s, water issues were among many that were over-
hauled. Early negotiations produced a list of 28 ‘fundamental principles and objectives’ for a new national 
water law. A national water policy was adopted by cabinet in 1997, and subsequently the National Water Act 
1998	was	drafted	and	adopted.	This	basic	framework	has	since	been	enhanced	by	a	National	Water	Resources	
Strategy, the first edition of which was finalized in September 2004. More detail is being added in each step 
– policy to law to management of implementation at different levels and scales. Further progress has seen 
the adoption of provincial water sector plans, such as in Mpumulanga Province in 2006. The point is that a 
package of agreements is required in South Africa (as in any other country), and at each stage various styles 
of negotiation become important.
A notable achievement in these reforms has been to specify how principles of decentralized and collaborative 
management of water and water resources will be put into practice. The National Water Act recognizes the 
importance of involving civil society, the private sector and industry in the management of water resources. It 
specifies the establishment of stakeholder participatory river basin management institutions such as the catch-
ment management agencies, catchment management fora and water user associations. Catchments have 
become the primary units for negotiation over water resources management, and catchment management 
fora in particular have become river basin-wide institutional spaces where emergent representational possibili-
ties and participatory action could shape new institutional forms and programmes. These fora address local 
interests and allow poor community members to participate more effectively in the management of water 
resources,	as	seen	in	the	Kat	River	Valley	Forum.79
International 
International agreements are agreements between States, governing the behaviour of State 
actors. These include global, regional, multilateral and bilateral agreements, such as UN declarations 
of principles, conventions and treaties. There are examples of international agreements that govern 
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the behaviour of States in their entire jurisdiction such as the Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992), as well as agreements for specific 
transboundary basins, aquifers and lakes such as that to launch the Nile Basin Initiative in 1999,80 and 
another to guide water-facility sharing for inter-State use of the Chu and Talas waters signed by the 
governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2000.
Regional water agreements are also increasingly being negotiated, such as the European Union 
Water Directive 2000, the Inter-American water cooperation agreement (2006) and a protocol to 
guide the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) whose members share many rivers.
Transnational 
Transnational agreements transcend nation states, and govern the behaviour of transnational 
actors wherever they operate. The critical feature of these agreements is that they focus on the 
behaviour of non-State actors, be they institutions or individuals, who commit to abide by the con-
tent. The role of individual countries, or the governments of these States, is not central. 
Transnational actors come in many shapes and forms:
•	 NGOs	such	as	WWF	and	International	Rivers.	
•	 Industry	 bodies	 such	 as	 the	World	 Business	 Council	 on	 Sustainable	 Development	 (WBCSD),	
the International Water Resources Association (IWRA), and the International Hydropower 
Association (IHA). 
•	 Financiers	of	development,	including	individual	banks	or	international	financing	institutions.	
•	 International	 organizations	 working	 on	 water	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Water	 Council	 (WWC),	
International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and IUCN.
Many transnational agreements are codes of conducts that set guidelines for behaviour. These 
are generally not legally binding and compliance can be more difficult to assess or enforce as it is 
done through peer or public pressure. Transnational water-related agreements also include the strat-
egies, policies and programmes developed by non-State actors which guide their actions globally. 
Actors and parties 
The key questions from the perspective of formulating an agreement are who will sign and 
therefore be accountable, and who will be governed. Although many actors may participate in an 
MSP, the signatories will depend on the type of agreement.
Most international agreements and national policy and law are signed by State representatives. 
Transnational agreements are typically signed by specific transnational actors. Charters and codes of 
conduct can be signed by a range of actors, as can contracts and other allocation and management 
agreements. 
Being clear on who will sign the agreement will guide actors in determining who needs to be 
engaged in negotiations, and how to design the process. However, when remembering the broader 
process of constructive engagement, MSP stakeholders can still negotiate and sign a set of recom-
mendations aimed at informing decision making by external authorities.
“THE KEY QUESTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF FORMULATING 
AN AGREEMENT ARE WHO WILL BE ACCOUNTABLE AND WHO 
WILL BE GOVERNED”
5.3 Types of agreements
Agreements can be broadly classified into policy, law, charters and codes, contracts and other 
allocation and management arrangements. These are broad categories with some overlap. The 
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language of agreements, and in particular law and policy, can be very confusing especially when 
operating in multiple languages. The same type of agreement can be called several things, depend-
ing on the actors involved and the legal and political context. The point is to be clear on what the 
agreement is intended to do, and how it will influence or govern behaviour, and not overfocus on 
its title. Types of agreements are summarized in Table 5.1. (see pages 86 and 87)
5.3.1 Policy
Policy sets out the general principles, objectives and strategic priorities that guide a government 
or organization in the management of its affairs. Policies are created at all levels of government 
and by other institutions. They are developed at all scales and levels, including documents to guide 
global practice. Although policy documents may be the responsibility of a single institution, they can 
be influenced by multiple actors.
There are many words associated with policy such as declarations, strategies, strategic plans 
and visions. Water policies (and strategies, plans, visions) provide the guiding framework for water-
related care, use and management. 
In Australia, the Great Artesian Basin Strategic Management Plan (2000), for example, set the 
strategic policies for managing the transboundary, multi-jurisdictional basin and laid the framework 
for more specific local plans, such as Queensland’s Water Resource (Great Artesian) Plan (2006). 
Negotiations between the governments of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia led to a joint Ministerial 
declaration in 2005 to establish a more formal institutional means of coordination and management 
for the Northwestern Sahara Aquifer System (better known as SASS, its French acronym), one of the 
first of its kind for transboundary aquifers.81 While they may be limited in detail, such agreements 
can be important milestones in building understanding and trust, and therefore lay the foundation 
for more specific agreements in the future.
5.3.2 Law
Law transforms policy into operating rules. In most cases, policies are developed first, followed 
by laws which are usually more specific and action-oriented. However this is not a hard-and-fast rule 
as policy-type documents can also be developed together with procedures and regulations to imple-
ment law (see Case 5.1) There are many terms associated with law, and differences between them 
can be quite subtle. In general, conventions, treaties and accords are laws signed by several countries. 
The terms act, bill, statute, decree, regulation and procedure refer most commonly to national (or 
sub-national) legislation and their implementing rules. 
5.3.3 Charters and codes of conduct
Charters and codes of conduct are typically used to establish a set of shared principles or guide-
lines that will guide the behaviour of a set of actors. They vary in their detail – from mapping out 
broad cooperation to specifying behaviours and actions that parties will abide by. The KYB Water 
Charter in Nigeria, for example, includes specific responsibilities and rules for land and water use and 
management in a particular basin in a single country (see Case 4.6 in Chapter 4). 
Charters and codes can be location-specific and apply to all individuals or institutions in a given 
area, as is the case for the KYB Water Charter in Nigeria, the Volta Basin Code of Conduct (see Case 
5.3) or the Fraser Basin Charter for Sustainability.82
Alternatively, they can focus on specific actors regardless of where they operate, such as the 
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol or the Equator Principles which apply to financiers 
of development. 
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In China, the Beijing-based Global Environment Institute (GEI), the University of International 
Business and Economics, and the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning collaborated with 
government officials to develop a code of conduct for the forestry sector for Chinese enterprises 
operating outside China. The code was signed in 2007 by the Ministry of Commerce and the State 
Forest Administration and requires Chinese companies to adhere to the laws of the countries in 
which they operate, even if those laws are being only loosely followed by other forestry actors. 
Chinese companies now risk being in violation of Chinese law in addition to the law of countries 
hosting their activities. This may be a powerful deterrent to destructive business practices. Buoyed 
by the potential of the forestry sector guideline, another has been negotiated in 2008 aimed at 
improving the behaviour of Chinese companies operating around the world in other sectors, includ-
ing energy and water. The negotiating parties again include Chinese NGOs, academia, government 
officials and business representatives.
“CHARTERS AND CODES OF CONDUCT ARE TYPICALLY USED TO 
ESTABLISH A SET OF SHARED PRINCIPLES OR GUIDELINES”
Charters and codes can be developed and adopted by a set of common stakeholders, as was 
the case for the Equator Principles and the original IHA Sustainability Guidelines, or be the product 
of a more multi-stakeholder process. In Canada, for example, a set of recommendations was devel-
oped based on the National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the Canadian 
Extractive Industry in Developing Countries. The roundtables were convened by the Government of 
Canada, and a multi-stakeholder advisory group, composed of representatives of Canadian industry 
and civil society, negotiated and signed a set of recommendations that aim to reduce the consider-
able potential negative social and environmental effects of the mining, oil and gas sectors in devel-
oping countries, and more equitably distribute its benefits. The recommendations include proposed 
CSR guidelines including standards, reporting and compliance mechanisms.
5.3.4 Contracts
Contracts are legally binding agreements that specify water allocation and management. They 
occur at multiple scales and involve a diversity of actors. Contracts are enforced through national 
contract law or international law.
“CONTRACTS ARE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS THAT SPECIFY 
WATER ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT”
National and sub-national authorities typically sign contracts with hydropower operators to sup-
ply electricity. Local authorities may use contracts to maintain village water systems, as is the case in 
western India where women’s groups were hired to maintain water pumps. 
Bilateral contracts can specify water sales or assurance of supply within or between countries. 
Examples of the latter include contracts between Malaysia and Singapore, Lesotho and South Africa, 
Canada and the USA.
Public-Private Partnerships are another example of contracts. The Nam Theun 2, Laos’ largest 
hydropower project, is an example of a build-own-operate-transfer scheme. A private company 
owned by a consortium of international State-owned and private power companies will transfer the 
project facilities to the government after its construction and operation for 25 years.
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5.3.5 Other allocation and management agreements
A final category includes other agreements that govern the allocation and management of 
water. They can involve various combinations of State and non-State actors. These types of agree-
ments are commonly enabled by policy and law, and document specific operating rules, set forth 
programmes or workplans, or are used to resolve a dispute. 
The 1987 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, for example, is a water-sharing agreement between 
Australia’s Federal government and five State/territory members. It is the largest integrated catch-
ment management programme in the world, covering an area of over one million km2. The agree-
ment sets out the objectives, functions and composition of the new institutions and the procedures 
to be followed for improving natural resource management, water distribution, asset management 
and financial disbursements. The Murray-Darling Basin Initiative, as it is known, is also a partner-
ship between State and communities. The organizational structure has changed during its first 20 
years. For a period it included a Community Advisory Committee who advised the Ministerial Council 
from a community viewpoint on critical natural resource management issues including indigenous 
issues. More recently, in 2008, the Murray-Darling Basin Commission has been transformed into the 
Murray-Darling Basin Authority, with various shifts in power, in an on-going institutional experiment 
searching for sustainability. Although the troubles of the Murray-Darling Basin remain huge, and 
are worsening, after 20 years the agreement remains a key reference point for deliberations and 
decision making.83 
Many local agreements fall under this category. Some are formal written agreements such 
as the agreement between farmers in Bhutan to manage watershed resources collectively, or the 
Memorandum of Agreement described in Chapter 2 between the government-operated Ok Tedi 
mine, affected communities and other stakeholders in PNG. The Memorandum captured the agree-
ments of an 18-month review of Community Mine Continuation Agreements. They secured com-
munity consent for the on-going operation of the controversial mine, on the condition of adequate 
compensation to affected communities and the creation of a foundation to support new sustainable 
development actions (see Case 2.3).
Other agreements are less formal and can even be verbal. This does not necessarily translate into 
ambiguity or less rigour in implementation, as seen in Case 5.2 of the centuries-old furrow water 
management system established by the Chagga people of Tanzania.
Case 5.2: The locally negotiated nuances of furrow water management in 
Tanzania
The Chagga people of Tanzania are renowned for having established and maintained the Chagga furrow water 
management system, which has survived in some places for centuries and remains important in the Kilimanjaro 
highlands. The open furrow system continues to provide water for drinking and irrigation and is an important 
backup when new piped systems sometimes fail to deliver due to either poor maintenance or drought. 
Detailed and site-specific water management rules were negotiated in the Chagga system to maintain the 
quality of water and to regulate its distribution. In one village where water is abundant, for example, the only 
limitation on using furrows is that the water is reserved for drinking between 5 and 6 a.m. In other areas, water 
is allocated to different villagers on different days of the week. In one upstream village, there are seasonal 
restrictions, so that downstream farmers can irrigate their fields.
Furrow management has survived Tanzania’s post-independence period with many of its main features intact. 
The water is still largely managed locally through elected furrow leaders and furrow councils, some covering 
several villages. Since 1982 local authorities have been formally empowered (or re-empowered) to deal with 
breaches against local bylaws. This has given furrow managers greater authority to ensure compliance.
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 5.4 Formulating agreements
Once there is clarity on the most appropriate type of agreement for a specific negotiation, atten-
tion shifts to how to formulate the agreement. This involves three topics:
•	 ensuring	coherence	with	the	existing	legal	and	policy	framework
•	 determining	the	content
•	 steps	needed	to	finalize	and	enact	the	agreement
5.4.1 Ensuring legal and policy coherence
Agreements at all levels must be developed in the context of the existing policy and legal frame-
work. Without coherence with wider policies and laws, agreements are likely to be unworkable and 
a source of dispute rather than contributing to better water governance. To achieve coherence, it is 
critical that negotiators understand the implications of existing frameworks for a new agreement. A 
review of relevant policies and law is therefore a vital first step in the process of formulating a new 
water agreement. 
Such a review must examine the legal framework that governs an agreement. As the IUCN toolkit 
RULE details, this framework encompasses international treaties and national laws which are legally 
binding, and ‘soft law’ agreements that are more difficult to enforce but represent commitments by 
governments and can offer useful guidance on best practice. Each is relevant to negotiations at both 
international level and within States, because they are obligations that a new agreement must not 
contradict if it is to be workable. 
“AGREEMENTS AT ALL LEVELS MUST BE DEVELOPED IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE EXISTING POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK”
There is now a developing body of global inter-governmental agreements with implications for 
water policy and law that need to be taken into account. Examples include:
•	 Dublin	Principles,	1992
•	 Convention	on	the	Law	of	Non-Navigational	Uses	of	International	Watercourses	(International	
Watercourses Convention), 1997
•	 Millennium	Declaration	and	Millennium	Development	Goals,	2000
•	 Johannesburg	Plan	of	Implementation,	2002
At national and sub-national levels, a review is needed of laws and policies in all sectors relevant 
to an agreement. For water-related agreements, this means examining legislation and policies with 
direct application to water, for example, a national water law or water resources development 
strategy. It is vital, however, that the review extends to water-related components of law and policy 
applying to other sectors and issues, including agriculture, forest, land, climate change, environment, 
energy and hydropower. 
Agreements thus do not operate in isolation. They must be developed while being cognizant of 
existing agreements and commitments, including those made in other sectors. Achieving coherence 
among agreements requires on-going analysis, negotiation and amendments. Agreements influence 
subsequent agreements, both in terms of their content and the process used. 
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5.4.2 Agreement content
While there is no blueprint or template, agreements should exhibit some core features, regard-
less of their type. The clearer the agreement, the more effective its implementation and more likely 
it is to achieve the desired outcomes.
A good agreement should define and describe:
Scope 
What	issues	are	to	be	addressed?	Where	does	the	agreement	apply	and	whose	behaviour	does	
it	govern?	What	are	the	rewards,	risks,	rights	and	responsibilities	of	all	parties	and	those	affected	
by	the	agreement?
The scope can cover geography, actors and issues. As demonstrated by the diversity of examples 
in this book, water agreements span a range of issues, places and people. The specificity and detail 
will depend on the intent of the agreement.
Governance mechanisms 
How	will	the	agreement	be	implemented	in	practice?	Who	has	what	responsibility?	When	and	
how	will	parties	interact	during	implementation?
The roles and responsibilities of all actors regarding the governance of the agreement should be 
stipulated. An existing institution may be selected to manage the implementation of the agreement, 
or a new institution could be formed. Agreements are often used to create new water management 
bodies, such as a river basin organization or commission. There may be separate bodies created for 
policy decisions, implementation or advice (for example with community representatives or technical 
specialists).
Financing 
Who	will	 pay	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 agreement,	 including	monitoring	 and	 learning?	
How	will	this	financing	be	administered?
All agreements require funding of some sort – even those not focused on action require fund-
ing for parties to continue to meet to monitor the implementation of their agreement or to take it 
forward. Unclear funding arrangements can quickly sour constructive relationships. The agreement 
should specify which parties will provide which resources (cash or in-kind) or how external finances 
will be sought. It should further specify how funds will be administered.
“THE AGREEMENT SHOULD SPECIFY WHICH PARTIES WILL PROVIDE 
WHICH RESOURCES”
Data and information sharing 
What	is	to	be	shared	and	how?
While this may not be a core component of all agreements, sharing of information is a common 
starting point for cooperation as it builds understanding and can facilitate improved planning and 
action. Due to its potentially sensitive nature, it is useful to clarify what information needs to be 
shared and how.
“SHARING OF INFORMATION IS A COMMON STARTING POINT
FOR COOPERATION”
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Compliance 
How	shall	parties	demonstrate	effective	implementation?	How	will	they	be	held	accountable?	
There should be clear guidelines on how the implementation of the agreement will be moni-
tored.	Who	will	report	what	and	when?	Joint	reviews	enable	all	parties	to	reflect	on	progress	and	
to approach monitoring as an opportunity for on-going learning and adaptive management. The 
agreement should also consider provisions to enable compliance, such as institutional support 
through capacity building or funding.
Enforcement and dispute resolution 
What	recourse	is	available	to	address	non-compliance	or	breach	of	the	agreement?	What	legal	
framework	governs	the	agreement?	How	can	affected	parties	express	and	resolve	their	grievances?	
How	shall	future	differences	or	disputes	be	resolved?
Agreements should specify actions to be taken in the case of non-compliance or breach of the 
agreement. Ideally, the parties will be able to resolve differences through additional engagement 
and negotiation. This reinforces the importance of regular meetings or fora to assess progress and 
negotiate action to address issues. 
When parties are unable to resolve differences or conflicts amongst themselves, there are several 
alternative routes: using the legal system that governs the agreement; applying public or peer pres-
sure through diplomacy or campaigns; or seeking third-party mediation or arbitration. The agree-
ment needs to include the full range of enforcement and dispute-resolution mechanisms (Box 5.1) 
and to specify the cases in which each will be used.
Box 5.1: Dispute-resolution options
Legally binding agreements such as contracts, treaties and law are governed by the relevant national or inter-
national law and associated courts of justice where civil and criminal law will be applied. 
Non-legal agreements still represent a ‘binding’ contract between parties, but the recourse in case of non-
compliance includes various kinds of peer or public pressure. For example, co-signatories can use diplomacy 
to hold parties to their word, or seek the intervention of a mediator or arbitrator. Public campaigns and other 
forms of advocacy are frequently used by external stakeholders to pressure State or industry actors to abide 
by their policies or codes of conduct. Elections are another means for citizens to express dissatisfaction with 
government policy and action.
Parties may also seek external support to resolve a conflict through mediation or arbitration. Sometimes 
referred	 to	 as	Alternative	Dispute-Resolution	Mechanisms	 (since	 they	 are	 an	 alternative	 to	 litigation),	 these	
approaches are similar but differ in the role of the third party. Mediation involves an independent third party 
who works with the parties to assist them to reconcile their differences. During arbitration, a neutral third party 
hears the evidence and independently decides on action to be taken.
Date of effect, duration and amendment procedures 
When	 does	 the	 agreement	 come	 into	 effect?	When	 does	 it	 expire?	How	will	 changes	 to	 the	
agreement	be	made?
Date of effect can be as simple as a certain date, or be conditional on the signing or endorsement 
of a specific number of parties. The agreement can terminate on a specific date, or upon completion 
of specified tasks. Agreements should specify the process by which amendments can be made, for 
example, by mutual agreement by all parties.
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“EACH AGREEMENT MUST BE TAILORED TO SPECIFIC ISSUES AND 
ACTORS”
There is no perfect agreement that can serve as a template. Each agreement must be tailored 
to specific issues and actors. Case 5.3 on the Volta Basin Code of Conduct and 5.4 on the Bhutan 
Watershed Management Bylaws are examples of comprehensive agreements.
Case 5.3: The Volta Basin Code of Conduct
A	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 between	 the	 governments	 of	 Burkina	 Faso	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Ghana	 was	 finalized	
in July 2006 for the sustainable and equitable management of shared water resources of the Volta Basin 
Development. The Code was supported by IUCN as part of a series of joint actions by the Directorate of Water 
Resources	of	Burkina	Faso	and	the	Water	Resources	Commission	of	Ghana,	undertaken	while	the	Convention	
on	the	Status	of	the	Volta	River	and	the	Establishment	of	the	Volta	Basin	Authority,	a	six-country	framework	
agreement for managing and conserving the resources of the basin, was in its initial stages of establishment. 
(The convention was subsequently signed in 2007). 
The Code of Conduct consists of eight parts and 59 articles that outline the principles, guidelines, joint activities 
and implementation mechanisms as follows:
Preamble
PART I: General Provisions
 Five articles on definitions, aims, objective, scope of application and legal nature.
PART II: Management Principles 
 Twenty-five articles outlining principles related to sustainable development, integrated water resources man-
agement, cooperation and governance.
PART III: Guidelines
 Five articles with guidelines on: environmental flows, integrated strategies, harmonization of laws and poli-
cies, good environmental practices, and steps to create a multilateral convention for coordinated management 
of the Basin.
PART IV: Joint Actions 
 Fifteen articles specifying joint actions including: development and implementation of policies, strategies 
and programmes; data and information sharing; research, monitoring and assessment; awareness building and 
capacity building; and conservation and sustainable use.
PART V: Institutional Arrangements
 Four articles that outline the establishment of a multi-stakeholder Consultative Commission responsible for 
coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the Code of Conduct. The detailed composition, functions 
and operational rules of the commission are to be developed in a separate addendum. 
PART VI: Dispute Resolution
 One article that calls on parties to resolve disputes peacefully, first with the aid of the Consultative 
Commission and, if unsuccessful, using diplomatic channels.
PART VII: Promotion of the Code of Conduct 
 One article requiring States to encourage other riparian basin States to adopt the Code.
PART VIII: Final Provisions
 Three articles stipulating how other riparian States may become members, how it will be amended and date 
of	effectiveness	(upon	signature	of	respective	Ministers	of	Water	Resources).
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Case 5.4: The Lingmutey Chu Watershed Management Bylaws in Bhutan
The Lingmutey Chu Watershed Management Bylaws were developed following an MSP amongst farmers of 
seven villages in the watershed that used role-playing games to explore optimal and equitable means to share 
irrigation water (see Case 3.7 in Chapter 3). The bylaws, which were signed by representatives of all villages 
following their finalization and approval in a village meeting, pledge all residents of the watershed to work 
collectively to manage the watershed resources for the benefit of present and future generations. They further 
establish the Lingmutey Chu Watershed Management Committee and articulate the composition, responsibili-
ties and specific operating procedures of the committee (such as frequency of meetings, basis for decision 
making, election of committee members, penalties for non-compliance, etc.).
“NOT ALL MSPs LEAD TO A FORMAL WRITTEN AGREEMENT… IT IS 
STILL IMPORTANT TO CAPTURE THE RESULTS OF MSPs IN ORDER 
TO INFLUENCE OTHER DECISION MAKERS”
Not all MSPs lead to a formal written agreement that encompasses all the elements listed above. 
However, it is still important to capture the results of MSPs in order to influence other decision mak-
ers. The content of such ‘agreements’ should include the issues discussed, options generated and 
recommendations for action. Parties should sign the agreement to clearly indicate their endorsement 
of its content.
Photo 5.1 Bhutanese villagers using a role-playing game to negotiate the allocation of irrigation water among 
seven villages in the Lingmutey Chu watershed (Bhutan).
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5.4.3 How to finalize an agreement
Finalizing an agreement includes the following steps: 
•	 Drafting
•	 Verification	
•	 Endorsement
•	 Enactment	
“ONCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE CONCLUDED, THE ISSUES AND
DECISIONS NEED TO BE CAPTURED IN A WRITTEN TEXT”
Once negotiations have concluded, the issues and decisions need to be captured in a written text. 
Drafting is usually done by a core group of people selected by all participants.
All stakeholders must check the text and verify that it accurately and adequately captures the 
scope and depth of the decisions taken. This may require returning to and consulting with their con-
stituencies. Concerns need be clarified through further deliberation amongst the group and amend-
ments made accordingly. This is not the time to introduce new items, but to ensure the text is clear 
and is acceptable to all parties. For provisions where there is not full consensus, parties may specify 
their reservations, as in Case 5.5.
Case 5.5: Noting reservations in agreements
The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) 
was a multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary examination of the role of agricultural knowledge, science 
and technology in reducing hunger and poverty, improving rural livelihoods and facilitating environmentally, 
socially and economically sustainable development. The findings and options from the global and regional 
assessments were discussed at an intergovernmental meeting in April 2008. The Global Summary for Decision 
Makers was approved in its entirety by 57 States, whereas three countries approved the opening statement 
but did not endorse the entire report. Their reservations on the full report together with reservations by all 
countries on specific passages are included in an Annex to the report.
The negotiating parties sign the text thereby indicating their endorsement and willingness to 
abide by its content. This is the last step in finalizing agreements where the negotiating parties have 
the authority and responsibility for implementation. 
“ALL STAKEHOLDERS MUST CHECK THE TEXT”
For agreements where authority rests outside of the negotiating table, such as international 
agreements or national laws, a further enactment step is required.
Many global agreements require ratification to come into effect. In general, once an interna-
tional treaty has been negotiated, States sign as an indication of their agreement and their intent 
to be bound by the treaty. States are not legally bound until the treaty enters into force and they 
have ratified the agreement. Treaties typically provide provisions for when they will come into force, 
through dates and/or numbers of States required to ratify or accept it. The ratification (or other 
acceptance, approval or accession process) is a State’s official means of indicating its readiness to be 
bound by the treaty. 
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National and sub-national policy and law are also typically enacted by relevant State authorities. 
This can involve review and approval at various levels such as department, ministerial and parliamen-
tary committees. 
Some agreements are developed and signed by multiple State and non-State actors yet require 
official State approval to come into force. The KYB Water Charter in Nigeria, for example, was devel-
oped through a multi-stakeholder negotiation involving the governments of the six Nigerian riparian 
States, fishers, pastoralists, irrigators, traditional authorities and other community-based organiza-
tions as well as academia, professional bodies and other members of civil society. The draft Charter 
was publicly read, debated, amended and finally validated in a February 2007 multi-stakeholder 
forum. The Water Charter will come into effect once it has been endorsed as a legal document by 
the leaders of the six Nigerian riparian States.
Other agreements may be developed and signed by a small group of actors and are open to fur-
ther endorsement by additional actors. Endorsement of the Equator Principles, for example, is done 
by individual financial institutions that do not sign the agreement per se, but formally declare they 
agree to abide by them.
5.5 Acting on the agreement – implementation and influence
Constructive engagement leads to many outcomes. Some processes lead to negotiated formal 
agreements. Effectively implementing these agreements is the next step in contributing to fairer and 
more effective water allocation, use and management.
Other MSPs aim to influence the decisions taken by other actors. Stakeholders may agree on a set 
of issues or actions that they would like to see a national policy enact, or a transnational actor abide 
by. The content of such recommendations is still a negotiated agreement that needs to be signed, 
but acting on these agreements requires developing strategies to translate recommendations into 
influence.
Constructive engagement can also strengthen relationships, build understanding and options, 
and demonstrate effective processes. Water actors should consider how to maintain and build on 
these relationships, and encourage the adoption of more multi-stakeholder and deliberative pro-
cesses in decision making and more broadly in governance.
“WATER ACTORS SHOULD CONSIDER HOW TO ENCOURAGE THE 
ADOPTION OF MORE MULTI-STAKEHOLDER AND DELIBERATIVE 
PROCESSES IN DECISION MAKING”
5.5.1 Implementing the agreement
For negotiations that lead to a formal agreement, attention then turns to steps needed for it to 
be effectively implemented.
Key considerations include:
•	 Communication	of	the	content	of	the	agreement	to	signatory	constituencies	(especially	on	the	
4Rs of rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities).
•	 Putting	 in	 place	 institutional	 arrangements	 for	 implementation	 –	 technical	 and	 financial	
resources, planning and monitoring processes, management structures.
•	 Building	capacity	of	implementers	as	required	(individuals	and	institutions).
•	 Taking	action	according	to	agreed	responsibilities.
•	 Developing	a	monitoring	strategy	with	agreed-upon	indicators	of	success	(impact,	effectiveness, 
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efficiency). Joint monitoring approaches are recommended to encourage reflection and learn-
ing.
•	 Celebrating	successes	and	rewarding	achievements;	make	changes	as	needed.
•	 Establishing	mechanisms	to	raise	and	resolve	emerging	issues	and	deal	with	non-compliance.
•	 Maintaining	and	possibly	expanding	the	constituency	–	continuing	to	communicate	with	all	
stakeholders and to a broader audience, and engaging with specific actors.
Key aspects of effective implementation are the mechanisms established to bring parties togeth-
er to monitor progress, learn from implementation and adapt as necessary. It is important to clarify 
who has responsibility for overseeing implementation, whether this is an existing organization or a 
body formed from representatives of participating stakeholders.
5.5.2 Influencing decisions that affect water
For MSPs that aim to influence the decisions taken by other actors, a different approach is 
required to see recommendations translated into influence.
Developing a communication and influence plan involves considering the following:
•	 Who	will	be	influenced?	Identify	decision	makers	who	are	most	willing	and	able	to	take	the	
recommendations forward to effect change.
•	 How	will	the	message	be	communicated?	Recommendations	could	be	summarized	in	a	brief	
document, presented in a detailed written report or shared through a verbal presentation. 
They can be shared formally or informally.
•	 What	 are	 the	opportunities	 for	 influence?	 There	may	be	 events	 that	 can	be	used	 to	bring	
attention to the issue, or individuals who can effectively access decision makers.
•	 How	can	broader	constituency	be	fostered?	Various	channels	can	be	used	to	raise	awareness	
about the issues, such as media, meetings, websites, newsletters, etc.
•	 How	 can	 coalitions	 be	 built?	 Partnerships	 can	 be	 formed	with	 other	 like-minded	 actors	 or	
groups.
•	 What	support	is	needed?	Put	in	place	institutional	arrangements	for	implementing	the	advo-
cacy or influence strategy including technical and financial resources. Build capacity of imple-
menters as required (individuals and institutions) in communication, advocacy, etc.
A key element of the strategy used by the Gomukh Trust in Case 5.6 in southern India, for 
example, was to bring district and State decision makers to see the concrete benefits of locally appro-
priate catchment management strategies prior to establishing MSPs to discuss alternatives to basin 
management. They also built local capacity and confidence to engage in water planning, and paid 
particular attention to groups typically marginalized during decision-making processes, such as the 
poor and women. Building the capacity of women to organize as well as gain technical skills was also 
emphasized in another case from India as a precursor to strengthening women’s ability to negotiate 
a more equitable role in water management. 
Case 5.6: Influencing basin policy in the Bhima River Basin, India
In	the	Bhima	River	Basin	in	southern	India,	community	organizations	and	NGOs	(including	the	Gomukh	Trust)	
have successfully influenced basin policy and programming using a locally driven negotiated approach. The 
approach is characterized by coupling demonstrations with the creation of various platforms to negotiate local 
strategies and subsequently influence basin-level planning and policy.
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The first step in the process was to create community fora to address the competing demands for water and 
explore options for more equitable and sustainable allocation and management in a severely water-stressed 
sub-catchment. The negotiations required trade-offs. Despite the potential individual gain, for example, farm-
ers in 16 villages agreed not to use deep-bore wells for irrigation in order to preserve ground water. 
The second step was to implement the selected strategies to demonstrate their viability. The interventions 
focused on locally appropriate technology and many built on traditional approaches such as restoration of 
traditional spring tanks and protection of sacred groves (forest patches with religious significance). The benefits 
were evident in a severe drought in 2003–4 when the valley was the only part of the basin to stay green.
The third step was to scale up local experience to influence water management on a basin scale. CSOs such as 
the Gomukh Trust played a facilitating role to bring parties together and help prepare community organizations 
to engage effectively. Their influence strategy included general awareness raising as well as targeted advocacy 
with district and State decision makers to show them the positive results. They also created platforms for com-
munity groups, local authorities, water ‘experts’, civil society and other stakeholders to discuss ways to improve 
watershed and basin management – a radically different approach from conventional top-down sectoral basin 
planning which may make space for technocrats but not communities. These platforms were proposed to help 
resolve conflicts, but also to discuss policy issues before conflicts arose. Through this strategy, the groups suc-
cessfully advocated for the adoption of several watershed management interventions across the State.84 
5.5.3 Influencing governance processes
MSPs and consensus building should have a specific aim or a specific agenda that they are trying 
to influence. Implementing an agreement or taking the recommendations from an MSP forward to 
influence a specific issue are therefore the most important outcomes of constructive engagement to 
change water use and management.  
However, there may also be opportunities to build upon the momentum created in the MSP 
to influence other aspects of water governance, and governance more broadly (see Case 5.7). This 
could include reflecting on the process used during the MSP or negotiation and examining ways in 
which similar constructive engagement methods could be applied in other spheres of water-related 
(or more general) decision shaping.
Participants in an MSP can encourage the on-going use of constructive engagement within their 
own or partner organizations. This should build on an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the methods used, and build capacity in negotiation or the specific tools used in MSPs (for example, 
4R analysis of rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities).
Water actors can also serve as the catalyst to encourage broader adoption of constructive 
engagement in other water-related issues or at different levels or scales. 
Case 5.7: MSPs at various levels in the Volta Basin
The Volta river basin covers 407,000 km2 and 85% is shared between Ghana and Burkina Faso. In 2007 the 
six basin countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali and Togo) signed a Convention on the Status 
of	the	Volta	River	and	the	Establishment	of	the	Volta	Basin	Authority,	a	framework	agreement	for	managing	
and conserving the resources of the basin. 
While the ratification process is underway and the Volta Basin Authority is in a formative phase, a series of 
actions	have	been	undertaken	by	a	joint	initiative	of	IUCN,	the	Directorate	of	Water	Resources	of	Burkina	Faso,	
and	the	Water	Resources	Commission	of	Ghana.	This	 intervention	not	only	adds	value	to	the	supranational	
institutional framework but builds a process in which all stakeholders, from communities up to national minis-
tries, are involved. This governance initiative is known as PAGEV (French acronym) and is characterized by the 
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mobilization of partnerships with stakeholders including ministries, local government, NGOs and civil society. 
MSPs have been established at various levels including: the creation of village committees where communities 
worked together on integrated management issues such as riverbank protection; the establishment of national 
fora (made up of villagers, local government authorities, community-based organizations and CSOs); and the 
creation of a local transboundary forum (made up of representatives from the national fora as well as minis-
tries, departments and agencies from the two countries). 
The project also facilitated the formulation and adoption of a Code of Conduct for the sustainable and equi-
table management of shared water resources of the Volta Basin, which aims at stimulating basin-wide joint 
management. Local communities have affirmed their commitment to the Code by further developing and 
signing statutes and regulations to guide their actions on transboundary water management.85 
5.5.4 Long-term change
Finalizing and acting on an agreement culminates the journey of constructive engagement and 
negotiation. Staying true to the principles and values of inclusion, fairness and deliberation will 
ensure that the product also reflects the process. Putting energy into relationships at all stages will 
strengthen the agreement being negotiated and lay the foundation for future negotiations. While 
the process may take more time up front as all stakeholders gain the capacity to effectively engage 
and represent their constituencies, a broadly supported agreement will lead to smoother implemen-
tation. There is no single perfect process or agreement; the best outcome is one where all stakehold-
ers feel their issues have been heard and their interests and options adequately considered.
The reality is that it often takes a long time to effect significant positive change in water gover-
nance and on the ground in fairer and more effective water management and use. Multi-stakeholder 
water governance is a long-term process encompassing cycles of engagement and negotiation where 
new issues arise and need to be addressed and resolved. Each negotiated agreement is significant, 
yet it is also important to build on the momentum and relationships created during multi-stakehold-
er engagement to positively influence decision-making processes and institutions in the long run.
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Box 2.2: Global water negotiation arenas
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Box 3.2: Steps used in scenario building
Box 4.1: Beware the pitfalls of adhocracy
Box 5.1: Dispute-resolution options
Case 2.1: Tensions in the Aral Sea Basin
Case 2.2: From conflict to constructive engagement in Nepal’s hydropower sector
Case 2.3: Ok Tedi Mine, Papua New Guinea – Changing the negotiating paradigm
Case 3.1: ‘Exploring Water Futures Together’ in the Mekong Region
Case 3.2: Breaking down the wall in Australia’s Cape York
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Web cases and authors
The following NEGOTIATE case studies are available in full on the IUCN water website:
www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/water/resources/toolkits/negotiate
Learning to listen – government openness to work with community members resolves decades of 
conflict over waste water treatment in Coffs Harbour, Australia
Pam Allan, Macquarie University, Australia
Negotiations for an Agreement on Sustainable Water Management in the Danube Basin
Catherine Ashcraft, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
South Florida Everglades Restoration
Catherine Ashcraft, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
Using Companion Modelling to level the playing field and influence more equitable water allocation 
in northern Thailand
Cécile Barnaud, Paris X-Nanterre University, France, Panomsak Promburom, Chiang Mai University, 
Thailand, and Guy Trébuil and François Bousquet, CIRAD, France
Using Structured Decision Making in Collaborative Planning Processes for Better Water Management 
- An Innovative Approach to Water Use Planning in British Columbia, Canada
Lee Failing and Graham Long, Compass Resource Management, Canada
A Multi-Stakeholder Platform to solve a conflict over a Water and Sanitation Project in Tiquipaya, 
Bolivia
Vladimir Cossio, Centro AGUA, UMSS, Bolivia
Experience of a process leading to integration of the actors in a watershed committee in the Cara 
Sucia-San Pedro Belén hydrographic region in the department of Ahuachapán, El Salvador
Nicolás Atilio Méndez Granados, and Maritza Guido Martínez, IUCN BASIM Project, El Salvador
Interlinking of Rivers in India: Dialogue and Negotiations by National Civil Society Committee.
Biksham Gujja, WWF International, Switzerland
Sharing Irrigation Water in Bhutan: Companion Modeling for Conflict Resolution and Promoting 
Collective Management
Tayan Raj Gurung, Aita Kumar Bhujel and Gyenbo Dorji, Renewable Natural Resources Research 
Center, Bhutan,  François Bousquet and Guy Trébuil, CIRAD, France
From “No Dams!” to “No Bad Dams!” Nepal’s Engagement with the World Commission on Dams’ 
Report.
Dipak Gyawali, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, Nepal
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How the Weak Prevailed - Nepali Activists Engaging the World Bank over Arun-3
Dipak Gyawali, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, Nepal
Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management - Umatilla County Critical Groundwater 
Areas
Todd Jarvis, Oregon State University, United States
Building Shared Understanding – Use of Role Playing Games and Computer Simulations to negotiate 
improved water management in the Republic of Kiribati
Natalie Jones, Australian National University, Australia
Strengthening Regional Consultation and Coordination of the SASS Aquifer
Kerstin Mechlem, Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster, Ireland
Negotiation Processes in Institutionalizing Grassroots Level Water Governance: Case of Self Employed 
Women’s Association, Gujarat, India
Smita Mishra Panda, Human Development Foundation, India
The Challenge of International Watercourse Negotiations in the Aral Sea Basin
Richard Kyle Paisley, University of British Columbia, Canada
Negotiating our way through Livelihoods and Ecosystems: The Bhima River Basin Experience
Vijay Paranjpye and Parineeta Dandekar, Gomukh Environmental Trust for Sustainable Development, 
India
Mekong River Basin, Agreement & Commission Case Study
George E. Radosevich, RAD International, Thailand
Tarim River Basin Case Study
George E. Radosevich, RAD International, Thailand
Integrated Water Resources Management in Four Pilot Microwatersheds in San Marcos, Guatemala
Ottoniel Rivera Mazariegos and Nora Herrera Illescas, IUCN Tacana Project, Guatemala
Ok Tedi and Fly River negotiation over compensation: Using the mutual gains approach in multi-
party negotiations
Barbara Sharp and Tim Offor, OfforSharp, Australia
Multistakeholder Platforms and Negotiation: The case of Kat River Valley Catchment Management 
Forum
Eliab Simpungwe, Limpopo Department of Agriculture, South Africa
Visioning on the future of the rivers Scheldt and Waal
Jeroen Warner,Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Komadugu Yobe Basin: A Case Study of Participatory Water Charter Development for Sustainable 
and Equitable Management of Water Resources
D. K. Yawson, H.G. Ilallah and I.J. Goldface-Irokalibe, IUCN-Komadugu Yobe Basin Project, Nigeria 
and Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria
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Glossary
A selection of terms that readers may find useful in understanding and designing negotiation 
processes.
accord – n.
an official agreement or treaty.
act – n.
a law passed formally by a parliament.
actors – n.
people at whatever level, ‘acting’ individually or collectively, taking part in any affair.
administration (water) – n.
the organization and running of a system to manage the supply, allocation, demand and care for 
water.
agreement – n.
negotiated arrangement; does not necessarily imply full satisfaction by all parties, nor unanimity on 
the reasons behind a decision, but reflects reaching an arrangement or product that is workable and 
acceptable to all.
agreement (water)
policy, law and other management arrangements that govern water-related behaviour; agreements 
(like negotiations) can be at different levels and scales, non-binding or binding (i.e., legally enforce-
able), formal or informal, verbal or written. 
allocation (water) – n.
formal and informal decision processes (and non-decisions) that alter the physical distribution of 
water, and water-related rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities.
amendment – n.
a minor improvement; agreements can and should be amended over time as circumstances change, 
and adaptation is required.
arbitrator – n.
an independent person or body officially appointed to settle a dispute.
assisted negotiation – n. 
as the number of parties and/or issues in a negotiation increases, it is often necessary to involve a 
neutral facilitator or mediator to help manage the negotiation processes of deliberation, problem 
solving, choice making, consensus seeking or optimization.
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authority – n.
the power or right to give orders and enforce obedience; or, a person or organization having official 
power; or, recognized knowledge or expertise.
bargain – v.
negotiate the terms of an agreement. Example phrase, ‘hard bargaining’, meaning pressing force-
fully for a deal in one’s favour. Hard bargaining is often associated with competitive modes of 
negotiation.
best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) 
concept developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury.86  Rather than focus on a traditional ‘bottom 
line’, they argued negotiators should know what possible outcomes are available in the absence of 
a successful negotiation. By researching and thinking creatively about the non-negotiated options, 
it is possible to have a clear measure against which any negotiated agreement can be measured. 
Knowing your BATNA strengthens your position and if you know the other side’s BATNA you have an 
even better chance of making the right decisions during a negotiation. If accepting this logic, parties 
doing better than their BATNA becomes a necessary condition for agreement.
bill – n.
draft of a proposed law presented to parliament for discussion.
breakthrough – n.
a sudden important development or success, such as a significant step forward in a negotiation which 
moves parties closer to an agreement.
charter – n.
a written constitution or description of an organization’s functions; or, a written statement of the 
rights of a specified group of people.
coalition – n.
a temporary alliance.
code – n.
a systematic collection of laws or statutes e.g., the penal code; or, a set of conventions governing 
behaviour.
competition – n.
the activity of competing against others, where to compete (v.) is to strive to gain or win something 
by defeating or establishing superiority over others.
compliance – n.
the action or fact of complying, where to comply means to act in accordance with a wish, or com-
mand, to meet specified standards, which may have been defined in one or other type of agree-
ment.
compromise – n.
an agreement reached by each side making concessions; or, an intermediate state between conflict-
ing opinions, reached by mutual concession.
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concession – n.
a thing conceded, or given up, or chosen to be left out.
conflict – n.
an incompatibility between opinions, principles, etc. Conflict is not necessarily bad, abnormal or 
dysfunctional, but rather an inherent element of human interaction. When thinking about the direc-
tions taken by society, the governance processes by which we deal with conflict are what really mat-
ter. Where there is conflict, parties may be less inclined or able to participate fully or constructively 
in negotiations until the conflict is adequately acknowledged.
consensus building – n.
the process of seeking unanimity in group decision making, through carefully managed dialogue and 
joint problem-solving negotiations. A consensus-building process may settle for a workable agree-
ment, in which participants agree on a course of action, but for different reasons, after all parties 
have had a chance to express their views and no further investment of time or effort will improve 
the agreement from anyone’s standpoint without disadvantaging others.
contract – n.
a written or spoken agreement intended to be enforceable by law.
convention – n.
an agreement between countries.
cooperation – n.
the action of cooperating, i.e., of working together towards the same end, purpose, or effect; joint 
operation.
deliberation – n.
deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well informed opinions in 
which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and 
claims made by fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of delibera-
tion, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy 
of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation.87
dialogue – n.
discussion directed towards exploration of a subject or resolution of a problem.
discourse – n.
a discourse is a shared set of concepts, categories and ideas that provides its adherents with a 
framework for making sense of situations, embodying judgements, assumptions, capabilities, disposi-
tions and intentions. It provides basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements.88 
Discourses can embody power in that they condition norms and perceptions of actors, suppressing 
some interests while advancing others. Understanding discourses will enable greater understanding 
of the behaviour of different parties in any negotiation.
dispute – n.
a disagreement. A dispute refers to a more specific issue or disagreement than a conflict, and can be 
due to a particular incident where one or more party is aggrieved. Parties may be in dispute due to 
an incident without there being any significant underlying conflict (incompatibilities, etc.).
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engage – v.
attract or involve (someone’s interest or attention); or, (engage in/with) participate or become 
involved in.
equity – n.
the quality of being fair and impartial.
ethics (in water negotiation) – n.
the moral principles governing or influencing conduct. People’s experience haggling over price in 
markets encourages many to think that it is acceptable to be untruthful in negotiations. It is common 
for negotiators to exaggerate the value of something, say that they have more attractive alterna-
tive offers, or to misrepresent information important to the negotiation. In negotiations over water 
issues, hollow threats and other dishonest devices may be used. Apart from the moral reasons for 
not being untruthful or exaggerating, there are practical reasons for being ethical. If people provide 
misleading information it is difficult to achieve outcomes that genuinely rely on what is of high 
value to one side and of low cost to the other. Also, long-term resentment can flow from dishonest 
negotiations as untruths often become evident as the negotiation progresses.
facilitate – v.
make easy or easier.
governance – n.
the action or manner of governing; the system of controlling, directing, or regulating influence; 
more than government, governance refers to the complex of processes and institutions by which 
society contests, makes and manages decisions.
governance (water) – n.
the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and 
manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society.89
hegemony – n.
dominance, especially by one State or social group over others.
high value-low cost – adj.
negotiators need to learn what is of high value to their own side and seek to claim it, and what is of 
low cost and be willing to concede it. They should also try to learn the same about the other side so 
that both sides can gain as much as possible of high value, while giving away what is of low cost.
institutions – n.
institutions are persistent, predictable arrangements, laws, processes or customs serving to structure 
political, social, cultural or economic transactions and relationships in a society. They may be informal 
or formal, and allow organized, collective efforts around common concerns.  Although persistent, 
institutions constantly evolve.90
interests – n.
interests are what underlie stated positions and provide insight into needs, wants, desires, concerns, 
hopes, fears and values. Interests may be substantive (referring to the content of the problem/issue), 
relational (about ways of relating, and of valuing the relationship) or procedural (related to how 
001-120_ARP.indd   108 17.2.2010   8:44:58
109
fair the process is, and the quality of participation and decision making).91  Interests are not just re-
worded positions. They can involve multiple layers, ranging from fulfilling basic needs to desire for 
understanding, creativity, stimulation, meaning, rationality, dignity, choice, control, autonomy and 
distributive justice (see ‘positions’).
issue – n.
an important topic for debate or resolution.
jurisdiction – n.
the territory or sphere over which the legal authority of a court or other institution extends.
law – n.
a rule or system of rules recognized by a country or community as regulating the actions of its mem-
bers and enforced by the imposition of penalties.
law (soft and hard)
soft law refers to quasi-legal instruments which do not have any legally binding force, or whose 
binding force is somewhat weaker than the binding force of traditional law, often contrasted with 
soft law by being referred to as ‘hard law’. Traditionally, the term ‘soft law’ is associated with inter-
national law, such as most resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
legislation – n.
laws collectively.
legitimate – adj.
confirming to the law or to rules; or, able to be defended with logic or justification.
litigate – v.
go to law, be a party to a lawsuit; or, take (a dispute) to a law court.
mediate – v.
try to settle a dispute between other parties.
multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) – n.
part of governance in which different stakeholders are identified, and usually through representa-
tives, invited and assisted to interact in a deliberative forum that focuses on: sharing knowledge 
and perspectives, generating and examining options, and informing and shaping negotiations and 
decisions.
mutual gains – n.
the benefits from a negotiation should not be proscribed by the limitations of the basic objectives 
that are evident at the outset. Negotiators should seek ways of expanding the pie for the benefit of 
both (or all) parties. Such creative thinking can lead to mutual gains. The classic example is the story 
of the two sisters negotiating over how to divide an orange. Cutting it in half would give each the 
minimum benefit, but when the two girls question each other about the use to which the orange 
will be put, they discover that one needs the inside to make orange juice and the other needs the 
peel to make marmalade, with the result that they can both gain the full use of the orange for their 
respective purposes.
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negotiation – n.
a process of interaction by which two or more parties, with differences to be reconciled or choices to 
be made, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they might do by acting individually; 
the main aim of negotiation is to reach a workable, acceptable agreement to all parties.92 This is the 
definition included in Chapter 1.
neutral – n.
an impartial or unbiased state or person.
neutral (in water negotiations)
a person/organization deemed acceptable by all key parties to assist constructive negotiations move 
forward by acting as an intermediary; an independent who needs to have high-quality negotiation 
skills. Whilst all actors have views and biases, a person/organization engaged as a neutral must put 
aside their own biases and focus on supporting all negotiating parties. However, the neutral should 
declare and maintain their own process bias, such as their own commitment to unforced consensus 
seeking.
non-decisions – n.
decisions consciously avoided or ‘not taken’, either because they are too difficult, or perhaps because 
leaving something vague or ambiguous provides advantage to one or other party.
paradigms – n.
the fundamental orienting philosophies underpinning the ways we perceive, understand and inter-
pret things, and thus informing our attitudes and behaviours. Often these can limit us from accept-
ing alternatives or new ways.
paradigm shift – n.
a significant shift in our paradigm, such that not only do aspects we thought inconceivable all of a 
sudden appear possible, but often the ‘impossible’ becomes ‘the obvious’.
Pareto plus principle – n.
a negotiation principle which holds that if proposing a new project or development, not only should 
no-one be made worse off, but all potentially disadvantaged peoples are made absolutely better off.
party – n.
a person or group forming one side in an agreement or dispute or negotiation.
plan – n.
a detailed proposal for doing or achieving something; or, an intention or decision about what one 
is going to do.
policy – n.
a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an organization or individual.
positions – n.
specifically stated solutions (or offers) to a problem or situation. They describe what is wanted or 
sought. A position may be presented as if there is no other viable option, and can appear to be a 
party’s main aim or goal (see ‘interests’).
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power – n.
the ability to do something or act in a particular way; or, the capacity to influence other people or 
the course of events; or, a right or authority given or delegated to a person or body; or, political 
authority or control.
procedure – n.
an established or official way of doing something.
protocol – n.
the official procedure or system of rules governing affairs of State or diplomatic occasions; or, the 
accepted code of behaviour in a particular situation.
ratify – v.
give formal consent to; make officially valid.
regulation – n.
a rule or directive made and maintained by an authority.
responsibility – n.
the state or fact of being responsible; or, the opportunity or ability to act independently and take 
decisions without authorization; or, a thing which one is required to do as part of a job, role or legal 
obligation.
reward – n.
a fair return for good or bad behaviour; v. (to be rewarded) receive what one deserves.
right – n.
justifiable claim, or legal or moral grounds, to have or obtain something, or to act in a certain way.
risk – n.
exposure to danger or loss.
rule – n.
a regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular sphere
social learning – n.
social learning has been described as ‘the interactive way of getting things done in theatres with 
actors who are interdependent with respect to some contested natural resource or ecological service. 
The interactive way of getting things done is based on conflict resolution, negotiated agreement, 
shared learning, convergence of goals, theories, and systems of monitoring, and concerted action’.93 
They are more than just participatory exercises, but, facilitated participation does play a key role. 
Building blocks of social learning are: the constructivist paradigm, an orientation towards reflection 
and action, and a commitment to try and take a systemic or holistic approach.94 
stakeholder – n.
a person with an interest or concern in something.
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stalemate – n.
a situation in which further progress by opposing parties seems impossible; an impasse.
statute – n.
a written law passed by a legislative body; or, a rule of an organization or institution.
strategy – n.
a plan designed to achieve a particular long-term aim.
subsidiarity – n.
the principle that a central authority should perform only those tasks which cannot be performed 
at a more local level.
sustainable – adj.
of, relating to, or designating forms of human economic activity and culture that do not lead to 
environmental degradation, especially avoiding the long-term depletion of natural resources.
trade-off – n.
a balance achieved between two desirable but incompatible features; a compromise.
transboundary waters – n.
waters that flow across a boundary, for example, a border between states or provinces or local juris-
dictions; the sharing of transboundary waters, as with any other waters, is best negotiated.
treaty – n.
a formally concluded and ratified agreement between States.
vision – n.
the ability to think about the future with imagination or wisdom; or, a mental image of what the 
future will or could be like.
Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA)
the BATNAs (Best Alternatives To a Negotiated Agreement) of all parties define a zone of possible 
agreement. The wider the ZOPA, the more possibilities for negotiating a workable agreement.
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Negotiate – Reaching agreements over water
Water practitioners are increasingly called upon to negotiate workable agreements about how to best 
use, manage and care for water resources. NEGOTIATE makes the case for constructive engagement 
and cooperative forms of negotiation in dealing with complex water issues. It unpacks constructive 
approaches such as Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) and consensus building, and finally focuses 
on the diversity of agreements which can be produced to regulate or encourage fairer and more 
effective water allocation and use.
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rivers back to life and maintaining the resource base for many.
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